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Abstract
This thesis discusses how Coleridge develops his trinitarianism, 'God1 'man1, and 
'nature', in response to modern philosophies since Descartes, especially to Kant's 
phenomenology, and how he finally forms the 'Pentad' in 1825. It will have seven 
chapters. The first chapter discusses his two unexecuted plans, 'the hymns to the 
elements' (1796) and 'Soother of Absence' (1802-10 ). It investigates how he 
comes to think that the hymn, or, the praise of the divine presence in nature, is the 
original and ideal form of poetry, and how he falls behind his ideal and replaces the 
first plan with the second. The purpose of the chapter is to show how his experience 
as a poet prepares the ground of his later philosophy and theology. The second 
chapter interprets 'The Ancient Mariner' (1798) as a poem about the departure 
from created nature to uncreated ocean, as an autobiographical poem about 
Coleridge's own yearning for 'something one & indivisible' which leads him to 
recognize that nature has turned 'ideot', that he has fallen from divine nature. The 
third chapter shows how in 'Dejection Ode' (1802) he contrasts his 'dejection' with 
'Joy' and acknowledges his failure as a poet of nature. It also discusses his attempted 
recovery from 'Reality's dark dream' by the 'Phantom' creativity of the active 
human mind illustrated in 'Apologia pro Vita sua' (1800). The fourth chapter 
concentrates on his days in Malta 1804-5. The first half shows how he experiences 
difficulty in distinguishing the product of 'the Phantom creativity' from 'Reality's 
dark dream', and how he shifts the problem to an ethical ground, and finds Kant's 
ethics insufficient for his problem. The second half shows how he begins to form his 
'trinitarianism' under such circumstances and to use the term 'symbol' in relating 
God and man. The first half of the fifth chapter deals with his ontological speculation 
on 'space' and shows that it leads him to adopt Leibnizian 'Hypopoeesis', contrasted 
with Newtonian 'Hypothesis', as an advanced form of 'the Phantom creativity' of the 
human mind. The second half interprets his 'Confessio Fidei' (1810) as his attempt
to accept and to rewrite Kant's ethics in theological terms in order to deal with 'an 
original corruption in our nature'. The sixth chapter argues that his theory of 
imagination in Biographia Literaria  (1817 ) is his response to Kant's 
phenomenology which draws on his own long-standing speculation on the passivity 
and activity of the human mind, and that he leads his argument towards 'art' and 
hints at the 'artistic' recovery of human nature. The final chapter deals with the 
metaphysical and theological recapitulations of his theory of imagination in the Logic 
(1823-9), and in Aids to Reflection (1825), and shows, as a conclusion, that by 
forming the Pentad he anchors the whole of his philosophical and theological 
argument on the mediatory function of 'the spirit, or, 'Mesothesis' of the Pentad.
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Introduction
A reader of Coleridge soon discovers that a small fragmentary piece may carry the 
whole weight of his philosophy and theology. In his major works, Coleridge both 
confesses and inquires, and produces a large mosaic of the accounts of his personal 
life organized by his philosophical and theological endeavour to make sense of them. 
And he is even so in a small fragment. He often reveals the essence of his thinking in 
a drafted poem of just one stanza, a Notebook entry of a few lines or a brief aphorism 
in a letter. 'Phantom or Fact: A Dialogue in Verse', probably of 1830,1 is such a 
typically Coleridgean small piece. The 'AUTFIOR' presents his brief autobiographical 
account in the first stanza, and the 'FRIEND' asks about 'This riddling tale' in the 
second stanza. Then the 'AUTFIOR' concludes the poem:
Call it a moment's work (and such it seems)
This tale's a fragment from the life of dreams;
But say, that years matur'd the silent strife,
And 'tis a record from the dream of life.
'Phantom or Fact' is a philosophical and, in Coleridge's case, a theological question. 
But first of all it is a personal question which imposes on him the choice between his 
miserable 'life' and his bright 'dream'. He cannot make this choice since it is either 
to confine himself in the lightless 'life' or to deceive himself in the bright but untrue 
'dream'. All his philosophy and theology is an effort to avoid such a choice and 
proceed from 'Phantom or Fact1 to 'Phantom and Fact'. However, 'phantom and fact' 
is not a stable distinction. In fact it only indicates that one is 'the phantom' of the 
other. It even suggests that the two are interchangeable. Therefore, being forced to
1 Poems, p. 354.
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choose 'Phantom or Fact1 inevitably results in turning round their 
interchangeability. One can break this circularity only by admitting 'Phantom and 
Fact'. In the end Coleridge suggests that 'phantom' and 'fact' are reconcilable, for 
once he fully acknowledges 'or', he finds 'and  also implied within 'or1 from the 
beginning.
The present thesis traces how Coleridge deals with 'Phantom and Fact', also 
referred to as 'reality and unreality' or 'the problem of two natures' in the thesis, 
and how he develops his Trinitarian resolution, 'God' 'man' and 'nature'. As he 
readily admits, he develops this particularly Coleridgean 'Trinity' largely from his 
poetical and philosophical speculations.2 Certainly, this 'Trinity' is not directly 
derived from the orthodox Christian Trinity, 'Father', 'Son', and 'Holy Ghost'. But it 
is nonetheless a theological Trinity.
[The Philosophical Trinity]
WHERE'ER I find the Good, the True, the Fair,
I ask no names—God's spirit dwelleth there!
The unconfounded, undivided Three,
Each for itself, and all in each, to see 
In man and Nature, is Philosophy.3
As he states here, he does not pay much attention to the philosophical Trinity as such. 
What is the most important to him is 'God', 'man', and 'nature' which is a theological, 
if not theologically orthodox, Trinity. It is also important that he says here God's 
'spirit'. He maintains this 'Philosophy' to the end and argues that man is an image of 
God placed in nature, or in his words, 'Man himself is a syllepsis, a compendium of
2 See BL, I, pp. 179-80, 204-5.
3 Poems, p, 324.
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Nature—the Microcosm'.4 However, he is a 'modern' theologian who develops his 
theological argument in response to modern philosophies since Descartes, most 
notably to Kant's phenomenology. Coleridge studies them, goes along with them and 
finally detects in their arguments the tendency to replace the divine 'Macrocosm' 
with the human 'Microcosm' and posit man as the subject of his own 'cosmos'. To 
them he makes a twofold, 'theological' objection. He argues that man 'cannot' replace 
'Macrocosm' with 'Microcosm', and that if he attempts it, he makes himself the 
subject of his own 'chaos', not 'cosmos'. He argues that the human subject simply 
replaces the correspondent symmetry between 'Macrocosm' and 'Microcosm' with 
asymmetry between 'divine cosmos' and 'human chaos'. The human subject becomes 
caught in the problem of two natures. The modern philosophies thus lead Coleridge to 
a starting point of his theology. He admits that he himself is such a subject and 
confesses that there is not correspondence, not even 'coincidence' between divine 
nature and his own human nature. He uses the word 'coincidence' in both 
epistemological and ethical contexts,5 and he admits that in both cases he is deprived 
of it. Here is another Coleridgean fragment, possibly from 1796:
inward desolations— 
an horror of great darkness 
great things that on the ocean 
counterfeit infinity— 6
At this point he begins a theological pursuit for a possible reconciliation between the 
original infinity and the 'counterfeit' infinity. It has to be 'theological', since he
4 TL, p. 423.
5 Coleridge writes in 'Confessio Fidei' (1810), 'all holy Will is coincident with the 
Will of God'. CN, III, 4005. In the twelfth chapter of Biographia Literaria (1817), 
he defines 'the truth' as 'the coincidence of the thought with the thing'. BL, I, p. 254.
6 CN, I, 273.
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believes that the problem lies between the original 'subject' and its 'counterfeit', 
between God and man. In Aids to Reflection (1825) he forms the Pentad and suggests 
that man may be reconciled with God, that nature may be restored somewhere in the 
middle of 'Phantom and Fact'.
If the dating of the above poem is correct, Coleridge is already aware of his 
'inward desolation' in 1796. His early poetic practice suggests that it is the case. 
The first chapter of the thesis deals with a plan, of 1796, to write 'hymns' and 
shows how he interprets the plan's failure as the mark of the Fall. It also deals with 
another plan, 'Soother of Absence' and investigates his extensive and desperate 
attempt to recover exercised under this title. The second and third chapters discuss 
his two best-known poems and shows that 'inward desolation' is the central theme of 
these poems. 'The Ancient Mariner' is a good example to see what he believes is the 
immediate result of that fall, the problem of evil. His reference to original sin at 
the time of the composition, as well as the poem itself, clearly reveals his 
particular, inherently theological attitude towards the discovery of his own 'inward 
desolations'. 'Dejection Ode' is also a clear statement of his 'inward desolations'. 
Drawing on the sharp distinction between himself and those who enjoy the inward 
joy, he most powerfully depicts his solipsistic despair which he calls in the poem 
'Reality's dark dream1.
Coleridge thus encounters the 'modern' problem as a poet. And when he does, he 
ceases to regard himself as a poet. It is therefore necessary to investigate his 
personal circumstance up to 1810 in the context of his poetic failure, and then 
follow how he develops his philosophy and theology on the basis of this experience. 
1810 seems to mark the turning point when his thinking begins to take a form close 
to systematic argument. It is the time when he, in respect to his public address, 
shifts his emphasis from poetry to literary criticism. This shift enables him to 
integrate his reading of Kant and others into discussion and develop along with this 
discussion his inherent and personal theology which he expects to explain why he
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fails as a poet and how he should seek for the recovery. The fourth chapter deals 
with the period preparatory for this development. The fifth and sixth chapters 
discuss in detail his sustained attempt to integrate his reading of Kant into his own 
personal theological argument. Finally, this attempt culminates when he forms the 
Pentad and publishes it in Aids to Reflection (1825). The thesis thus attempts to 
show how he develops his particular theology in the context of poetical and 
philosophical discussion and how he exercises his implicit theological argument 
while dealing with supposedly non-theological matters such as poetry and 
philosophy. That is, it attempts to argue that his theology originates in his 
experience as a poet and a metaphysician, and that his repeated reconsideration of 
this experience finally leads him to the formation of the Pentad. As the conclusion, 
the seventh chapter shows how he expresses his personal theology in forming the 
Pentad. He spends his last ten years relating this final form of the Coleridgean 
'Trinity' to the orthodox Christian Trinity. But the full investigation into this 
development in the still unpublished Notebooks lies outside the scope of the thesis, 
since the Pentad in 1825 is his last public statement concerning the Coleridgean 
Trinity, and he himself thinks that it is the final form of his poetical, philosophical, 
and implicitly theological argument.
Coleridge is an 'illustrative' rather than 'conceptual' thinker. His writing 
suggests that he illustrates his thought first and conceptualizes it afterwards, that he 
thinks and develops his argument by illustration rather than by systematic 
conceptualization.7 He is particularly illustrative in the early years. And he does 
not lose all the illustrative quality even when he acknowledges his failure as a poet. 
In reading Coleridge, therefore, it is crucial to let illustrations speak and respond to
7 Kant, on the contrary, takes for granted the priority of concept over illustration. 
He believes that this is the matter of style, but his philosophy as a whole seems to be 
determined by his propensity to subordinate illustration to concept, intuition to 
conceptualization. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), A XVII- 
XVIII.
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them rather than reduce them. For me to read Coleridge is to read how he 
experiences the world and how he illustrates his experience. I believe that man 
'knows* the world by basic distinctive experiences such as 'above' and 'below', 'light' 
and 'darkness', 'without' and 'within', 'passivity' and 'activity', or 'Fact' and 
'Phantom'; that his primary experience is to discover that there is a point of 
distinction which divides 'above' from 'below' and so on. I believe that complex 
philosophies and elaborate theologies are originally derived from these basic 
experiences, eloquently demonstrating the possibility of their infinite variations and 
combinations. Coleridge tends to think that the first distinction is between God and 
man, and, consequently, that those other distinctions are derivative of this first 
distinction. Therefore, whenever he speaks about the distinctions he is implicitly 
theological; and he is particularly so when he argues that the point of distinction is 
also the point of reconciliation. The thesis is an attempt to 'decipher' his vast and 
notoriously complex writing by these basic distinctions and detect when and how he 
adopts theological language in an essentially poetical and philosophical argument.
I employ many, sometimes lengthy quotations from Coleridge in an attempt to 
avoid arbitrarily conceptualizing his illustrations and to see if they in themselves 
lead to a coherent argument. The use of secondary sources is limited to a minimum 
for the same reason. Quoting from Coleridge I pay little attention to whether the 
work is verse or prose, public or private, published or unpublished. For I think 
Coleridge is essentially the same thinker in each work irrespective of genre, scale 
or circumstance.
In transcribing Coleridge's texts, all the spellings, punctuations and errors are 
kept as the editors reproduce them. Translations of Coleridge's foreign texts, if not 
noted otherwise, are the ones provided by the editors of the works. Other 
translations are either specified in footnotes or, in a few occasions where published 
translations are either unavailable or unsuitable for the discussion, my own.
Chapter 1 'Hymn of Joy1 and 'Soother of Absence'
I. Coleridge shares with his contemporaries the romantic belief that the child is a 
poet of nature. What is also true of him is that the belief is always accompanied with 
his pessimistic acknowledgment that he himself is no longer a child or a poet. He 
certainly yearns after that romantic ideal, but he always admits that he can no 
longer embody that ideal. For example, he writes to Southey on 28 September 1802 
of his children playing in the fields and says it is 'as pretty a sight as a Father's eyes 
could well see':
Hartley & little Derwent running in the Green, where the Gusts blow most 
madly—both with their Hair floating & tossing, a miniature of the agitated Trees 
below which they were playing/inebriate both with the pleasure—Hartley 
whirling round for joy—Derwent eddying half willingly, half by the force of the 
Gust—driven backward, struggling forward, & shouting his little hymn of Joy.1
He characteristically idealizes children as natural hymn-singers and sees in them 
the unity of what is contradictory in man. A child naturally unites activity and 
passivity, or, a move forward and backward. And it is from such a union that the 
'little hymn of Joy' flows. However, 'a Father's eyes' see not only the joy of his 
children but also his own misery. September 1802 is the time when Coleridge 
publicly acknowledges that the hymn of joy no longer flows from him. A week 
following this letter 'Dejection Ode' appears in the Morning Post, in which he draws 
a sharp contrast between children's hymn of joy and his own moaning of deprivation, 
between what he once was and what he now is. However, he is not an ironist. He 
certainly accepts that his lingering hope to be a hymn-singer in nature and his
1 CL, II, p. 872.
16
acknowledged failure create an ironical situation. Yet he is free from irony in the 
sense that he takes the problem seriously and sincerely seeks for the solution.2
Coleridge expresses a similar view about idealized child two years before. He 
writes Godwin on 22 September 1800:
I look at my doted-on Hartley—he moves, he lives, he finds impulses from within 
& from without—he is the darling of the Sun and of the Breeze! Nature seems to 
bless him as a thing of her own! He looks at the clouds, the mountains the living 
Beings of the Earth, & vaults & jubilates!3
This is the letter in which he expresses his doubt about the baptism of his son 
Hartley. He confesses his bitter contempt to human 'follies' and argues that a blessed 
child of nature does not need any artificial measure to receive blessings. In spite of 
or probably because of his 'moody philosophy' he earnestly idealizes his child. He 
says of his son that in nature 'he moves, he lives' and mediates 'impulses from 
within and from without'. This passage clearly resonates with Acts 17: 28, 'For in 
him we live, and move, and have our being'. And the resonance in return reveals a 
characteristically Coleridgean modification of this biblical passage.4 His son is in 
nature, and therefore, Coleridge implies, in God. Moreover, in the place of 'we have 
our being', he says his son 'finds impulses from within and from without1, that is, he 
participates in nature actively as well as passively. By such participation he 
remains Nature's blessed son, 'a thing of her own'.5
2 For example, in spite of its pessimistic overtone, Coleridge manages to put an 
optimistic ending to 'Dejection Ode'. See Chapter 3.
3 CL, I, p 625.
4 For other occasions in which Coleridge quotes this biblical passage, see below.
5 It should be noted here that Coleridge's speculation on passivity and activity of 
man originates in his observation of 'a child of nature'. When he finds that passivity 
and activity form a paradox in himself, he recognizes that he is no longer 'a child of 
nature'. This personal crisis is the basis of his philosophy and theology. The search
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The scene of this 'hymn of Joy' seems to be so vivid that it causes some 
retrospection in Coleridge. In 1798 he made a long list entitled 'Infancy & Infants' 
in the Notebook.6 In September 1802 he adds the 'hymn of Joy' to the list with only 
slight modifications. The fourteenth entry of the list now reads:
14. The wisdom & graciousness of God in the infancy of the human species—its 
beauty, long continuance &c &c. <Children in the wind—hair floating, tossing, a 
miniature of the agitated Trees, below which they play'd—the elder whirling for 
joy, the one in petticoats, a fat Baby, eddying half willingly, half by the force of 
the Gust—driven backward, struggling forward—both drunk with the pleasure, 
both shouting their hymn of Joy.>
Characteristic of a romantic poet, his retrospection reaches much farther than his 
childhood. As in the above entry, it takes him back to his own infancy and 
subsequently to the 'the infancy of the human species'. Here retrospection is 
combined with idealization, and 'poet' becomes the idea not only of what he once was 
but also of what man in the beginning was. George Dekker argues that Robert Lowth's 
Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews (1753) has a decisive influence on 
romantic retrospection of this sort.7 Dekker shows how Lowth idealizes the Psalms, 
the Hebrew ode, as the oldest kind of poetry and quotes from him, 'the origin of the 
ode may be traced into that of poetry itself, and appears to be coeval with the 
commencement of religion, or more properly the creation of man'.8 The first hymn,
for the mediation of passivity and activity thus becomes the starting point of his 
speculation.
6 CN, I, 330.
7 George Dekker, Coleridge and the Literature of Sensibility (London, 1978) pp. 
219 -20 .
8 Ibid., p. 219. Dekker quotes from Robert Lowth, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of 
the Hebrews (1753) vol. II, p. 192.
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that is, Adam's hymn, is described by Lowth as 'an effusion of praise to his Great 
Creator, accompanied with a suitable energy and exultation of voice'.9
'Hymn' understood by Lowth is Adam's 'spontaneous overflow' of praise. 
Coleridge borrows Lowth's book from the Bristol Library in September 1796.10 In 
the same year, though probably earlier, he plans to write 'Hymns to the Sun, the 
Moon, and the Elements—six hymns ... In the last Hymn a sublime enumeration of all 
the charms or Tremendities of Nature'.11 He is obviously high-spirited, and his 
exulted voice in announcing the plan is not unlike that of Lowth. According to Charles 
Lamb's correspondence with Coleridge between 1796-7, Coleridge works on the plan 
for sometime.12 However, although Lamb encourages its progress and Coleridge 
makes some preparatory notes in the Notebook, the plan remains largely unexecuted. 
Since then, the plan receives specific attention three times, each at a different stage 
of his life. In a letter to Southey on 29 July 1802 when preparing a volume on 
Christ's divinity which too is abandoned, he says, 'This is no mere Dream, like my 
Hymns to the Elements/for I have written more than half the work1.12 But these 
hymns are daring ones. On 25 September 1816, he lists the plan as the first of the 
three projected works. He says, 'Seven Hymns with a large preface or prose 
commentary to each— 1. to the Sun. 2. Moon. 3. Earth. 4. Air. 5. Water. 6. Fire. 7.
9 Ibid. Dekker quotes from Lowth, ibid., p. 190. It seems to be the case in Lowth 
that when he draws on the Ninety-sixth and Ninety-eighth Psalms and argues that 
the praise of the creation is the original form of poetry, the Psalms' destructive 
elements and their apocalyptic ending are forgotten and buried in the exultation of 
romantic optimism. Coleridge, however, is alien to this sort of optimism even in his 
earliest days. It attracts him, but in his case the very attraction forces him to 
remain aware of the dark side of the creation.
10 George Whalley, 'The Bristol Library Borrowings of Southey and Coleridge, 
1793-8', The Library, IV (1949) 114-31, p. 123.
11 CN, I, 174: 16. Quoted in full and discussed in relation to 'The Ancient Mariner' 
in Chapter 2, I.
12 Charles and Mary Lamb, The Letters of Charles Lamb to which are added those of 
his sister Mary Lamb, ed. E. V. Lucas, 3 vols (London, 1935) I, p. 27, 52, 94. See 
also John Livingston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu: A Study in the Ways of the 
Imagination (London, 1927) pp. 74-92.
12 CL, II, p. 829.
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God.'14 As late as on 30 March 1820, he mentions the still unwritten hymns 
’entitled Spirit, Sun, Earth, Air, Water, Fire, and Man’, remembering ’the proud 
times when I planned’.15 It should be noticed that in these recollections he gradually 
adds ’God1, ’Spirit’ and ’Man1 to the plan. While the reason of this addition can only be 
guessed at, the addition itself is highly significant. It is so if he is consciously 
expanding the plan or even if he is remembering it merely incorrectly after twenty- 
five years. For Coleridge's own lifelong problem concerning 'God1, 'Spirit' and 'Man' 
emerges as early as 'the proud time' when he plans them, and this problem may be 
the reason why he cannot execute the plan.
The truth is that Coleridge does not have the lived experience of 'the proud time' 
even in his youth which would enable him to execute the plan. In 1796 he publishes 
thirty-three 'Effusions' with other compositions, but the overall tone is so far from 
exulting that they have little to do with the romantic view of poetry. In 1797 he 
reworks the plan and writes 'The Ancient Mariner', but the poem is essentially of 
man and not of the elements. But while his poetic exercise remains distanced from 
the idea of Adam's hymn, the idea itself grasps him firmly. That is, he begins to 
present himself as a hymn-singer. As a result, he writes, apart from the abandoned 
plan, 'Hymn to the Earth [IMITATED FROM STORBERG'S 'HYMN AN DIE ERDE’] ’ (1799), 
'Hymn Before Sun-Rise, in the Vale of Chamouni' (1802), and 'A Hymn' (1814). 
Yet, as will be seen below, none of them are genuine hymn. It is obvious that poetics 
of this kind are alien to his own creativity, and that when he applies it to himself the 
result is certainly less than successful.
At this point Coleridge makes a peculiar decision, of which the level of impact he 
receives from the romantic poetics seems to be the only possible explanation. What 
he does when he realizes that he cannot sing Adam's hymn is to retain the misapplied 
poetics and abandon his own poetic creativity. He begins to formulate his poetics on
14 CL, IV, p. 687.
15 CL, V, p. 28.
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the line of the romantic view of Adam's hymn from which he as a poet is essentially 
alien, and at the same time he begins to praise more than anything else a poet who 
can fulfil his poetics, Wordsworth, as the closest example. Coleridge writes on 19 
December 1800:
Wordsworth & I have never resided together—he lives at Grasmere, a place 
worthy of him, & of which he is worthy—and neither to Man nor Place can higher 
praise be given ... As to our literary occupations they are still more distant than 
our residences—He is a great, a true Poet—I am only a kind of a Metaphysician.16
Coleridge simply repeats his acknowledgment that his 'poetry' is astray. It is always 
'a true Poet', such as his children or Wordsworth, who reminds him that he is not a 
poet. In a letter to Godwin on 25 March 1801, he presents himself as a dying poet 
and leaves the account of his own life, 'Wordsworth descended on him, like the rv<o0i 
cjeavrov from Heaven; by shewing to him what true Poetry was, he made him know, 
that he himself was no Poet.' Coleridge's description of a dead poet in the letter 
clearly articulates what he believes a poet should be:
The poet is dead in me—my imagination (or rather the Somewhat that had been 
imaginative) lies, like a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass Candle-stick, 
without even a stink of Tallow to remind you that it was once cloathed & mitred 
with Flame. That is past by!—I was once a Volume of Gold Leaf, rising & riding on 
every breath of Fancy—but I have beaten myself back into weight & density, & 
now I sink in quicksilver, yea, remain squat and square on the earth amid the
16 CL, I, p. 658. Coleridge's ambivalent attitude towards metaphysics, along with 
his oscillating attitude towards himself as a poet of nature, will be discussed in the 
next Chapter.
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hurricane, that makes Oaks and Straws join in one Dance, fifty yards high in the 
Element.17
The dead poet is alienated from the presence of God in nature. He is fundamentally 
deprived of receiving any inspiration from nature at all. As a result, his creativity 
becomes like an extinct candle. With this recognition, however, he begins to seek for 
recovery from 'death1 and formulate his poetics in this direction. His poetic exercise 
thus begins to assume the slight suggestion that it is a remedial exercise.
II. Coleridge's letter to William Sotheby on 10 September 1 8 0 2 18 is a crucial 
document to see the development of his new poetics and its result. Here he presents 
his poetics as directly opposed to his early poetic exercises such as 'Effusions' 
(1796). In the letter the discussion begins with criticizing Bowles, from whom the 
epigraph of 'Effusions' was taken and to whom the first 'Effusion' was dedicated. The 
epigraph was:
Content, as random Fancies might inspire,
If his weak harp at times or lonely lyre 
He struck with desultory hand, and drew 
Some soften'd tones to Nature not untrue.
Bowles18
Coleridge now criticizes Bowles’ 'faintness of Impression'. Obviously, he is no 
longer 'content' with Bowles’ 'Fancies', with 'Some soften'd tones to Nature not 
untrue'. He argues in the letter, 'Nature has her proper interest; & he will know
17 CL, li, p. 714.
18 CL, II, p. 864.
19 Poems, p. 35.
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what it is, who believes & feels, that every Thing has a Life of it’s own, & that we are 
all one Life.' What he has in mind is the idea of the romantic poetry which he 
ascribes to his children, Wordsworth or Adam. He restates his view in the letter in 
more explicit terms: ’In the Hebrew Poets each Thing has a Life of it's own, & yet 
they are all one Life. In God they move & live, & have their Being'.20 With this 
romanticized poetics he lays criticism on almost everything around him. Bowles' 
works, he says, ’are "Sermoni propiora" which I once translated—"Proper for a 
Sermon'", but not for a hymn. In Greek religious poems 'All natural Objects were 
dead—mere hollow Statues—In the Hebrew Poetry you find nothing of this poor 
Stuff—as poor in genuine Imagination, as it is mean in Intellect'. To Deism he says 
'In God they [natural Objects] move & live, & have their Being—not had, as the cold 
System of Newtonian Theology represents/but have.' The key concept of this poetics 
is the unity between the poet and nature. It argues that there should be no 
discrepancy between the poet's being in nature and his act. As 'hymn of Joy' comes 
out from a child's 'eddying half willingly, half by the force of the Gust', a hymn 
requires unity between the poet's being in nature and his creative act. Coleridge 
argues in one breath 'that everything has a Life of its own' and 'that we are all one 
Life'. 'Everything' certainly includes the poet. He has to have a life of his own and 
also remain within 'one Life'. For that purpose, 'A Poet's Heart and Intellect should 
be combined, intimately combined & unified, with the great appearances in Nature' 
as in Wordsworth, and 'not merely held in solution & loose mixture with them, in 
the shape of formal Similes' as in Bowles and Coleridge himself. The latter have 
'Fancy, or aggregating Faculty of the mind' but lack 'Imagination, or the modifying,
20 This passage is from Acts 17: 28. It should be noted that Coleridge applies this 
passage, originally said of man, to the whole nature. See above. He often quotes this 
with characteristic modifications. See Chapter 5, I, Chapter 7, I.
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and co-adunating Faculty1. They have ‘the sensibility of a poet1 but w a n t1native 
Passion'.21
Coleridge's next step is to apply this poetics to himself. He exemplifies his 
confidence in it by quoting from his ’To Matilda Betham from a Stranger' (1802):
Poetic Feelings, like the flexuous Boughs 
Of mighty Oaks, yield homage to the Gale,
Toss in the strong winds, drive before the Gust, 
Themselves one giddy storm of fluttering Leaves; 
Yet all the while, self-limited, remain 
Equally near the fix'd and parent Trunk
21 Later, Coleridge develops the statement 'every Thing has a Life of it's own, & that 
we are all one Life1 into 'the principle of individuation' in Theory of Life. He writes, 
'I define life as the principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given all 
into a whole that is presupposed by all its parts.' TL, p. 385. He also calls it 'the 
principle of unity in multeity', that is, the principle which brings resolution to the 
problem of one and many. It also solves the problem of passivity and activity, or, of 
'ab extra' and 'ab intra'. In the eleventh Philosophical Lecture he explain the 
principle by ascribing it to Giordano Bruno and adopting what appears to be the 
Leibnizian argument of 'Monad'. He says, 'there is throughout all nature an aptitude 
implanted that all things may be <related> to each and to all, for everything that 
exists in some time strives to be always, everything that perceives anywhere 
strives to perceive everywhere, and to become that universally whatever it has as an 
individual; in short each part of nature contains in itself a germ of the 
omnipresence, inasmuch as it still strives to be the whole, and what it cannot 
possess at any one moment it attempts to possess by a perpetual succession of 
development.' Phil Lects, p. 326. For his adoption of Leibnizian argument, see 
below and Chapter 7, 111. The principle of individuation involves 'the polar logic’, 
which becomes the basis of the formation of the Pentad. He writes, ’polarity, or the 
essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its productive unity, and still tending to 
reaffirm it, either as equilibrium, indifference, or identity ... Life, then, we 
consider as the copula, or the unity of thesis and antithesis, position and 
counterposition,—Life itself being the positive of both; as, on the other hand, the two 
counterpoints are the necessary conditions of the manifestations of Life.' TL, p. 393. 
For the relation of the polar logic to the Pentad, see Chapter 7, I note. This 
'manifestation' is, however, the divine self-manifestation. And Coleridge’s inherent 
anxiety that the human self-manifestation may not be included in it, or more 
precisely, his anxiety that he himself may not be included in it, denies him all the 
assurance which the above argument seems to offer. He carefully avoids this 
problem in Theory of Life. For a further discussion about the problem, see Chapter 
7. For how his attempt at defining 'Life' forces the inception of the human subject 
'I', see Chapter 3, III.
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Of Truth & Nature, in the howling Blast 
As in the Calm that stills the Aspen Grove.22
The first half describes how the poet receives 'Poetic Feelings' from nature. It is 
basically the same expression as the 'hymn of Joy' or 'The Eolian Harp' in which 'the 
gust' represents the divine presence in nature. The latter half reaffirms that poetry 
is essentially a hymn. The quotation is virtually the versification of his new poetics 
which he extensively discusses in the letter. But the latter half is strangely out of 
place. For, according to his own argument, there is no need of such reaffirmation. 
Childrens' 'hymn of joy' does not require any argumentation that it is a hymn. 
Moreover, immediacy between reception and response in the act of singing precludes 
the possibility of reaffirmation in the first place. Therefore the fact that he sees the 
need of reaffirmation indicates, probably contrary to his own intention, his 
awareness that his response to the 'Poetic Feelings' might not be as direct and 
immediate as his children's. That is, he betrays his inherent anxiety concerning his 
own status in nature.
Coleridge wrote a year and half before that 'my imagination' was in fact 'rather 
the Somewhat that had been imaginative',23 and about the same time acknowledged 
that he was 'only a kind of a Metaphysician' while Wordsworth is 'a true Poet'.24 
Here he opposes metaphysics to poetry. But what he attempts to do in the letter to 
Sotheby is to incorporate metaphysics into poetry. In fact, three months before this 
letter, he already wrote to Sotheby, 'a great Poet must be, implicite if not explicits, 
a profound Metaphysician.'25 In his poetic argument, he says that a poet should 
exercise both passive reception and active participation, both 'Fancy, or aggregating
22 CL, II, p. 864.
23 CL, II, p. 714
24 CL, I, p. 658. Quoted above.
25 CL, II, p. 810.
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Faculty1 and 'Imagination, or the modifying, and co-adunating Faculty'. The crucial 
point in this argument is that he implicitly admits the possible separation of the two. 
He argues, therefore, they should be reunited. The fact is that this argument is no 
longer poetical but metaphysical, that it no longer presupposes the immediate union 
between reception and response but aims at their reunion. He thus shifts the point of 
argument from the immediate response of children to the mediated response of man, 
'thinking1. 'Imagination, or the modifying, and co-adunating Faculty' is mental, 
active faculty which is different from passive, sensible 'Fancy'. Accordingly, he 
criticizes Bowles for the lack of thinking. He says, Bowles 'has no native Passion, 
because he is not a Thinker'. He continues: 'Bowles ... has probably weakened his 
Intellect by the haunting Fear of becoming extravagant.' Coleridge is willing to be 
'extravagant', and it is not by 'Fancy' but by 'Intellect'.
Coleridge suggests that the successful metaphysician is in fact a poet. He would 
still argue that Wordsworth, for example, is 'a profound Metaphysician', but no 
longer maintain the immediacy between reception and response as a prerequisite of 
the poet. He now argues that poetry comes out of the successful mediation, and not 
the immediate union, of reception and response. It is inevitably mediatory or 
'secondary'. At first he seems to enjoy this new, metaphysical 'extravagancy'. 
However, behind such 'extravagancy' is his bitter recognition that he can no longer 
offer immediate response. The once-admitted gap between reception and response 
gradually reveals itself when he exercises this 'metaphysical' poetics in 'Hymn 
Before Sun-Rise'.
That this [devotional feeling] is deep in our Nature, I felt when I was on Sea' 
fell—. I involuntarily poured forth a Hymn in the manner of the Psalms, tho' 
afterwards I thought the Ideas &c disproportionate to our humble mountains—& 
accidentally lighting on a short Note in some swiss Poems, concerning the Vale of
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Chamouny, & it's Mountain, I transferred myself thither, in the Spirit, & 
adapted my former feelings to these grander external objects.26
He admits here that he has to 'transfer' the scenery of 'Sea' fell' to that of Chamonix 
'in the Spirit'. But what he actually does is to transfer himself to the other poet. He 
may be unaware of this difference, but the real gap is not between 'Sea' fell' and 
Chamonix but between 'a kind of Metaphysician' and a poet who sings hymns. 
Coleridge's difficulty in this 'transference' is that his 'native Passion' has to be 
transferred to the other poet, or more precisely, 'native  Passion' has to be 
transferred to him from the other poet, in order for him to sing hymns. And even 
when he successfully receives the transferred 'native Passion', there still remains 
the fact that he, the metaphysician, is solely dependent on the other, true poet.
Thus, in spite of his argument to the contrary, there remains the gap between the 
poet and the metaphysician. Coleridge would jump over the gap if his 'metaphysical 
extravagancy' were such as to allow him to claim that he himself is Adam. It does 
not, but it allows him to admit that his poetic creativity cannot but be in the form of 
'transference', that is, the form of plagiarism. He writes in the Notebook towards 
the end of the year, 'A thief in the Candle, consuming in a blazm§ the Tallow 
belonging to a the wick out of sight—/Plagiary from past authors &c—'.27 When his 
'poet' died, he described himself as 'a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass 
Candle-stick, without even a stink of Tallow to remind you that it was once cloathed 
& mitred with Flame'. Now the candle is lit, but it burns 'transferred' tallow. 
Because of this transference, the composition of 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise' is 
generally regarded as the first conspicuous occasion of his plagiarism. The charge 
was first raised by De Quincey in 1834, and recently discussed in detail by
26 CL, II, p. 864-5.
27 CN, I, 1316. Norman Fruman suggests that this notebook entry is Coleridge's 
confession of the plagiarism he commits in composing 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise'. See 
Fruman, Coleridge, the Damaged Archangel (London, 1972) pp. 26-30.
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Fruman.28 But their moral charge misses Coleridge's own definition of plagiarism 
which he imposes on himself when he struggles with his own poetics. That is, if all 
the derivation from 'the wick1 is 'plagiary1, the only possible distinction between an 
original poet and plagiarists is that between 'a true Poet' and metaphysicians, that 
is, Adam and the rest. The difficulty he faces in his own composition is that even 
when he admits that it is 'plagiary', his poetics still urges him to re-produce Adam's 
hymn. The measure he tries in 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise' is to present himself as a 
fictive, 'transferred', hymn-singer.
Coleridge borrows without public acknowledgement the poem's setting at 
Chamonix from Friederica Brun, a Swiss poet of the Sturm und Drang period. As 
Fruman shows, Coleridge's first half of the introductory note is a close translation 
from Brun's. But Coleridge would defend himself by arguing that he adapted 'his' 
poetic feeling at 'Sea' Fell' to Brun's at Chamonix, and transferred 'himself' to Brun 
the hymn-singer, and that since each poetic feeling is derived from and addressed to 
one source, it is of secondary importance to define when, where or by whom one 
particular poetic feeling is received and articulated.29 Relying on the notion of the 
omnipresent and transferable 'Poetic Feelings', he would allow himself to say even in 
the borrowed setting, 'the whole vale, its every light, its every sound, must needs 
impress every mind not utterly callous with the thought—Who would be, who could 
be an Atheist in this valley of wonders!'30
Even though they share the supposedly same setting, 'Chamouny beym 
Sonnenaufgange'31 and 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise, in the Vale of Chamouni'32 are
28 Ibid.
29 Referring to Schelling's ’small pamphlet against Fichte' [Darlegung des wahren 
Verhaltnisses der Naturphilosophie mit der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre 
(Tubingen, 1806)], Coleridge says, ’I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist: I care 
not from whose mouths the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are 
audible and intelligible.' BL, i, p. 164.
30 PW, I, p. 377.
31 PW, II, p. 1131.
32 Poems, pp. 289-91.
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different poems. They are different in the sense that the latter has a hint of 
Coleridgean metaphysics. Coleridge is different from Brun in that he expresses his 
wish to sing hymn and at the same time acknowledges that he cannot. At first, 
however, Coleridge follows Brun's model and introduces the figure of hymn singer in 
the poem. Brun writes:
'Aus tiefem Schatten des schweigenden Tannenhains 
Erblick' ich bebend dich, Scheitel der Ewigkeit,
Blendenden Gipfel, von dessen Hohe 
Ahndend mein Geist ins Unendliche schwebet!
[Above the deep shadows of the silent forest
With awe I glimpse at you, the summit of the eternity,
From the height of the dazzling peak 
My spirit already floats on to the Infinite.]
It is obvious that Coleridge takes the idea from Brun's and makes a similar self­
introduction as a hymn-singer. He writes:
0  dread and silent Mount! I gaze upon thee,
Till thou, still present to the bodily sense,
Didst vanish from my thought: entranced in prayer
1 worshipped the Invisible alone.
But one soon hears Coleridge's own voice. This is Coleridge's third stanza:
Awake, my soul! not only passive praise 
Thou owest! not alone these swelling tears,
Mute thanks and secret ecstasy! Awake,
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Voice of sweet song! Awake my heart, awake!
Green vales and icy cliffs, all join my Hymn.
The voice which narrates this stanza is Coleridge's own in the sense that it does not 
have a counterpart in Brun's poem. But more importantly, it is so because it echoes 
within himself. It is the voice which still remains in darkness and wishes to reach 
'the Infinite', which is different from the voice in the first stanza which is already 
reaching 'the Infinite'. Thus the hymn is sung in a peculiar duality of voice,.on the 
one hand already reaching the sun and on the other still waiting in darkness. This 
latter voice is the same as that which appears in the latter half of the quotation from 
'To Matilda Betham from a Stranger' in the letter. It is the voice of the 
metaphysician which has essentially no place in hymn. It is the voice which is more 
suitable for petition than for praise, for mediated thinking than immediate response.
Coleridge is reluctant to speak in this voice. His early attempts show not so 
much his ambition as his hesitation to present himself as a hymn singer. Both 
'Hymn to the Earth' (1799) and 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise, in the Vale of Chamouni1 
(1802) are dependent on the German originals. In them, he presents himself as a 
fictive figure. He is merely a 'transferred1, therefore negative, figure. It is more 
than a decade later when he writes another hymn, 'A Hymn' (1814). Yet it shows 
the direct continuity of thought from the early attempts, in the sense that it begins at 
the point where the early hymns ended. In 'A Hymn1, he ventures to present himself 
as a positive figure. The poem begins with his own direct address, 'MY Maker!'. 
Inevitably, it reveals the reason why he hesitated to do so in the early attempts. 'A 
Hymn1 deals with the Fall in a positive, explicit manner:
Great God! thy works how wondrous fair!
Yet sinful man didst thou declare 
The whole Earth's voice and mind!
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Lord, ev'n as Thou all-present art,
0  may we still with heedful heart 
Thy presence know and find!
Then come what will, of weal or woe,
Joy's bosom-spring shall steady flow;
For though 'tis Heaven THYSELF to see,
Where but thy Shadow falls, Grief cannot be!—33
Here he discloses his implicit anxiety which he had even in the early attempts. Here 
he expressedly deals with the problem that the divine presence in nature and his own 
presence in it are contradictory. In the early hymns, he could maintain the divine 
presence if at the cost of his own. But when he presents himself as a positive figure, 
he can no longer maintain that 'he' receives the divine presence in nature. 'A Hymn1 
is in fact addressed not to the presence but to the 'shadow' of the presence. His 
petitionary voice which was but faint in the early attempts is here unmistakably 
loud and clear. The tone is entirely changed. It is that of consolation, which is not 
unlike that of 'Effusions' which have no trace of exultation.
Five years later, Coleridge takes up again the same theme. In a letter to an 
unknown correspondent in November 1819, he deals with the same problem once 
again by drawing on 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise'.34 There is an obvious difference in 
argument between 1802 and 1819. In 1802 the argument was focused almost 
exclusively on the reception of 'Poetic Feelings', but here the point of attention is 
largely shifted from reception to response. However, he begins the letter as if he 
repeats his early poetics. Stressing devotional 'feelings', he writes:
33 PW, I, p. 423.
34 CL, IV, p. 974-5.
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In a Copy of Verses entitled, 'a Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouny1, I 
described myself under the influence of strong devotional feelings gazing on the 
Mountain till as if it had been a Shape emanating from and sensibly representing 
her own essence, my Soul had become diffused thro1 'the mighty Vision1; and there
As in her natural Form, swell'd vast to Heaven.
The verse line is taken from the second stanza of 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise'. But in 
this second stanza he already made a strong suggestion that his composition carries 
the trace of metaphysical argument. Addressing to nature, he wrote these lines:
Thou, the meanwhile, wast blending with my Thought,
Yea, with my Life and Life's own secret joy:
Till the dilating Soul, enrapt, transfused,
Into the mighty vision passing—there
As in her natural form, swelled vast to Heaven!
The fact is that it is 'my thought', 'my Life' which have no place in hymn. Moreover, 
he acknowledges the secrecy of 'joy' which clearly makrs the loss of his 'hymn of 
Joy'. Therefore 'my thought' and 'my Life' have to be blended with the original 'Life', 
naturally or even artificially in order to recover 'joy'.35 But the 'blending'
35 'Joy' is one of Coleridge's key terms. In 'Dejection Ode' he writes:
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower Poems, p. 281.
Yet he admits that he has lost this natural gift. He thus faces himself to the task to 
rediscover 'Joy'. His adoption of Fichte's idealistic argument is coupled with his 
expectation to find 'Joy' within himself. He puts together Wordsworth's lines
—and the deep power of Joy 
We see into the Life of Things—
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procedure itself is also outside the scope of the hymn in which the original unity has 
to be undoubtedly presupposed. He remembers in the letter that Wordsworth, who 
apparently disliked tension of this kind, criticized the passage just after its 
composition. Coleridge says, 'Mr. Wordsworth, I remember, censured the passage as 
strained and unnatural, and condemned the Hymn in toto ... as a specimen of the Mock 
Sublime.' He now responds to that criticism, 'It may be so for others; but it is 
impossible that I should myself find it unnatural, being conscious that it was the 
image and utterance of Thoughts and Emotions in which there was no Mockery.' In 
short, Wordsworth found metaphysics to be a mere mockery, but Coleridge had to 
take it as the only possibility left to him. Coleridge readily admits that his poetry is 
different 'from Milton's and Thornton's and from the Psalms'. What is surprising 
here is that Coleridge implicitly claims the immediacy of 'his' poetic response in 
contrast with the mediacy of theirs. He says that he addresses 'himself to individual 
Objects actually present to his Senses, while his great Predecessors apostrophize 
classes of Things, presented by the Memory and generalized by the understanding'. 
He cannot say this unless he drops the notion of immediate reception in the previous 
sense, unless he implicitly argues that no one has been given the original unity of 
reception and response. Here he is virtually arguing that the unity recovered 
through metaphysical transference is the only possible unity. As he admits, 'in this
with Fichte's 'wall' in one notebook entry. See CN, I, 921. Quoted and discussed in 
Chapter 4, I. But it turns out to be unsuccessful. He fails to find 'Joy' within 
himself. He writes in November 1804, 'I have forgotten what the Joy is'. CN, ll, 
2279. Quoted and discussed below. In the passage he later inserts into 'The Eolian 
Harp' he suggests that the recovery of 'Joy' may resolve the problem of 'within' and 
without':
0! the one Life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every-where— Poems, p. 52.
Thus his speculation on 'the one Life within us and abroad' immediately leads his to 
say 'joyance every-where'.
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there may be too much of what our learned Med'ciners call the Idiosyncratic for true 
Poetry.’
Coleridge continues the letter and ascribes his 'idiosyncrasy1 to the inherent 
peculiarity of his perception. He says, 'individual Objects actually present to his 
Senses' are in fact not given but gained by him through conscious abstraction and 
unrealization. He writes, 'from my very childhood I have been accustomed to 
abstract and as it were unrealize whatever of more than common interest my eyes 
dwelt on; and then by a sort of transfusion and transmission of my consciousness to 
identify myself with the Object'. With this recognition the whole perspective finally 
overturns. Unity is recovered when his 'self' is finally united with 'the Object'. But 
it is by 'abstraction' and 'unrealization' of nature. His 'self transfusion and 
transmission' in fact result in the total loss of nature around him. It is by this 
overturn that his 'self', which he finds displaced from nature, becomes the centre of 
the whole perspective. But it is an overturned perspective.36 And it is in this 
overturned perspective that his self receives a new and more positive assertion. He 
continues the letter:
I have often thought, within the last five or six years, that if ever I should feel 
once again the genial warmth and stir of the poetic impulse, and refer to my own 
experiences, I should venture on a yet stranger & wilder Allegory than of yore— 
that I would allegorize myself, as a Rock with it's summit just raised above the 
surface of some Bay or Strait in the Arctic Sea,
36 This 'overturn' is described in 'The Ancient Mariner' as a departure from divine 
nature, and in 'Dejection Ode' as a theft from divine nature. See Chapter 2, i and 
Chapter 3, III. Thus the problem of two natures, ridden by the sense of guilt, 
becomes the main topic of his later thinking.
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While yet the stern and solitary Night 
Brook'd no alternate Sw ay-
all around me fixed and firm, methought as my own Substance.37
His 'self' finally arrives at the definite point. And from this point he measures the 
surrounding sea and makes it his 'own' 'Substance'. But this positive argument is 
vulnerable to his religious instinct equally inherent in him. In other words, the 
argument is positive only when it is restricted within the overturned perspective 
and kept away from any doubt concerning the overturning itself. However, he 
continues the letter and reveals that he is still in a religious darkness. 'A Rock' is 
described as 'a pride and a place of Healing to lie, as in an Apostle's Shadow, within 
the Eclipse and deep substance-seeming Gloom'. 'My own Substance' thus turns out 
to be in reality 'the deep substance-seeming Gloom'. He fixes himself on the firm 
point, but he is still surrounded by chaos and not by restored nature. What consoles 
him at the top of 'a Rock' in the Arctic Sea is not restored nature around but the 
northern lights above in darkness:
lofty Masses, that might have seemed to 'hold the Moon and Stars in fee' and often 
in such wild play with meteoric lights, or with the quiet Shine from above which 
they made rebound in sparkles or dispand in off-shoots and splinters and 
iridescent Needle-shafts of keenest Glitter.38





I grieved not to serve them—yea, lovingly and with gladsomeness I abased myself 
in their presence: for they are my Brothers, I said, and the Mastery is their's by 
right of elder birth and by right of the mightier strivings of the hidden Fire that 
uplifted them above me.
After this passage the letter is broken off. And no more substantial argument about 
hymns has come to light. In that sense the hymn addressed to 'the hidden Fire' in 
darkness has to be taken as the last form of his attempt to write hymns. In regard to 
its internal development it is indeed the final form. His first written hymn was 
'Hymn to the Earth' (1799) and then 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise' (1802). Since then 
Coleridge's night has become darker and darker as if he were in regression from day 
to darkness, in exact parallel with his unfulfilled metaphysical pursuit for 'the 
Infinite'. But once he accepts that he is thrown out in darkness, the pursuit itself 
proves to be the source of creativity of a quite different kind, which his later 
literary career well demonstrates.39
III. In 1795 Coleridge twice uses the expression 'a Convex Mirror in the 
surrounding Landscape' to illustrate what he believes to be the ideal state of man. 
First it appears in a letter on 10 March, and then in the sixth lecture on Revealed 
Religion delivered in June. While he does not repeat this expression until later, he 
keeps the idea at the heart of his thinking. It plays a central role in setting up his
39 At the end of Biographia Literaria Coleridge writes:, 'Religion passes out of the 
ken of Reason only where the eye of Reason has reached its own Horizon; and that 
Faith is then but its continuation: even as the Day softens away into the sweet 
Twilight, and Twilight, hushed and breathless, steals into the Darkness. It is Night, 
sacred Night! the upraised Eye views only the starry Heaven which manifests itself 
alone: and the outward Beholding is fixed on the sparks twinkling in the aweful depth, 
though Suns of the other Worlds, only to preserve the Soul steady and collected in its 
pure Act of inward Adoration to the great I AM, and to the filial WORD that re- 
affirmeth it from Eternity to Eternity, whose choral Echo is the Universe.' BL, II, 
pp. 247-8. That is, he believes that 'Religion' is the way from 'inward desolations' 
to 'inward Adoration'. For his theological speculation on 'the great I AM', see Chapter 
7, I.
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idea of man's unity with nature as the symmetrical correspondence between man and 
nature. All the important philosophical and theological problems with which he 
lives the rest of his life are in fact already expected in this brief expression. The 
questions concerning the formal correspondence between the divine presence in 
nature and its reflection, the ontological status of the reflection, and the problem of 
distorted reflection are all here in their potential forms.
It may be surprising that the idea was first presented without any relation to 
poetics. In 1795 it is not a poetical but political ideal which aims at social 
reformation. He says in the sixth lecture on revealed religion in June:
Citie's Drunkenness, Prostitution, Rapine, Beggary and Diseases—Can we walk 
the Streets of a City without observing them in all their most loathsome forms? 
Add to these Irreligion. The smoakes that rise from our crowded Towns hide from 
us the face of Heaven. In the country, the Love and Power of the great Invisible 
are everywhere perspicuous, and by degrees we become partakers of that which 
we are accustomed to contemplate. The Beautiful and the Good are miniatured on 
the Heart of the Contemplator as the surrounding Landscape on a Convex 
Mirror.4 0
In contrast with the grim reality of the city, he presents the idea of man's unity with 
nature as a political and social ideal. He protests against the urban society and its 
necessary evils and presents this idea as a remedy of them. Obviously he has in mind 
'Pantisocracy', his utopian movement with Southey and others to emigrate to 
America which is ardently upheld till September 1795. Yet one should not overlook 
the autobiographical aspect in his description of the city. In 'Frost at Midnight'41 he 
tells the story of how he was deprived of this ideal in his youth as a schoolboy. And
40 Lects 1795, p. 224.
41 Poems, pp. 137-9.
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during his flight from Cambridge in December 1793 and his short career as a 
soldier, he had the actual experience of what he describes as the 'citie's evils'. The 
experience is such that he forces himself to face the problem of religious sin 
probably for the first time.42 And it is only two months after being discharged from 
the dragoons that he meets Southey, and the enthusiasm for Pantisocracy begins. In 
this sense the utopian country-life is to him from the beginning a personal remedy 
as well as the ideal of social reformation. And this internal, personal pursuit is to 
prove as difficult as the external, political one.
The description of man as 'a Convex Mirror of the landscape' resembles Leibniz's 
description of the monad as 'a perpetual living mirror of the universe' [un miroir 
vivant perpetuel de I'univers].43 Although there is no evidence of Coleridge's direct 
reading of Leibniz at this time, Coleridge is certainly familiar with this Leibnizian 
idea. Leibniz writes:
tout Monade etant un miroir de I'univers a sa mode, et I'univers etant regie dans 
un ordre parfait, il faut qu'il y ait aussi un ordre dans le representant, c'est-a- 
dire dans les perceptions de I'ame et par consequent dans le corps, suivant lequel 
I’univers y est represente.
[since every monad is a mirror of the universe in its own way, and the universe 
is regulated in perfect order, there must also be an order in the being which 
represents it, that is to say, in the perceptions of the soul and therefore also in 
the body, according to which the universe is represented in it.]44
42 See Coleridge's correspondence with his brother George during this period. CL, I, 
p. 67, 70, 74, 78. See also Richard Holmes, Coleridge: Early Visions (London, 
1989) pp. 39-58.
43 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, La Monadologie (1714) in Opera Philosophical quae 
exstant latina gallica germanica Omnia, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Aalen, 1959) p. 709, and 
Leroy E. Loemker, trans., 'The Monadology', in Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and 
Letters (Chicago, 1956) p. 1053.
44 Leibniz, ibid., p. 710, and Loemker, ibid., p. 1055.
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In Leibniz, as in Coleridge, the reflective symmetry includes an ethical dimension. 
Leibniz continues, 'we must also point out here another harmony between the 
physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace' [nous devons remarquer 
ici encore une autre harmonie entre le regne physique de la nature et le regne moral 
de la grace].45 But there is one decisive difference between Leibniz and Coleridge. 
In presenting the idea, Leibniz is neutral and descriptive. Coleridge, on the other 
hand, pushes the idea as a protest against social and personal evils. In Leibniz the 
symmetrical correspondence between nature and man is undisturbed. His calm, 
descriptive tone may even imply that it is inviolable. On the contrary, Coleridge's 
urgent voice reveals that in him it is already threatened seriously or even destroyed. 
When he presents the idea, his primary concern is the pursuit of it, or rather, the 
recovery of its loss. Urgency in his pursuit is evident in a more anxious tone of 
voice in the other occasion where he repeats the same argument:
It is melancholy to think, that the best of us are liable to be shaped & coloured by 
surrounding Objects—and a demonstrative proof, that Man was made to live in 
Great Cities! Almost all the physical Evil in the World depends on the existence 
of moral Evil—and the long-continued contemplation of the latter does not tend to 
meliorate the human heart.—The pleasures, which we receive from rural 
beauties, are of little Consequence compared with the Moral Effect of these 
pleasures—beholding constantly the Best possible we at last become ourselves the 
best possible. In the country, all around us smile Good and Beauty—and the 
Images of this divine KakoKayaddv are miniatured on the mind of the beholder, 
as a Landscape on a Convex Mirror.46
45 Leibniz, ibid., p. 712, and Loemker, ibid., p. 1059.
46 CL, I, pp. 154-5.
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The contrast between 'melancholy' in the city and 'pleasure' in the country is clear. 
Man is still 'a mirror', a passive creature which cannot but accept whatever 
surrounds him. Therefore, even when he implicitly identifies urbanization with the 
Fall of man, all he can do is to cry for an urgent relief. He continues the letter:
Thompson in that most lovely Poem, the Castle of Indolence, says—
[']l care not, Fortune! what you me deny—
You cannot rob me of free Nature's Grace!
You cannot shut the Windows of the Sky,
Through which the Morning shews her dewy face—
You cannot bar my constant feet to rove 
Through Wood and Vale by living Stream at Eve'—/
Alas! alas! she can deny us all this—and can force us fettered and handcuffed by 
our Dependencies & Wants to wish and wish away the bitter Little of Life in the 
felon-crowded Dungeon of a great City!—
Thus he admits that he can no longer take 'Nature's Grace' for granted, that he has to 
seek after it socially as well as personally. 'Pantisocracy' in this sense is the 
measure for the recovery of 'Nature's Grace' which, he believes, he had once and lost.
During the days of Pantisocracy Coleridge writes to Southey on 18 September 
1794:
Sublime of Hope I seek the cottag'd Dell,
Where Virtue calm with careless step may stray47
47 CL, l, p. 104.
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When the Pantisocracy scheme is abandoned a year later, his pursuit of the utopian 
ideal becomes more like that of idyllic retirement. In October 1795 he marries 
Sara Fricker and stays in a cottage at Clevendon for the next six weeks, and at the end 
of 1796 he moves from Bristol to Nether Stowey. During this time, he becomes less 
engaged in social reformation and more in his own recovery as a poet of nature. Now 
the idea is to place himself in nature as a mirror and to restore his internal disorder 
in that idyllic surrounding. During this period he writes 'conversation1 poems such 
as 'The Eolian Harp', 'Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement', and 'This 
Lime-Tree Bower My Prison'. All of these have fair descriptions of landscape and 
show that his attempt of recovery is at first successful.48
The same rapturous descriptions of landscape continues when he moves to 
Keswick in June 1800. At his first introduction to the Lake District in November 
1799 he already writes:
how deeply I have been impressed by a world of scenery absolutely new to me ... 
Hawes Water thro' many a varying view kept my eyes dim with tears, and this 
evening, approaching Derwentwater in diversity of harmonious features, in the 
majesty of its beauties & in the Beauty of its majesty—0  my God! & the Black 
Crags close under the snowy mountains, whose snows were pinkish with the 
setting sun & reflections from the sandy rich Clouds that floated over some & 
rested upon others! It was to me a vision of a fair Country.49
48 Kelvin Everest describes the situation and argues that the poems during 
Coleridge's retirement reveals his profound social and political concern, that they 
contain a 'secret ministry'. See Everest, Coleridge's Secret Ministry: The Context of 
the Conversation Poems 1795-1798  (Sussex, 1979).
49 CL, l, pp. 544-5.
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During his long walk from 1 to 9 August 1802 he makes a series of minute 
descriptions of landscape both in the Notebooks and letters.50 Among them is the 
description of Wastdale Water:
When I first came the Lake was a perfect Mirror; & what must have been the 
Glory of the reflections in it! This huge facing of Rock said to be half a mile in 
perpendicular height, with deep Ravin[e]s the whole winded & torrent-worn, 
except where the pink-striped Screes come in, as smooth as silk/all this 
reflected, turned into Pillars, dells, and a whole new-world of Images in the 
water!51
He finally finds the ideal mirror of nature. 'The Lake1 reflects on its clear surface 'a 
whole new-world of Images'. The region abundant with clear water provides him 
with many occasions to speculate on the divine presence in reflection. A month after 
his arrival at Keswick, he already begins to describe the lake as 'a mirror'.52 Here 
is another example:
To Grasmere yesterday, I returned today. 0  Thirlmere!—let me some how or 
other celebrate the world in thy mirror.—Conceive all possible varieties of 
Form, Fields, & Trees, and naked or ferny Crags—ravines, behaired with 
Birches—Cottages, smoking chimneys, dazzling wet places of small rock- 
precipices—dazzling castle windows in the reflection—all these, within a divine 
outline in a mirror of 3 miles distinct vision!55
50 See CL, II, pp. 834-45; CN, I, 1207, 1228.
51 CL, II, p. 839. See also CN, I, 1213 flO.
52 CN, I, 798 f34, f37.
53 CN, I, 1607. 23 October 1803.
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However, there is a subtle but crucial epistemological shift in these descriptions. 
That is, he begins to receive the beauty of landscape not directly from nature but 
from its reflection on the water. Meanwhile he seems to forget his personal question 
whether he himself is one of those faithful mirrors. With rapture he just traces the 
beauty of these 'perfect', clear and static images.
Let me not, in the intense vividness of the Remembrance, forget to note down the 
bridging Rock, cut off alas! from the great fall by the beaked promontory, on 
which were 4 Cauldrons, & a small one to boot—one at the head of a second Fall, 
the depth of my Stick, reflected all the scene in a Mirror—Gracious God/54
Coleridge does not explain why he is not one of those mirrors. But the reason is 
not difficult to guess. A description such as 'the whole World seem'd imag'd in its 
vast circumference' in 'Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement' is more 
suitable to 'a perfect Mirror' of nature than to human perception. Contrasted with 
the 'perfect', clean and static mirror, 'a convex Mirror' such as a human eye is 
small and round, and potentially distortive. Moreover, it is three-dimensional, that 
is, it has its deep, 'inward darkness' within itself. He seems to abandon his own 
reception altogether when he loses confidence in it at the discovery of the superior, 
'perfect' mirror without paying much attention to its consequence. But this shift 
brings about a peculiar effect in him. In musing on the reflected landscape, he 
begins to confuse reflection with reality. At first he only notices that 'the Shadow' 
can exist even when the original is not present. On his first visit to the Lake 
District in November 1799, he writes:
54 CN, I, 1495. Coleridge is on tour in Scotland.
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Now as we return the fog begins to clear off from the Lake, still however leaving 
straggling Detachments on it—, & clings viscously to the Hill/—all the objects on 
the opposite Coast are hidden, and all those hidden are reflected in the Lake, 
Trees, & the Castle, cLyulph's Tower,> & the huge Cliff that dwarfs it!—Divine!— 
The reflection of the huge pyramidal Crag is still hidden, & the image in the 
water still brighter//but the Lyulph's Tower gleams like a Ghost, dim & 
shadowy—& the bright Shadow thereof how beautiful it is cut across by that 
Tongue of breezy water— now the Shadow is suddenly gone—and the Tower itself 
rises emerging out of the mist, two-thirds wholly hidden, the turrets quite 
clear—& a moment all is snatched away—Realities & Shadows—55
In January 1804, however, he notes two occasions in the Notebook in which he can 
intentionally confuse reality and shadow. In both cases he mistakes reality for 
reflection.
Thaw/Half the Lake (the hither, we by the Gate on the ascent 1 /4  of a mile or so 
from Gill's Cottage) bright, the other half breezey-dull/the snowy-zebraed 
Mountain in the reflection, all bright/ —the Gap between Seat Sandal & Fairfield a 
beautiful upright blue Triangle in the water A with, as I thought six or seven
slips of Clouds most beautifully coloured & as beautifully disposed/l looked at the 
Gap <itself>, & could not perceive any corresponding clouds—noticed it to 
William, who immediately discovered & made me perceive that they were not 
clouds, but flakes of Ice on the hither shore close by—instantly the distance 
altered, & I saw the slips as flakes of Ice close on the surface of the hither 
shore/yet by volition could again make them clouds—56
55 CN, I, 553.
56 CN, I, 1836. January 1804.
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He discovers that he may alternate reality and reflection both unconsciously and 
consciously. He now has 'volition' which can change reflection to reality and vice 
versa. At the discovery of this 'volition' within himself, he ceases to be a faithful 
'mirror'. It means to him that the distinction between the real landscape and the 
reflection on the water becomes uncertain. Or more precisely, it means that the 
distinction between reality and unreality is no longer determined for him, therefore 
he has to determine it by 'his volition'. It also means that the stability of the 
undoubted distinction between them is lost to him forever.
Images of Calmness on -Grasmere Rydale Lake, Jan. 14/new fresh Delves in the 
Slate Quarry I mistook for smoke in the reflection/An islet Stone, at the bottom 
of the Lake, the reflection so bright as to be heaved up out of the water/the Stone 
& its reflection looked so compleatly one, that Wordsworth remained for more 
than 5 minutes trying to explain why that Stone had no Reflection/& at last found 
it out by me/the shore, & green field, with a Hill bank below that Stone, & with 
Trees & Rock forming one brilliant picture without was such, that look at the 
Reflection & you annihilated the water/it is all one piece of bright Land/just half 
wink your Eyes & look at the Land, it is then all under water, or with that glossy 
Unreality which a Prospect has, when seen thro' Smokes.57
When 'annihilating the water', he sees the whole of the landscape and the reflection 
as 'one piece of bright Land'. Only in contrast with reality, the reflection becomes 
'all under water'. Again it is his 'volition' which decides whether he is seeing the 
bright reality or the 'glossy Unreality'. His 'volition' cannot deny the real 
landscape, but it can temporarily eliminate it and assume that the 'glossy Unreality' 
is reality. In other words, he is no longer certain whether he is receiving the real
57 CN, II, 1844. January 1804.
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landscape or its counterfeit, that is, his 'volition' has to decide it all independently. 
It is worth noticing that it is always Wordsworth, when Coleridge exercises such 
'volition' to confuse reflection with reality, who corrects him and restores the stable 
distinction between reality and unreality.
But Wordsworth cannot eliminate Coleridge's already discovered 'depth'. When 
Coleridge discovers a world of shadow below the bright surface of the water and 
relates it to 'volition', he falls into his own 'metaphysic depths', as he later calls 
it.58 Its immediate result is that he loses the original landscape. It is interesting to 
see how Wordsworth, who remains suspicious of Coleridge's engagement in 
metaphysics, observes this turn. Coleridge transcribes Wordsworth's 'Resolution 
and Independence' together with 'Dejection Ode' in a letter to Sir George and Lady 
Beaumont on 13 August 1803.59 Wordsworth, probably in response to 'Dejection 
Ode', sets up a figure of an old leech-gatherer as an example of 'mighty Poets in their 
misery dead'.
At length, himself unsettling, he the Pond 
Stirr'd with his staff, & fixedly did look 
Upon the muddy water which he conn'd 
As if he had been reading in a book;
As an allusion to Coleridge the metaphysician, this is accurate. Wordsworth here 
implies that the book of nature becomes unreadable to Coleridge because he stirs the 
depth of the pond and made its clear surface all muddy, that the clear reflection of 
nature will disappear when he begins to search something below the surface. The 
more he stirs, the darker the surface becomes. Nature becomes like obscure books 
in which Coleridge indulges himself. Interestingly, Wordsworth happens to criticize
58 BL, I, p. 17.
59 CL, II, pp. 966-73
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Coleridge in the same way as Coleridge complained about materialistic epistemology 
two years before. Coleridge wrote in the Notebook, 'Materialists unwilling to admit 
the mysterious of our nature make it all mysterious—nothing mysterious in nerves, 
eyes, &c: but that nerves think &c!!—Stir up the sediment into the transparent 
water, & so make all opaque.'60 He wrote this criticism when he had a remnant 
confidence in his early romantic optimism which allowed him to say in 1795, 'The 
Omnipotent has unfolded to us the Volume of the World, that there we may read the 
Transcript of himself'.61 But now Wordsworth tells him that if materialists are 
distanced from the divine presence in nature, metaphysicians are alienated from it 
still further. Wordsworth dooms the leech-gatherer's future as follows:
But fewer they became from day to day,
And so his means of life before him died away.
Later, Coleridge accepts Wordsworth's point. He writes in Biographia Literaria 
(1817), 'Well were it for me perhaps, had I never relapsed into the same mental 
disease; if I had continued to pluck the flower and reap the harvest from the 
cultivated surface, instead of delving in the unwholesome quicksilver mines of
60 CN, I, 9 2 0 .  Some fifteen years later, Coleridge repeats the same complaint about 
materialism. Discussing the reception of 'Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established 
harmony' or 'the hypothesis of Hylozoism' in Biographia Literaria, he writes, 'Far 
more prudent is it to admit the difficulty once for all, and then let it lie at rest. 
There is a sediment indeed at the bottom of the vessel, but all the water above it is 
clear and transparent. The Hylozoist only shakes it up, and renders the whole 
turbid.' BL, I, pp. 1 3 0 -2 .  But the fact is that not only 'the Hylozoist' but Coleridge 
himself lack the prudence not to disturb. The difference is that Coleridge refuses to 
live with the turbid water and pushes the question still further. For his 
reassessment of Leibnizian system, see Chapter 7, III. He uses the same illustration 
in the twelfth Philosophical Lecture. See Phil Lects, p. 3 5 1 .  Here he relates it to 
the question concerning the homo- or heterogeneity of body and soul. This seems to 
indicate that his metaphysical investigation is closely related to the problem of the 
split between body and soul. For a further discussion about 'body and soul', and his 
personal experience of the split, see Chapter 4, III.
61 Lects 1795, p. 94 . For Coleridge's later revision of this view, see Chapter 4, III.
47
metaphysic depths.'62 But he also gives a firm reason why he steps into 'the 
unwholesome quicksilver mines'. 'Of the necessary consequences of the Hartleian 
t h e o r y * , 6 3  he writes:
Thus the whole universe co-operates to produce the minutest stroke of every 
letter, save only that I myself, and I alone, have nothing to do with it, but merely 
the causeless and effectless beholding of it when it is done. Yet scarcely can it be 
called a beholding; for it is neither an act nor an effect; but an impossible 
creation of a something-nothing out of its very contrary! It is the mere quick­
silver plating behind a looking glass; and in this alone consists the poor 
worthless I!64
He refuses to remain 'a looking glass'. Or rather, he cannot. The reason is simple. 
Once the third dimension behind 'a looking glass' opens up, it is no longer the divine 
hand that produces 'the minutest stroke of every letter'. Here he is talking about his 
own hand which cannot but produce 'every letter'. The shift itself is inevitable in 
each individual. But in taking this shift, Coleridge, quite unlike Wordsworth, slips 
into 'metaphysic depths', into his own 'inward darkness'. He falls into the sphere 
which his 'volition' opens up within himself. He knows that the sphere is unreal and 
dark. But being deprived of the original reality, he cannot but take it as a sole 
reality for him. And it is dark. He does not always articulate why this is so. But he 
certainly knows that his own 'depth' is where he is bound to find his creativity.65
62 BL, l, p. 17.
63 BL, I, p. 116.
64 BL, I, p. 119.
65 Kant also uses 'mirror' for a illustration of his argument for the regulative 
usage of transcendental ideas. Arguing that the usage is limited in 'this', 
phenomenal, human sphere and calling the usage in 'that', noumenal, divine sphere 
'illusion', he writes, 'Hence arises the illusion ... just as objects reflected in a 
mirror are seen as behind it. Nevertheless ... the illusion involved is indispensably 
necessary if, besides the objects which lie before our eyes, we are also to see those
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IV. Coleridge's long walk from 1 to 9 August marks a decisive turning point in how 
he receives impressions from nature. He makes a series of detailed descriptions of 
landscape in the letters and in the Notebooks, as if he wishes to present himself as ’a 
living mirror1 which reflects the ever-changing landscape. But it is also in these 
depictions where he begins to overstep the bounds of passive reflection. During a 
climb to Sea1 Fell he receives such a vivid impression that he later tries to make it 
into a hymn, which eventually emerges as 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise, in the Vale of 
Chamouni' (1802). However, as seen above, in this composition he no longer 
presents himself as a clear, 'perfect', mirror of nature. It is also during this trip 
that he makes the first statement of his new projected plan, 'Soother of Absence'. 
The plan is written down and dated by him in a Notebook entry in which he makes a 
long, detailed description of landscape reflected on 'a <large> mirror over a rapid'. 
In doing so, he notices that there are 'many' reflections of 'one' landscape:
which lie at a distance behind our back. [Nun entspringt uns zwar hieraus die 
Tauschung ... (so wie die Objekte hinter der Spiegelflache gesehen werden), allein 
diese Illusion ... ist gleichwohl unentbehrlich notwendig, wenn wir auSer den 
Gegenstanden, die uns vor Augen sind, auch diejenigen zugleich sehen wollen, die weit 
davon uns im Riicken liegen]'. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
(Frankfurt, 1968), and Norman Kemp Smith, trans., Critique of Pure Reason 
(Hampshire, 1929) B 673-4. Thus Kant argues that things behind the mirror are 
mere illusion, that is, things which are 'really' behind the mirror are utterly 
unknowable. Coleridge regards this argument as a problem and later argues that the 
ideas are not only regulative but also constitutive. See Chapter 6, I note. To use 
Kant's illustration, Coleridge is here experiencing the fall from 'that' side of the 
mirror to 'this' side. He soon finds himself confined in 'this' sphere. Later in 1825 
he calls the mind 'Self-conscious Looking-Glass'. CN, IV, 5192 and 5280. He places 
the problem in an explicit theological context when he points out, in a marginal note 
to Richard Baxter's Catholick Theologie (London, 1675), what he thinks is Baxter's 
mistake and insists that 'a glass' should be translated as 'a mirror' in 1 Cor 13. 12: 
'For now we see through a glass [Siectojttpou] darkly; but then face to face'. See CM,
I, p. 237 and note. He also suggests that God is also such a 'Self-conscious Looking- 
Glass'. He writes, 'the personal, living, self-conscious God'. CM, I, p. 242. In 
1825 he speculates on the possibility that the two Self-conscious Looking-Glasses 
cease to be 'self'-conscious. He writes, '21 Feby. 1825.—My dear Friend I have 
often amused my fancy self with the thought of a Self-conscious Looking-glass, and 
the various metaphorical applications of such a fancy—and this morning, 4 it struck 
across my the Eolian Harp of my Brain that there was something pleasing and 
emblematic (of what I did not distinctly make out) in two <such> Looking-glasses 
fronting, each seeing the other in itself, and itself in the other.—' CN, IV, 5192.
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Passed over a common, wild, & dreary, and descending a hill came down upon 
Ulpha Park Kirk, with a sweet view up the River, with a <large> mirror over a 
rapid/ ... The view from the Bridge ... is eminently picturesque—A little step (50  
or 60 yards) beyond the Bridge, you gain a compleatly different picture— ... 
compleat in a Mirror & equally delightful as a view/ ... Here it was seated on this 
Mount, on Saturday, August 7, that I resolved to write under the name of The 
Soother of Absence, the topographical poem which I had long mummel'd about in 
my mind66
The 'topographical' description of the scenery is again Leibnizian in presenting one 
substance and infinitely diverse perceptions.
Et comme une meme ville regardee de differens cotes parott toute autre et est 
comme multipliee perspectivement, il arrive de meme, que par la multitude 
infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de differens univers, qui ne 
sont pourtant que les perspectives d'un seul selon les differens points de vue de 
chaque Monade.
[Just as the same city viewed from different sides appears to be different and to 
be, as it were, multiplied in perspectives, so the infinite multitude of simple 
substances, which seem to be so many different universes, are nevertheless only 
the perspectives of a single universe according to the different points of view of 
each monad.]67
Coleridge follows what Leibniz presupposes here, namely, the harmonious unity 
between one presentation and many reflections. But, as seen above, Coleridge admits 
such harmony only between the presentation and the static and perfectly
66 CN, I, 1225 f26.
67 Leibniz, ibid., p. 709, and Loemker, ibid., p. 1053.
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symmetrical reflection of a mirror of nature. He does not, or fails to, include his 
own reflection which he produces by his 'volition1 in this overall symmetrical unity. 
He notices the problem of 'shadow1 when he finds that 'a whole new-world of Images' 
under the surface of water or 'glossy Unreality' can be equal to real landscape in its 
clarity and brightness. He notices that his 'volitionary' reflection produces his own 
world which is separate from the original presentation. Thus he steps into his own 
world of absence, the world which lies below the surface of water. The original 'one' 
presentation is still presupposed, but he regards it as absent from his own 
reflections. His 'topographical poem' is no longer a hymn to the presence but 'The 
Soother of Absence'. It is, he says, 'the topographical poem which I had long 
mummel'd about "in my mind'".
Coleridge first mentions 'Soother of Absence' in August 1802 and keeps planning 
to write it as late as October-November 1810. But the idea of 'Soother of Absence' 
seems to extend beyond this time span. When he mentions it first, he indicates its 
long prehistory in which he 'had long mummel'd about' it in his mind. In fact, the 
preface to the second edition of his Poems (1797) suggests that his poetic exercise 
even in the period when he believed in 'the romantic poetics' was virtually 'Soother 
of Absence'. He writes, 'Poetry has been to me its own "exceeding great reward": it 
has soothed my afflictions: it has multiplied and refined my enjoyment; it had 
endeared solitude; and it has given me the habit of wishing to discover the Good and 
the Beautiful in all that meets and surrounds me.'68 And when he fails 'to discover 
the Good and the Beautiful' and 'falls' from his own poetic ideal, he becomes the poet 
of 'Soother of Absence'. From this point on the plan for the 'Soother of Absence' 
gradually absorbs all the aspects of his life. When traced chronologically, the plan 
develops in four stages. After being conceived as 'the topographical poem', it first 
occasions the internalization of his political ideal into poetics. Then it becomes the
68 PW, II, pp. 1145-6.
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plan to write a love-poem to Sara Hutchinson. Thirdly it becomes autobiographical, 
and finally it is conceived as a half-comical versification of the Fall. As 'Soother of 
Absence' absorbs all his life suggests that he keeps losing the sense of the real 
presence all these years. If he maintains, as he does, that the presence is real and 
the absence is unreal, he cannot but admit that the whole of his life has become 
'unreal'. That is not to suggest that he does not try to reach the presence. But such 
an attempt results in turning round the distinction between reality and unreality. It 
seems almost inevitable that when he keeps overturning the distinction, he only 
increases his inward depth and darkness which he meant to eliminate when he first 
presented himself as a mirror in nature. And at the last stage of the plan in 1810, 
he possibly relates it to Kant's phenomenology.
In a letter to Sir George and Lady Beaumont on 1 October 1803, Coleridge 
mentions his retirement from politics.69 In the letter he remembers the 
Pantisocracy scheme as 'Dreams linked to purposes of Reason'. Its purpose was:
to project this phantom-world into the world of Reality, like a catoptrical 
mirror ... to make ideas & realities stand side by side, the one as vivid as the 
other, even as I have often seen in a natural well of translucent water the 
reflections of the lank weeds, that hung down from it's sides, standing uptight, 
and like Substances, among the substantial water-plants, that were growing on 
the bottom.
But, as he admits later, he failed to achieve such a symmetry between 'ideas' and 
'realities'.70 When the scheme was abandoned, he managed to internalize the form of 
political idealism into that of poetical ideal. But in his case, the internalization did 
not help him to regain the clear symmetry. In the same month he writes in the
69 CL, II, pp. 999-1000.
70 See CN, II, 2557. For his later reference to this observation, see Chapter 7, III.
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Notebook, 'Mix up Truth & Imagination, so that the Imag. may spread its own 
indefiniteness over that which really happened, & Reality its sense of substance & 
distinctness to Imagination/ For the Soother of Absence—1.71 Here 'Imagination' is 
contrasted with 'reality'. Its function is to 'spread its own indefiniteness over that 
which really happened', which is opposed to 'Reality' and its function to bring 'its 
sense of substance & distinctness to Imagination'. These two functions are 
contradictory in the sense that one is an object of the other. His attempt to mix them 
up is to bring back the unity between the two contradictory functions and to resolve 
the very contradiction. But this is not 'a hymn' but 'a Soother of Absence', because in 
this attempt the unity is not presupposed but sought for, and because the search 
originates in his side, the underworld of 'Imagination' and traces back to 'Reality' 
above. Moreover, the precedence of 'Reality' over 'Imagination' is destabilized so as 
to make them possibly interchangeable. It becomes questionable which of the two 
comes first, and, accordingly it becomes ambiguous when or whether he is a 
receptive 'mirror' or a responsive 'poet', that is, when or whether he is passive or 
active. This ambiguity appears again in another similar occasion with an additional 
distinction between 'within' and 'without'. In April 1804 he writes:
Soother of absence./O that I had the Language of Music/the power of infinitely 
varying the expression, & individualizing it even as it is/—My heart plays an 
incessant music/for which I need an outward Interpreter/—words halt over & 
over again!—and each time—I feel differently, tho' children of one family.72
Here 'Imagination' is taken up independently of 'reality'. He exercises 'the power of 
infinitely varying the expression, individualizing as it is. It is he, a poet or a
71 CN, I, 1541.
72 CN, II, 2035.
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musician of language, who plays the music from within. Therefore, 'I need an 
outward Interpreter'.
Oscillation between reality and unreality repeats when the plan becomes 
expressedly that of Coleridge's love-poem to Sara Hutchinson. There is a Notebook 
entry in which he seems to be paralleling the presence/absence of landscape with 
that of Sara Hutchinson. He writes in 19 October 1803:
the mountains cloudy—the Lake has been a mirror so very clear, that the water 
became almost invisible—& now it rolls in white Breakers, like a Sea; & the 
wind snatches up the water, & drifts it like Snow/—and now the Rain Storm pelts 
against my Study Window!—O lapa Sapa why am I not happy!73
When it is calm, he manages to disregard the water which divides the presence above 
and the absence below and make his imaginary world equal with the presence. But 
when the wind reminds him of the existence of the water between reality and 
unreality, he realizes that it has been all his delusion. In February-March 1804 
just at the brink of his voyage to Malta he makes two seemingly contradictory 
Notebook entries for the love-poem plan.
Poems in the Soother of Absence—
Ode on a Suicide for Love, whose punishment after his Death consisted in the 
continuance of the same appetiteless heart-gnawing Passion which he could not 
reveal./The wanderings of this Ghost thro1 the world may be finely worked up74
This is virtually a confession. When he is deprived of the 'reality1, of 'an outward 
Interpreter', he is a ghost wandering in his own world within even 'after his Death'.
73 CN, I, 1 5 7 7 .
74  CN, II, 1 9 1 3 .
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But the following entry which he makes about the same time seems to say the 
opposite.
It is a pleasure to me to perceive the Buddings 
Of Virtuous Loves
To know their minutes of Increase, their Stealth,
And silent Growings.—
A pretty idea, that of a good Soul watching the progress of an attachment from the 
first glance to the Time when the Lover himself becomes conscious of it—A poem 
for my Soother of Absence—75
However, Kathleen Coburn points out that the verse is a quotation and supplies what 
Coleridge 'does not' quote:
You ne'er knew 
That I destroy'd true virtuous Loves; it is 
A pleasure to me to perceive their Buddings,
To know their Minutes of Encrease, their Stealth,
And silent Growings.7®
The bright tone of Coleridge's quotation thus turns out to be that of the 'glossy 
Unreality'. He seems to have in mind an attempt to revive the once 'destroy'd' love 
by overriding the boundary from 'Imagination' to 'reality'. The result of such an 
attempt is seen in a Notebook entry in November 1804 at Malta.
75 CN, II, 1937.
76 Ibid, note.
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Soother of Absence. Days & weeks & months pass on/& now a year/and the Sun, 
the Sea, the Breeze has its influences on me, and good and sensible men—and I feel 
a pleasure upon me, & I am to the outward view of all cheerful, & have myself no 
distinct consciousness of the contrary/for I use my faculties, not indeed as once, 
but yet freely—but oh Sara! I am never happy, never deeply gladdened—I know 
not, I have forgotten what the Joy is of that which the Heart is full as of a deep & 
quiet fountain overflowing insensibly, or the gladness of Joy, when the fountain 
overflows ebullient.—S.T.C.77
He may reproduce everything in imagination. But he fails to re-create 'Joy1.78 
Thus the whole attempt brings him back to where it began. And now he has at hand 
the still more rigid duality between reality and unreality. He has to carry it in 
himself, and his person becomes split between the external cheerful appearance and 
the internal despair. He retreats from the attempt at abolishing the boundary and 
returns to his inward darkness to find 'Soother of Absence' there. In November- 
December 1806 he writes, 'In any poem on Sleep the sleep cum amata, familiar, 
confident/O! this felt with enthusiasm & so expressed enumerating all the other 
excellencies of Sleep/—Soother of Absence.'79 But this sweet dream may change to 
nightmare at any moment.
'Absence' is Coleridge's internal, 'mental' problem. That is to say, it is basically 
irrelevant whether he enjoys the physical presence of Sara Hutchinson herself. In 
October 1808, he notes his fear that even Sara Hutchinson's external presence might 
ultimately fail to save him from his internal disorder, nightmare. He writes:
77 CN, II, 2279.
78 For Coleridge's attempt to recreate 'Joy', see above.
79 CN, II, 2953.
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22 Oct. 1808—astonishing Effect of an unbecoming Cap on Sara. It in the 
strictest sense of the word frightened me, and even continued to do so in a less 
degree, producing a painful startle, whenever she turned her face suddenly round 
on me, or I mine/even when I force myself to remain looking for a while, the 
effect is perhaps yet more unpleasant, for then it has the distressing character of 
one of those Dreams ... It would make the subject of a very affectionate Poem, 
which might even take an elevated character—gracious Heaven! when I call to 
mind that heavenly Vision of her Face, which came to me as the guardian Angel of 
my Innocence and Peace of mind ... What if on my Death-bed her Face, which had 
hovered before me as my soothing and beckoning Seraph, should all at once flash 
into that new face, rendered of yet more affrightful expression of by the action of 
the painful feelings produced by it, thence associated with it, thence returning 
with it in the same Trance of recollection, and of course modifying i t —This told 
in the third Person and as part of the Life & Feelings of ['Coleridge1 in anagram] 
in the "Soother of Absence".8^
In October 1797 he expresses his anxiety that the landscape he sees may turn to be 
'counterfeit' at any moment.81 Eleven years later, he confesses his fear that the face 
of his 'soothing and beckoning Seraph' may turn out to be 'that new face' at any 
moment. During this decade he lives his life with considerable anxiety about 
unreality. And now he admits that with all the desperate effort he has just 
transformed it into the fear of nightmare.82 He provides some details in an 
autobiographical manner under the same title, 'Soother of Absence'.
When the plan became that of writing a love-poem, it was already 
autobiographical. But it becomes more so when he begins to present himself as a
80 CN, III, 3404.
81 See CL, I, pp. 349-52. The point is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, I.
82 For Coleridge's problem of nightmare, see Chapter 4, II.
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wanderer. He writes in April 1804 on board to Malta, 'The Birds that never see land 
but live & sleep upon the [?waves]. Where do they breed? If on Shore or on some 
little Rock-island, that would make a beautiful illustration &c in my Soother of 
Absence.'83 He also remembers the very beginning of his own wandering and takes it 
into the plan. He writes in December 1804 in Malta, 'In the Soother of Absence— 
introduce Domus quadrata hortensis at Henley on Thames, the beautiful Girl—her 
after fate—& my Struggle in London, 1804—Jan.'84 'Domus quadrata hortensis at 
Henley' is the Pest House of the Henley work house, where he, in February 1794 as 
a soldier, nursed another soldier who had smallpox. Finally, he plans a self- 
portrait. He makes the following entry, dated by him 'Christmas Eve, 24 Dec. 1807. 
Bristol, Mr Morgan's'.
In proportion as a disposition, constitutionally as well as habitually susceptible 
of social & yet keener loving-kindness, has been by mishap banished from or 
stripped of, the Objects of these, does it become prone to quarrelsome & angry 
emotions, & the heart becomes a reservoir of predispositions to the same. 
Illustrate this by some simile—& introduce it into the Soother of Absence—/ 85
Here he is not even a wanderer. He shuts himself in his imaginary world and 
suppresses his frustration all within himself. At this point, religion seems to be the 
only possible direction to take, simply because there remains nothing else for him.
In May 1808 he makes a Notebook entry which at first seems unlikely to be a 
part of the plan of 'Soother of Absence'. He writes: 'In the S. of A. to describe Sotting
83 CN, II, 2054. Coleridge repeats the same self-description with a graver tone in 
1810. He writes, 'Soother of Absence—distant 2000 miles—what seas, what 
wildernesses, &c &c between us!—And yet how incalculably farther might a single 
Thought separate us—a suspicion, or jealousy, a wound brooded over!—' CN, III, 
3698.
84 CN, II, 2366.
85 CN, II, 3191.
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allegorically, losing the way to the temple of Bacchus, come to the Cave of the Gnome, 
&c &c .'36 But when he explicates the idea two years later, it proves to be at the 
focal point of all the above observation. In February 1808 he writes:
Man in the savage state as a water-drinker or rather Man before the Fall 
possessed of the Heavenly Bacchus as (See Boehmen's Sophia or celestial Bride) 
his fall—forsaken by the Aiowoog  the savage state—and dreadful consequences of 
the interspersed vacancies left in his mind by the absence of Dionysus—the 
Bastard Bacchus comes to his Relief, or rather the Gemini, the one Oivog 
permitted by the Dionysus—the other a Gnome— this pursued, in the mixt effects 
of the god— ... The former rjdovr] iiedvcnciog from Thoughts, and Action is least, as 
far as communication—the latter introversive from fear, & feeling in feeling, 
till the intensity manufactures the shemata into B lX 6eo \
A most delightful Poem may be made of it.87
In the editorial note, Coburn makes an insightful comment to this entry: 'Coleridge 
may be combining a theory of the Fall and a theory of the imagination, something that 
would support some interpretations of The Ancient Mariner1. Although her 
interpretative attempts seem to divert from her insight, her suggestion to relate the 
entry to the intersecting point of theology and philosophy fits well in the context of 
'Soother of Absence'. Here the entry of 1808 seems to be providing a summary of 
the whole development. 'Man before the Fall possessed of the Heavenly Bacchus'
86 CN, II, 2840.
87 CN, III, 3263. Coburn notes that the condition of the text is 'almost to 
illegibility1 and that her reading differs from the attempts of others. In her edition 
the last sentence reads 'The former ijdovrj fxedvoKiog from Thoughts, and Action, 
[?at/is] least, [?As/as] far as communication—the latter introversive from fear, & 
feeling in feeling, till the intensity manufactures the shemata into BiXdeoW and thus 
remains 'tantalizing where small differences in reading may yield large differences 
in meaning.' To read 'Action is least, as far as communication' is an attempt to read 
the entry in relation to 'Soother of Absence1.
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represents everything he is to lose: innocence, unity with Sophia, 'inebriation with 
pleasure1 which resembles 'hymn of Joy'.88 Then the Fall takes place and the 
absence follows. It leaves in his mind 'the interspersed vacancies', that is, the 
internal world of his own which leads to the problem of duality. The duality of 'the 
Gemini' is very much like that between the world of the presence and the world of the 
absence; one is 'permitted' while the other is suppressed underneath. 'The mixt 
effects of god' then is the confusion or collision of the two worlds. In the 'permitted' 
world man is a passive, receptive mirror. He is in 'rjdovr] nedvcnciog [sweet 
drunkenness] from Thoughts, and Action is least, as far as communication'. In his 
own world man is active but 'introversive from fear, & feeling in feeling, till the 
intensity manufactures the shemata into Bikdeo [Bilder (image)]'. Thus by 'losing 
the way to the temple of Bacchus', he arrives at 'the Cave of the Gnome', that is, his 
own space of his own activity. It is 'the Cave', the space of darkness and nightmare. 
But at the same time it is the space of his imagination, his 'Soother of Absence'.
Thus 'Soother of Absence' is a grand project of Coleridge's self-reflection. It 
extends its time span till 1810. 1810 is the year when he reaches the darkest 
moment of his self-reflection and writes his 'Confessio Fidei'.89 But it is also the 
time when his self-reflection begins to become slightly brighter. When he mentions 
the plan for the last time, the tone is not that of desperation but of hope. He writes 
in June-July 1810:
The words of of Ma Lady Guyon first Confession, that produced her conversion, 
are words of gold—& to be to inscribed over the Gate of the Temples—Speaking of 
her discomforts, doubts & c—
"It is, because you seek without what you have within."
88 CL, II, p. 872. Coleridge says that his children are 'inebriate both with 
pleasure—Hartley whirling round for joy—Derwent ... shouting his little hymn of 
Joy.' Quoted in full and discussed above.
89 See Chapter 5, III.
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A defence of mystical description of feelings of well-executed, i.e. faithfully- 
drawn from the pleasure all good minds receive from descriptions of material 
Objects, Landscapes, Trees &c they have never seen/Assuredly, the impressions 
received by the words are very faint compared with the actual impression—it is 
but a dim abstract at best—and most often a Sort of tentative process now by this 
analogy, now by that, to recall the reader to some experiences, he must have, tho' 
he had not attended to them—This for the Soother of Absence/—either in the 
poem, or in the preface—90
With the resolution to find his recovery not 'without' but 'within', he once again 
takes up poetics. But this time it carries the whole weight of philosophical and 
theological self-reflections planned under the title, 'Soother of Absence1. It is along 
this 'tentative process' of words that his thinking begins to become and unfold in the 
form of theological argument.
90 CN, III, 3946, 3947.
Chapter 2 'The Ancient Mariner1 and Departure from Divine Nature
I. The idea of idyllic retirement is an important pretext of 'The Ancient Mariner' 
(1798 ).1 Just as the scene of domestic celebration provides the background of the 
Mariner's narrative, Coleridge has a brief period of peaceful domestic life in the 
countryside shortly before getting to work on 'The Ancient Mariner'. As seen in the 
previous chapter, the purpose of retirement is to bury his restless mind in plain 
everyday life and dissolve 'inward desolations' into the natural light of the 
surrounding landscape. It is successful for a while. He writes to Thomas Poole on 
12 December 1796:
Lloyd's Father in a letter to me yesterday enquired, how I should live without any 
companions?—I answered him, not an hour before I received your letter—'I shall 
have six companions—My Sara, my Babe, my own shaping and disquisitive mind, 
my Books, my beloved Friend, Thomas Poole, & lastly, Nature, looking at me 
with a thousand looks of Beauty, and speaking to me in a thousand melodies of 
Love.'2
But it does not last long. Even in the letter he adds, 'If I were capable of being tired 
with all these, I should then detect a Vice in my Nature, and would fly to habitual 
Solitude to eradicate it'. Precisely as he predicts here, his 'disquisitive mind' soon 
becomes tired of them. In Biographia Literaria he relates how his 'disquisitive mind' 
begins to stray. 'I retired to a cottage in Somersetshire at the foot of Quantock, and 
devoted my thoughts and studies to the foundations of religion and morals. Here I 
found myself all afloat... I began then to ask myself, what proof I had of the outward
1 Poems, pp. 173-89.
2 CL, I, pp. 270-1.
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existence of any thing?'3 It is what he calls 'a Vice in my Nature' that forces his 
mind to wander. And once he takes his departure, he loses the external, divine 
nature all at once.
'The Ancient Mariner' is very autobiographical in this respect. It is the poem of 
a mind which abstracts itself from nature. The Mariner goes through a continuous 
loss of all of what naturally constitutes man until he becomes an abstract mind. The 
voyage deprives him of the land, of the crew, and finally of his own being.
I moved, and could not feel my limbs:
I was so light—almost 
I thought that I had died in sleep,
And was a blessed ghost.
The point is reinforced by the Latin epigragh later attached to the poem, which is 
taken from Thomas Burnet's, Archaeologicae Philosophicae sive Doctrina Antiqua De 
Rerum Originibus (London, 1692). It first appears in Sibylline Leaves (1817), 
but the transcription from Burnet in the Notebook is made in late 1 802.4 In 
translation it reads:
I can readily believe that there are more invisible than visible natures in the 
universe of things. But who shall explain their family, their orders, 
relationships, the stations and functions of each? What do they do? Where do 
they live? Human nature has always sought after knowledge of these things, but 
has never attained it. Meanwhile, I do not deny the pleasure it is to contemplate
3 BL, I, p. 200. Coleridge inserts into this autobiographical account a passage which 
reflects his later speculation on space. He writes, 'The idea of the Supreme Being 
appeared to me to be as necessarily implied in all particular modes of being as the 
idea of infinite space in all the geometrical figures by which space is limited.' For 
his speculation on space and its relation to Kant's phenomenology, see Chapter 5 ,1.
4 PW, I, p. 186 and CN, I, 1000H.
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in thought, as though in a picture, the image of a better and greater world: lest 
the mind, habituating itself to the trivia of life, should become too narrow, and 
subside completely into trivial things only. But, at the same time we must 
distinguish the certain from the uncertain and night from day.5
The contrast between 'a better and greater world' and an ordinary domestic world is 
clear and sharp. Burnet is unambiguous about which of the two worlds is 'the 
certain'. But when Coleridge quotes the passage and attaches it to 'The Ancient 
Mariner', Burnet's distinction between 'the certain' and 'the uncertain', 'day' and 
'night' overturns. Coleridge makes a characteristic modification in quoting Burnet 
and adds 'What do they do? Where do they live?' to the original text. He thus 
introduces the search for 'the certain' which is uncertain to himself. Accordingly, 
the Mariner's departure is that from ordinary certainty to perilous uncertainty, 
from the land of natural light to the dark ocean. Because of this Coleridgean twist, 
the Mariner's voyage simultaneously represents the loss of, and, the search for, 'the 
certain'.
The twist comes from the fact that the Mariner's departure is from 'divine 
nature'. In the conversation poems, the description of landscape is always coupled 
with the praise of God. Coleridge for example writes in 'Reflections on having left a 
Place of Retirement':
It seem'd like Omnipresence! God, methought,
Had built him there a Temple: the whole World 
Seem'd imag'd in its vast circumference:6
5 Quoted from Allan Grant, A Preface to Coleridge (London, 1972) p. 124.
6 Poems, p. 80.
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The landscape is 'the whole World1 of the divine orderliness. But this divine temple 
is essentially an enclosed space. Vast though it may be, the landscape is always 
circumscribed and confined. Describing the landscape in the poem, however, he 
already sees what lies beyond the circumference.
Oh! what a goodly scene! Here the bleak mount,
The bare bleak mountain speckled thin with sheep;
Grey clouds, that shadowing spot the sunny fields;
And river, now with bushy rocks o'er-brow'd,
Now winding bright and full, with naked banks;
And seats, and lawns, the Abbey and the wood,
And cots, and hamlets, and faint city-spire;
The Channel there, the Islands and white sails,
Dim coasts, and cloud-like hills, and shoreless Ocean—7
It is in the 'shoreless Ocean' beyond the divine landscape that the Mariner's journey 
takes place. The Mariner describes his departure:
Merrily did we drop
Below the kirk, below the hill,
Below the light house top.8
But his voyage is a transgression of the boundary which distinguishes created nature 
from uncreated chaos.
7 Ibid.
8 Poems, p. 174.
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Coleridge's letter to Thelwall on 14 October 1797,9 written a month before he 
begins to work on 'The Ancient Mariner', is a crucial document in showing that it is 
his epistemological anxiety that leads him to the departure to the unknown ocean.
I can at times feel strongly the beauties, you describe, in themselves, & for 
themselves—but more frequently all things appear little—all the knowledge, that 
can be acquired, child's play—the universe itself—what but an immense heap of 
little things?—I can contemplate nothing but parts, & parts are all little— My 
mind feels as if it ached to behold & know something great— something one & 
indivisible— and it is only in the faith of this that rocks and waterfalls, 
mountains or caverns give me the sense of sublimity or majesty!—But in this 
faith all things counterfeit infinity!—
He begins to suffer from the recession of the divine presence in nature. The 
landscape, which he once described as 'God's temple' turns to be 'an immense heap of 
little things'. As s result, what he receives from nature becomes 'child's play' in a 
derogative sense which is quite different from child's 'hymn of Joy'. He does not 
explain how the presence turns out to be the absence nor why the landscape loses its 
cohesion. It is even uncertain whether there is an objective difference between the 
original landscape and 'an immense heap of little things'. Suddenly he realizes that 
'parts are all little'. Instead of trying to give an objective argument, he offers an 
internal, subjective account for the incident. 'My mind feels as if it ached to behold 
& know something great— something one & indivisible'. Here he endeavours to grasp 
the peculiar nature of this 'ache' which he also calls 'the faith'. The ache is both the 
recognition of the loss of 'something great— something one & indivisible' and the 
attempt of its recovery. With this 'ache', his mind, once called 'indolent and passive
9 CL, I, pp. 349-52.
66
brain1 in 'The Eolian Harp1,10 becomes 'afloat'. But also with this 'ache' it begins to 
be active in trying to recover the lost presence. The result is necessarily a puzzling 
one. It is a successful recovery on one hand, for 'it is only in the faith of this that 
rocks and waterfalls, mountains or caverns give me the sense of sublimity or 
majesty1. But it is not on the other, for 'in this faith all things counterfeit infinity'. 
Here he does not consider what is behind the expressive difference between the 
previous description of landscape in 'Reflections on having left a Place of 
Retirement', 'the whole World seem'd imag’d in its vast circumference', and the 
present one, 'all things counterfeit infinity'. The difference is nonetheless crucial in 
regard to the cause of his departure. What divides the latter from the former 
descriptions of the landscape is the recognition ultimately of a split between God and 
man. The divine imagination in his landscape is different from the human 
imagination in a counterfeited landscape. What is puzzling him is the fact that the 
problem is twofold. The counterfeited infinity is an epistemological problem, but he 
sees it leading to the deeper theological problem, the implicit enmity between God 
and man. Therefore, his recovery needs be twofold, that is, it needs be both the 
recovery of nature and the reconciliation with God. But the attempt is likely to 
contradict internally. Here is the problem of the immanence and transcendence of 
God. Because of the nature of the problem, his search for the immanent 'one & 
indivisible' is simultaneously the cause of its loss. And he now discovers that he can 
involve himself in this problem 'actively'. The result is the production of 
'counterfeit' nature. While he may regard this development as recovery, this 
recovery is likely to bring the whole search back to its beginning.11
10 Poems, p. 53.
11 For a further discussion about immanence and transcendence, see Chapter 7, I. 
Coleridge may pick up the term 'counterfeit' from Cudworth's The True Intellectual 
System of the Universe (1678) which he borrows from 9 November to 13 
December 1796. See George Whalley, 'The Bristol Library Borrowings of Southey 
and Coleridge, 1793-8', The Library, IV (1949) 124. For further discussion about 
the possible relevance, see W. Schrickx, 'Coleridge and the Cambridge Platonists', 
Review of English Literature, 7 (1966) 81, and David Jasper, Coleridge as Poet and
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Coleridge continues the letter and abruptly quotes a passage from 'This Lime- 
Tree Bower my Prison1.
'Struck with the deepest calm of Joy' I stand
Silent, with swimming sense; and gazing round 
On the wide Landscape gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily, a living Thing 
Which acts upon the mind, & with such Hues 
As cloath th' Almighty Spirit, when he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence!—
According to his own account, he was under the influence of Berkeley's spiritualism 
when he wrote this poem. When he drafted the poem in a letter to Southey on 17 
July 1797, three months before the present letter to Thelwall, he added a note, 'You
Religious Thinker (London, 1985) p. 20. Coleridge also reads A Collection of 
Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More (1662) which he borrows from 
Carlisle Cathedral Library from 4 April 1801 to July 1802. See CN, I, 938 note. 
For Coleridge's reference to More, see Chapters 3, II and 5, I. Coleridge may find a 
hint of distinguishing reason from understanding while reading the Cambridge 
Platonists, which seem to lead him to say in Biographia Literaria, 'I have cautiously 
discriminated the terms, the REASON, and the UNDERSTANDING, encouraged 
and confirmed by the authority of our genuine divines, and philosophers, before the 
revolution.' BL, I, p. 173. For Coleridge's distinction between 'reason' and 
'understanding', see Chapter 6, II. Unlike the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge has to 
struggle with the problem of the human subject 'I' which inevitably arises from the 
split or even the contradiction between 'reason' and understanding'. Moreover, he 
experiences the loss of 'one & indivisible', that is, the loss of 'reason' which he 
considers as the Fall. In 'Essays on the Principles of Method' he writes, 'that reason 
in which the essences of all things co-exist in all their distinctions yet as one and 
indivisible'. Friend, I, p. 516. At the same time he calls man 'the high-priest and 
representative of the Creator'. Therefore the loss of 'reason' or 'something one & 
indivisible' which he confesses in the letter, means the loss of this special status of 
man in nature. And when he recovers his 'reason' he becomes 'man ... as subsumed in 
the divine humanity, in whom alone God loved the world'. Ibid. For Coleridge's 
argument about the loss and recovery of reason, see Chapter 6, II.
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remember, I am a Berkleian — [S.T.C.]1 Berkeley's spiritualism is seen for example 
in a following passage from A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge:
That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which 
favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the 
soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all 
freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead 
thereof makes a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of 
all beings.12
In the verse lines, Coleridge suggests along with Berkeley that 'th'Almighty Spirit1 
and human 'Spirits' are instantly reconcilable when there is no 'matter', or, 'gross 
bodiliness'.13 But Berkeley does not appease Coleridge's 'ache'. Since his philosophy 
presupposes and takes for granted 'something great— something one & indivisible', it 
has nothing to do with Coleridge's 'ache' to reach 'one & indivisible'. It does not 
concern Coleridge's epistemological anxiety that 'such Hues as cloath th' Almighty 
Spirit' may turn out to be 'counterfeit' in a moment. It simply denies the very 
duality between the original reality and the counterfeit, which is the cause of 
Coleridge's ache. In the letter, Coleridge acknowledges that 'the ache' takes him over 
and forces him to abandon his avowal to Berkeley's doctrine. He says, 'It is but 
seldom that I raise & spiritualize my intellect to this height'.14
1 2 George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge 
(1710) in Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London, 1975), pp. 105-6. 
Berkeley continues: 'That they should hearken to those who deny a providence, or 
inspection of a superior mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole 
series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, arising from the impulse of 
one body on another. All this is very natural.' This passage has a significant 
relevance to Coleridge's plan for 'the hymns to the elements', which is an important 
pretext of 'The Ancient Mariner'. See below.
13 For his re-enactment of this spiritualism, see Chapter 5, I.
14 Coleridge's dissatisfaction with Berkeley is stated in the Notebook entry of 
January 1804. There he expresses his epistemological anxiety by what seems to be 
Descartes' 'Wax' in the third meditation. After transcribing in full the seventh
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At this point Coleridge recedes into dreaming. If he cannot maintain his 
’spiritual height1, he would rather sink into dreaming than remain on the ground of 
'gross materiality1. He continues the letter:
at other times I adopt the Brahman Creed, & say—It is better to sit than to stand, 
it is better to lie than to sit, it is better to sleep than to wake—but Death is the 
best of all!—I should much wish, like the Indian Vishna, to float about along an 
infinite ocean cradled in the flower of the Lotos, & wake once in a million years 
for a few minutes—just to know that I was going to sleep a million years more.
He already wrote about the divine sleep in the Notebook in 1796. This time it is 
sleep not in the ocean but in the paradise. 'In the paradisiacal World Sleep was 
voluntary & holy—a spiritual before God, in which the mind elevated by 
contemplation retired into pure intellect suspending all commerce with sensible 
objects & perceiving the present deity—'.15 But he is not allowed to remain at rest 
in this paradisal dreaming. The entry is followed by another entry from the same 
period. 'In a distempered dream things & forms in themselves common & harmless 
inflict a terror of anguish.—' 16 Thus he has to depart even in dreaming. He 
continues the letter to Thelwall and exemplifies the departure from the land to the 
ocean with a long quotation from Osorio (1797). The quotation ends with these lines:
section of the introduction in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, he writes, 'I am at a loss how to conceive any thing externally existing, 
which is not a Thing'. CN, I, 1842. Coleridge's basic metaphysical question is 'what 
proof I had of the outward existence of any thing?' The negative answer which 
Berkeley's system provides is not the solution but the beginning of Coleridge's quest, 
his 'ache'.
15 CN, I, 191.
16 CN, I, 205. Coleridge writes to Thomas Poole on 18 December 1 796 of 'the 
feelings of those distressful Dreams, where we imagine ourselves falling from 
precipices'. He explains, 'I seemed falling from the summit of my fondest Desires; 
whirled from the height, just as I had reached it.' CL, I, p. 287.
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It were a lot divine in some small skiff 
Along some Ocean's boundless solitude 
To float for ever with a careless course,
And think myself the only Being alive!
Similarly, the Mariner's voyage strips him of all the ordinary realities and leads 
him to an absolute isolation. But his voyage does not necessarily recover 'the 
paradisiacal World' of sleep. In fact, the voyage is far from being 'a lot divine'.
0  Wedding-Guest! this soul hath been 
Alone on a wide wide sea:
So lonely 'twas, that God himself 
Scarce seemed there to be.17
It is unlikely, however, that Coleridge intends from the beginning to write a 
poem of the 'scarce' presence of God. It is the failure of his early poetics and his 
interpretation of that failure as the Fall that causes the shift in intention and makes 
the poem addressed not to the abundant presence but to the 'scarce' presence. It is 
evident that he is optimistic about the result of such address when he begins to 
prepare materials for the poem. He writes in the Notebook in early 1796:
Hymns to the Sun, the Moon, and the Elements—six hymns—In one of them to 
introduce a dissection of Atheism—particularly the Godwinian System of Pride
1 7 Poems, p. 188. The Mariner's voyage is cheered at first and not moaned. 
Similarly, Coleridge does not regard 'dream' as a problem until it turns out to be 
nightmare. He experiences the scarce presence of God not so much as the loss of 
reality as fearful nightmare. His personal experience of nightmare is always behind 
his phenomenological argument. See Chapter 4.
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Proud of what? An outcast of blind Nature ruled by a fatal Necessity—Slave of an 
ideot Nature! X t
X Deproeliantium e carcere nubium &c
t  In the last Hymn a sublime enumeration of all the beauties charms or 
Tremendities of Nature—then a bold avowal of Berkley's System! !! ! !18
At first, the plan seems to show the same optimistic sentiment as found in the praise 
of landscape in the conversation poems. It is to end with 'a sublime enumeration of 
all the beauties charms or Tremendities of Nature1. But under its optimistic 
overtone, the plan already reveals his deep anxiety. The setting of the poem is 
shifted from land to ocean, that is, from the theistic landscape of the conversation 
poems to the atheistic chaos of 'The Ancient Mariner'. Accordingly, the intention of 
the poem is no longer to praise the divine creation but to 'dissect' Atheism. It is as if 
he cannot write hymns without dissecting his own atheism, as if the plan for him to 
write hymns inevitably demands such dissection as a prerequisite procedure. And 
even if the attempt turns out to be successful, there remains a difficult problem. 
For it is all uncertain whether the hymns to 'the Elements' are the same as the hymn 
of Joy in nature, whether the expected hymns thus produced after 'a dissection of 
Atheism' retain the original poetic spontaneity. At this stage, however, his optimism 
seems to be covering up his inherent fear. But it is Coleridge himself who draws the 
distinction between 'the beauties' of nature and 'the Tremendities' of the Elements. 
The truth is that what he can expect to recover at the end of successful metaphysical 
or theological battle is at best the 'secondary' spontaneity. In fact, his entire career 
as a thinker divides the primary spontaneity he here wishes to recover and 'the 
secondary spontaneity' he actually recover.19 The fact that the plan itself remains
18 CN, I, 174: 16.
19 Coleridge's awareness of this 'secondary' spontaneity leads him to the argument 
about the primary and secondary imaginations in Biographia Literaria. By this
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unexecuted and reworked into 'The Ancient Mariner' shows that he soon notices this 
essential difference between the two.20
If Coleridge has personal interest in writing 'The Ancient Mariner', it is about 
the recovery of spontaneity. But it is 'secondary', metaphysical one. As he later 
explains, it is the optimism of 'the desire of giving a poetic colouring to abstract and 
metaphysical truths in which a new world then seemed to open upon me'.21 He 
describes the Mariner's departure: 'The ship was cheered, the harbour cleared, 
Merrily did we drop1. The 'merriness' of the departure comes from the expectation 
of 'the new world'. Coleridge seems to defy Locke's sceptical depiction of 
metaphysicians: 'we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being, as if all that 
boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, 
wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions or that escaped its 
comprehension'.22 At the time of planning the hymns to the elements, even at the 
time of writing 'The Ancient Mariner', he still believes that he can sail through 'the 
vast ocean of being'. It is only in 1801 that he explicitly acknowledges his failure 
not only in poetics but also in metaphysics. He writes in the Notebook, 'Mind,
argument he distinguishes himself from Kant who understands 'spontaneity' 
differently. See Chapter 6.
20 John Livingstone Lowes argues on the contrary that 'The Ancient Mariner' is the 
direct development of the plan. He writes,'Sun, Moon, Air, Fire, and Water—no 
longer hid in a mist of Godwinian and Berkeleyian speculations, but in visible, 
tangible, trenchantly concrete reality—weave the very fabric of the poem. And they 
weave it in visual imagery as vivid as when—Fire, Air, and Water blended into one— 
the sun paints rainbows in the spindrift.' Lowes, The Road to Xanadu: A Study in the 
Ways of the Imagination (London, 1 927) p. 76. However, 'the very fabric of the 
poem' only serves as its background. The point is that these uncontrived autonomous 
elements have nothing to do with the Mariner. Instead of 'a sublime enumeration of 
all the beauties charms or Tremendities of Nature', 'The Ancient Mariner' has the 
Mariner's prayer for its conclusion. And his 'prayer' after the voyage through the 
atheistic ocean is essentially different from the praise which is possible only within 
the boundary of the divine creation. Lowes dismisses 'Godwinian and Berkeleyian 
speculations' as irrelevant, but it is precisely these which bring about this 
difference. The plan and the outcome show that while the primary purpose of the 
plan recedes into the background, the secondary, theological purpose of the plan 
becomes the centre of the composition.
21 BL, I, p. 8.
22 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) in The Works of 
John Locke, 10 vols (London, 1823) vol. 1, pp. 5-6.
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shipwrecked by storms of doubt, now mastless, rudderless, shattered,—pulling in 
the dead swell of a dark & windless Sea.'23 He thus gradually becomes aware that his 
metaphysical engagement does not necessarily lead him to recovery, that is, the 
Mariner's return journey is not necessarily the expected 'recovery1. While he 
attempts to overcome the first poetical failure by his metaphysical engagement, it 
too fails and drives him to a yet more difficult position.
II. Coleridge's plan thus shows a transitional period when his metaphysical interest 
is gradually taking over his poetical interest. While it shows his lingering hope for 
hymns, it contains at its centre his metaphysical argumentation. He plans to have 'a 
sublime enumeration of all the beauties charms or Tremendities of Nature', but it is 
a preparation for the final conclusion of the whole poem, 'a bold avowal of Berkley's 
System '. As suggested above, his metaphysical argument resonates to that of 
Berkeley's in his attack on materialism. His adoption of Berkeley's system, 
however, has a characteristically Coleridgean effect on himself, which suggests that 
his real interest is not in metaphysical argumenation as such. While Berkeley 
categorically denies 'matter' in order to establish a complete argument, Coleridge 
implicitly admits the distinction between spirit and matter. And by accepting 
Berkeley's spiritualism, Coleridge sets up a scheme of linear ascent from the latter 
to the former. It is the scheme of constant denial of matter and of continual ascent 
towards spirit. In the plan he proposes to put this scheme into practice, which he 
expects to lead him to 'a bold avowal' of the complete spiritualism.
Coleridge's continual recession from the divine presence in nature, which he 
regards as the Fall, thus assumes an entirely different aspect. Self-alienation from 
material nature turns out to be not the Fall but the ascent towards immortality.
23 CN, I, 932.
74
Accordingly, he begins to see nature as a positive hindrance/the ascent. In August 
1796 he makes some Notebook entries titled 'Prayer'.
Brutal Life—in which we pursue mere corporeal pleasures & interests— 
Human Life—in which for the sake of our own Happiness & Glory we 
pursue studies and objects adapted to our intellectual faculties.
Divine Life—when we die to the creatures & to self and become deiform by 
following the eternal Laws of order from the pure Love of Order & God.24
The linear ascension towards God involves the denial of 'ideot Nature1. In order to 
practice this scheme of 'Prayer1, he has to leave behind the 'Brutal Life' and the 
'Human Life', in his words, 'die to the creatures'. It is the process of continual 
denial both of nature itself and nature in man. He immediately expands the scheme 
and make it more elaborate:
P rayer-
First Stage—the pressure of immediate calamities without earthy aidance 
makes us cry out to the Invisible-
Second Stage—the dreariness of visible things to a mind beginning to be 
contemplative—horrible Solitude.
Third Stage—Repentance & Regret—& self-inquietude.
4th stage—The celestial delectation that follows ardent prayer—
5th stage—self-annihilation—the Soul enters the Holy of Holies.—25
It is very likely that he has this entry in mind when he composes 'The Ancient 
Mariner'. The Mariner's departure, unfortunate voyage, and isolation are all
24 CN, I, 256.
25 CN, I, 257.
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foreseen in this entry. The '4th stage' describes the scene where the Mariner prays 
and receives 'the celestial delectation', the rain. But the '5th stage' poses a problem. 
In the poem he does not achieve self-annihilation nor become immortal. He 
discovers that his 'self' remains even when he is deprived of everything else. That 
is, he dies to the creatures but fails to die to his 'self'. And because of this failure 
his linear ascent remains incomplete. Thus the scheme of prayer too remains 
unfulfilled in 'The Ancient Mariner'.
'A dissection of Atheism' is the only promise in the plan for hymns which 
Coleridge fulfils in 'The Ancient Mariner'. The poem is a powerful statement that 
man once thrown out into 'blind and ideot Nature' necessarily prays. All the human 
narrative, once attached to the autonomous movements of the elements, becomes 
meaningless. The Mariner finally clings to the narrative of the Fall, not because it 
is more likely than the others but because it is internally most powerful. Dissection 
of Atheism thus allows him to argue that it is the Mariner's prayer that saves him 
from 'a fatal Necessity' and restores him to immortality, and that atheism or 'the 
Godwinian System of Pride', on the contrary, remains unaccountable to fatality of 
man. However, his 'dissection of Atheism' requires a careful examination. David 
Jasper traces back the usage of the word 'perfectibility' in England to William 
Godwin's Political Justice (1793) and argues that Coleridge must be familiar with 
the word through his connexion to this rational, democratic circle of the time.26 
Jasper summarises the optimistic sentiment attached to the word by quoting from 
Condorcet's Equisse d'un tableau historique des progres de I'esprit humain to which 
Coleridge refers in The Watchman (1796): 'Let us count on the perfectibility with 
which nature has endowed us.' It is important to rememeber that this human 
perfectibility is said to be endowed by 'nature'. However, as Jasper says, 'for 
Coleridge himself it was a religious subject'. That is, Coleridge does not take the
26 David Jasper, Coleridge as Poet and Religious Thinker (London, 1985) pp. 29- 
32.
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word ’perfectibility' as exclusively human as others do. He writes to his brother 
George on 6 November 1794, during the Pantisocracy scheme:
I see evidently, that the present is not the highest state of Society, of which we 
are capable—And after a diligent, I may say, an intense study of Locke, Hartley 
and others who have written most wisely on the Nature of Man—I appear to 
myself to see the point of possible perfection at which the World may perhaps be 
destined to arrive—27
It sounds as if he is propagating the 'human' perfectibility. But he continues to say, 
'in deep-felt humility I resign it to that Being ... Who hath said ... ["]The Wolf and 
the Lamb shall feed together!'". It is very likely that he understands the word 
'perfectibility' religiously from the beginning, even to the extent that he 
immediately paraphrases Condorcet's 'perfectibility' and 'nature1 as 'immortality' 
and 'God'. When the Pantisocracy scheme is abandoned, he begins to take a polemic 
stance to rational humanism. Accordingly, he makes a rigid distinction between 
perfectibility and immortality. He writes to Josiah Wade on 27 January 1796 and 
complains about Erasmus Darwin's rational atheism:
all at once he makes up his mind on such important subjects, as whether we be 
the outcasts of a blind idiot called Nature, or the children of an all-wise and 
infinitely good God; whether we spend a few miserable years on this earth, and 
then sink into a clod of the valley, or only endure the anxieties of mortal life in 
order to fit us for the enjoyment of immortal happiness.28
27 CL, I, 126.
28 CL, I, 177.
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It bs obvious that there is no ground of discussion between them. As Erasmus Darwin 
insists that 'there is a certain self-evidence in infidelity', so Coleridge deems him by 
quoting St. Paul, 'Ye have an evil heart of unbelief'. As long as atheism remains 
unaccountable to the fatality of man, Coleridge 'dissects' it and shows its 
insufficiency. But his polemic against atheism does not prove that his faith in 
immortality is sufficiently accountable. The Mariner prays, but he remains 
altogether uncertain whether he is indeed one of 'the children of an all-wise and 
infinitely good God'. Coleridge's theism is a powerful tool for dissecting atheism and 
showing its insufficiency, but so is atheism for doing the same to the Mariner's 
proclamation. This can be illustrated by tracing how Coleridge reads Hume, whom he 
thinks to be 'the pillar, & confessedly, the sole pillar, of modern Atheism' and plans 
'a disquisition on Hume's system of Causation—or rather of non-causation1.29 He 
seems to have this plan for some time. In fact he already made his argument against 
Hume three years before. In 1795 he began 'Lectures on Revealed Religion' with the 
'allegoric vision', probably alluding to Hume:
He [an old dim eyed Man] spoke in diverse Tongues and unfolded many Mysteries, 
and among other strange Things he talked much about an infinite Series of 
Causes—which he explained to be—a string of blind men of which the last caught 
hold of the skirt of the one before him, he of the next, and so on till they were all 
out of sight; and that they all walked straight without making one false step. We 
enquired, Who there is at the head to guide them. He answered No one, but that 
the string of blind men went on for ever without a beginning for though one blind 
man could not move without stumbling, yet that infinite Blindness supplies the 
want of sight."
29 CL, I, pp. 385-6. Letter to John Prior Estlin on 13 February 1798.
30 Lects 1795, pp. 92-3. Coleridge repeats this expression in Logic, p. 86.
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'Hume's system of Causation—or rather of non-causation' requires careful handling 
when brought into theism/atheism argument. For 'Hume's system of Causation' is a 
system within an anthropocentric sphere, or, it is 'a system of non-causation' only 
when it is seen from a theocentric point of view. Similarly, Coleridge's own system 
of causation which he obviously has in mind is valid only in a theocentric sphere, and 
it becomes a system of non-causation when brought into an anthropocentric sphere. 
Therefore, his 'allegoric vision' is the description of atheists only because 'an old 
dim eyed Man' responds, when asked 'Who there is at the head to guide them?', 'No 
one'. If he answered 'God', he could well be a Coleridgean figure and 'a string of blind 
men' could well be the chain of theists. The seeming argument is in fact simply 
pressing an alternative choice between God and man. The truth is that both theist and 
atheist presume the two to be mutually exclusive, argue which to be chosen, and 
inevitably remain unaccountable for what they exclude. Coleridge's choice at this 
point is quite clear. What nature gives him is only 'a few miserable years on this 
earth'. He refuses to believe in nature nor in the perfectibility nature is said to 
have endowed him. And he chooses to believe in 'the enjoyment of immortal 
happiness'.31
Coleridge thus comes surprisingly close to Pascal. In spite of apparent 
remoteness, Coleridge shares a basic congeniality in thought with Pascal.32 Placed
31 It is important to see that this is Coleridge's desperate choice. He is a sort of 
person who finds no meaning of life without this faith. The poem 'Human Life: On the 
Denial of Immortality' is an eloquent example:
0  Man! thou vessel purposeless, unmeant,
Yet drone-hive strange of phantom purposes!
Surplus of Nature's dread activity,
Which, as she gazed on some nigh-finised vase,
Retreating slow, with meditative pause,
She formed with restless hands unconsciously.
Blank accident! nothing's anomaly! Poems, p. 321.
32 'Coleridge and Pascal' may sound unusual since there have been few attempts to 
relate them in any respect of their thinking. It is true that he receives little 
intellectual impact from the French, especially from the contemporary French, as 
he becomes 'a vehement anti-gallican' because of the chaos and the intellectual
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at the beginning and the end of the Age of Reason, neither of them are in support of 
rationalism as such. At the beginning of the Enlightenment Pascal sees with 
prophetic insight that there is an essential limit to human rationality, and at the end 
of that movement Coleridge is forced to recognize its then obvious limit. Both are in 
agreement that human rationality cannot replace nor exhaust religion. Yet at the 
same time they are persistent critics of orthodox establishment, by relentlessly 
attacking its dogmatism and denouncing its superstition publicly as well as 
privately. In spite of the difference in circumstance and the still wider difference in 
temperament and talent, they lead the same path from orthodoxy to rationalism, and 
from there to keener and deeper religiosity. They have in common the rigid, 
Augustinian understanding of the Fall that man as well as the whole of creation is 
irretrievably fallen. And it is this conviction that leads the Jansenist of mid­
seventeenth century France and the 'Calvinist' of Romantic England to the same 
religious existentialism.
Philological evidence of Pascal's direct influence on Coleridge is meagre. 
Coleridge annotates his copy of Provinciates, and makes some quotations in his 
Notebook around July 1805. And there is only one occasion known today where 
Coleridge quotes from Pensees. He writes to Poole from Germany on 6 April 1799, 
'La Nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les Dogmatistes. Nous avons 
une impuissance a prouver, invincible a tout le Dogmatisme: nous avons une idee de 
la verite, invincible a tout le Pyrrhonisme.'33 Yet even this quotation is not likely
barrenness brought by the Revolution. BL, I, p. 187. But Coleridge gives quite a 
different status to Pascal. He takes caution to spare Pascal even when he condemns 
French philosophy in general. He writes in the Notebook, 'spite of Paschal, Madame 
Guyon, and Moliere France is my Babylon, the Mother of Whoredom in Morality, 
Philosophy, Taste ... How indeed it is possible at once to love Paschal, & Voltaire?' 
CN, II, 2598. He writes to Sir George and Lady Beaumont on 22 September 1803 
while reading Provinciates, 'Tho' but a wretched French Scholar, I did not go to bed 
before I had read the Preface & the two first Letters. They are not only excellent; 
but the excellence is altogether of a new kind to me!' CL, II, p. 994.
33 CL, I, pp. 478-9. The quotation is the conflation of the two sentences from the 
different articles of Pensees, Article 434 and 395 in Brunschvicg edition. See
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to be from the original. Thomas McFarland argues that the quotation is a conflation 
of the two passages from the different articles in Pensees, and that, as Jacobi uses 
this conflation in his books, it is very likely that Coleridge quotes it from Jacobi.34 
McFarland expresses 'considerable doubt that Coleridge at that time either knew 
enough French to have read Pascal, or, conversely, was enough aware of Pascal for 
such an undertaking even had his French sufficed.1 McFarland's philological 
argument is strong. But one such textual finding should not suffice to suggest that 
there is little between Pascal and Coleridge. For there is an essential, if not 
philological, congeniality between the rest of Pascal's article from which Coleridge 
quotes and Coleridge's plan to write hymns which eventually becomes a preparatory 
note for 'The Ancient Mariner'.
The first half of Jacobi/Coleridge's quotation of Pensees comes from one of the 
articles gathered under the title 'Contrarietes'.
La nature confond les pyrrhoniens et la raison confond les dogmatiques. Que 
deviendrez-vous done, o hommes qui cherchez quelle est votre veritable 
condition par votre raison naturelle? Vous ne pouvez fuir une de ces sectes, ni 
subsister dans aucune.
Connaissez done, superbe, quel paradoxe vous etes a vous-meme. 
Humiliez-vous, raison impuissante; taisez-vous, nature imbecile: apprenez que 
I'homme passe infiniment I'homme, et entendez de votre maitre votre condition 
veritable que vous ignorez. Ecoutez Dieu.35
[Nature confounds the sceptics, and reason confounds the dogmatists. What then 
will become of you, man, who seeks your true condition through your natural 
reason? You cannot escape one of these sects nor survive in either of them.
Blaise Pascal, CEuvres de Blaise Pascal, ed. Leon Brunschvicg, 3 vols (Paris, 1921) 
vol. 2, pp. 302, 346-7.
34 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford, 1969) pp. 
296 -7 .
35 Pascal, ibid, pp. 346-7.
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Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself. Be humble, 
impotent reason! Be silent, imbecile nature! Learn that man infinitely 
transcends man, hear from your master your true condition which you do not 
know. Listen to God.]
Pascal's primary concern is not with scepticism nor dogmatism. He is a rationalist 
to the extent of thinking that feeble scepticism and irrational dogmatism are rightly 
to be superseded with human rationality. But to him 'la raison naturelle', 
rationality endowed in man by nature, is in itself the most problematic of all. For 
nature is corrupt, and human rationality can never save man from his natural 
corruption. Dogmatism and scepticism fail to save him. But for that matter 'la 
raison naturelle' is equally 'impuissante' and 'imbecile'. At this point his voice 
becomes prophetic: 'Que deviendrez-vous done, o hommes qui cherchez quelle est 
votre veritable condition par votre raison naturelle?' The parallel between Pascal 
and Coleridge is unmistakably clear when Coleridge writes of 'a dissection of 
Atheism—particularly the Godwinian System of Pride'.36 They share the exactly 
same attitude towards the seemingly triumphant rationalism. Pascal shouts at it, 
'Humiliez-vous, raison impuissante!', and Coleridge challenges it, 'Proud of what?1. 
When they observe that human rationality generates false certainty which is derived 
from nature, they prophetically argue that religion is the only source of certainty. 
The expressive similarity between Pascal's 'nature imbecile' and Coleridge's 'ideot 
Nature' seems to be more than a mere accident.
As to the measure of recovery, what they are pointing at is quite obvious. Pascal 
begins the article with a statement: 'We have no certainty of the truth of these 
principles, except for the faith and the revelation' [nous n'avons aucune certitude de 
la verite de ces principes, hors la foi et la revelation].37 He makes it clear that he
36 CN, I, 174: 16. Quoted and discussed above.
37 Pascal, ibid., p. 341.
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is not propagating any dogmatism. But he does not clarify any further what 'la foi et 
la revelation' is. To him grace is the last word. Coleridge, on the other hand, is 
more articulate. He continues:
X DeproeliantiOm e carcere nubium &c
t  In the last Hymn a sublime enumeration of all the beauties charms or 
Tremendities of Nature—then a bold avowal of Berkley's System ! ! !  !
Coleridge still keeps his hope for the recovery of nature. It is as if he expects that 
when the whole nature is re-created and blessed again, he, as a poet, can sing the 
praise again. What he is to praise is no longer 'beauties' but newly revealed 
'tremendities' of nature. For that sake he has to depart from old and corrupt nature 
and to discover 'new' nature. Thus Coleridge begins to engage himself with the 
problem of two natures. It is the problem with which Pascal ends his article.
nous font connaitre qu'il y a deux verites de foi egalement constantes: I'une, que 
I'homme dans I'etat de la creation ou dans celui de la grace est eleve au-dessus de 
toute la nature, rendu comme semblable a Dieu, et participant de sa divinite, 
I'autre qu'en I'etat de la corruption et du peche, il est dechu de cet etat et rendu 
semblable aux betes. Ces deux propositions sont egalement fermes et certaines. 
[we should know that there are two truths of faith which are equally constant: 
one is that man in the state of the creation, or in the state of grace, is elevated 
above the whole of nature, made in the image of God, and participating in the 
divinity. The other, in the state of corruption and sin he has fallen from the first 
state and has become like beasts. These two propositions are equally firm and 
certain.]
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Pascal is rather detached and descriptive, and therefore not entirely absorbed in this 
paradox. Coleridge, on the contrary, is determined and confident at overcoming the 
paradox. In trying to solve the problem of two natures, Coleridge introduces the 
'second' departure. Pascal knows only one departure, and that is the Fall. Coleridge 
goes farther and seeks for the second departure, and that is meant to be the recovery. 
But man is allowed only one departure. Therefore Coleridge's first and second 
departures inevitably overlap and his journey becomes simultaneously Fall and 
recovery. Pascal asks, 'quel paradoxe vous etes a vous-meme?'.
'The Ancient Mariner' is not only the poem of departure but also of return. The 
Mariner completes his journey when he becomes an immaterial 'blessed ghost'. But 
he wakes up again and the return journey begins. The poem's largest irony is that 
this return journey brings him back not to the original reality but to the original 
anxiety. The crew is revived and the land is regained, but they are utterly different 
from what they were. They re-appear as it were on the other side of reality. When 
he arrives at his homeland, he exclaims 'the lighthouse top', 'the hill', 'the kirk' in 
the exact reverse order. And in his homeland he experiences the intense ambiguity 
of his return journey. Fie certainly ends his voyage in the unknown ocean, but he 
remains an outcast on the land. He is no longer an expelled atheist, but still deprived 
of the ordinary reality which he had left behind at his departure. Moreover, in spite 
of his prayer he does not recover the stable distinction between reality and 
nightmare. Even the Mariner's own being does not recover its original certainty. 
The Mariner reassures the Wedding-Guest:
Fear not, fear not, thou Wedding-Guest!
This body dropt not down.
But he did drop down into his 'sleep'. And even though he seemingly recovers 
everything, he finally fails to undo the reality of his surreal experience out in the
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ocean. His departure turns round 'phantom and fact1 once, and his return journey 
merely does so once more.
Thus the Mariner fails to get into the '5th stage' of the prayer, which is 'self- 
annihilation—the Soul enters the Holy of Holies.'38 The linear ascent from 
materiality to spirituality stops short just before its completion and begins to  
circulate. The Mariner thus abstracts himself from material nature but fails to  
resolve himself into spirit, and at the end of his return journey he fails to bury his 
'self' in materiality either. His 'self' is thus not quite material nor spiritual; it is 
an unstable entity which circulates between the two ends. When Coleridge speculates 
on 'prayer', he also makes the following Notebook entry. 'Prayer Mrs Estlin's Story 
of the Maniac who walks round & round.'39 In fact, this 'Prayer' describes much 
better the Mariner's circular voyage and its endless repetition in his narrative than 
the 'Prayer' of the linear ascent.40
Some twenty years later Coleridge takes up the question of linearity and 
circularity again. In the twelfth chapter of Biographia Literaria, he translates 
Schelling's argument on mathematics with small but significant modifications. As a 
result, Coleridge's seemingly geometrical observation is the declaration of his 
commitment to ethics, his mathematical discussion about 'the point in motion' is 
virtually his ethical argument about the human mind. He writes:
38 CN, I, 257. Quoted and discussed above.
39 CN, I, 260.
40 Coleridge is to write in July-August 1808, 'The habit of psychological Analysis 
makes additionally difficult the act of true Prayer ... it does make Prayer, the sole 
instrument of regeneration, very very difficult. 0  those who speak of Prayer, of 
deep, inward, sincere Prayer, as sweet and easy, if they have the Right to speak 
thus, 0  how enviable is their Lot!' Yet he also says that self-reflection 'may be 
employed as a guard against Self-delusion'. CN, III, 3355. Later he mentions the 
difficulty and rarity of 'true Prayer'. He writes in a marginal note to Metaphysik 
der Sitten, 'It takes for granted that Prayer is not an act, but a mere wishing—0! 
who ever prayed, that has not an hundred times felt that scarce an act of Life was so 
difficult as to determine to pray? Effective Resolve to Heart-amendment must have 
commenced, before true Prayer can be uttered—And why call words of Hypocrites or 
Formalists Prayers?' CM, III, pp. 267-8.
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In geometry the primary construction is not demonstrated, but postulated. This 
first and most simple construction in space is the point in motion, or the line. 
Whether the point is moved in one and same direction, or whether its direction is 
continuously changed, remains as yet undetermined. But if the direction of the 
point have been determined, it is either by a point without it, and then there 
arises the strait line which incloses no space; or the direction of the point is not 
determined by a point without it, and then it must flow back again on itself; that 
is, there arises a cyclical line which does inclose a space. If the straight line be 
assumed as the positive, the cyclical is then the negation of the straight. It is a 
line which at no point strikes out into the straight, but changes its direction 
continuously.41
If linearity and circularity are contradictory, and if the Mariner is not given ’one 
and same direction1 for his voyage, his journey necessarily falls into circularity. 
The Mariner is 'the Maniac who walks round & round1, who confines himself in 'a 
space' inclosed by a cyclical line.42 In order to break this senseless circularity, 
Coleridge shifts the dimension of argument and redefines the Mariner's 
disorientation as freedom. He continues:
But if the primary line be conceived as undetermined, and the strait line as 
determined throughout, then the cyclical is the third compounded of both. It is at 
once undetermined and determined; undetermined through any point without, and 
determined through itself.
41 BL, I, pp. 248-50 and note.
42 This 'space' is the 'human' space. For Coleridge's further speculation on space, 
see Chapter 5 ,1.
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For Coleridge this is no longer a geometrical observation but an ethical argument. 
He argues that what breaks the maniac's magic circle is determination from within, 
that the Mariner's voyage is lost not because it does not have a fixed destination but 
because it lacks self-determination. He concludes the passage with his own word, 'a 
practical idea'—that is, ethical impetus from within. However, this unconditioned 
freedom turns out to be the beginning of another, graver problem for Coleridge. In 
'The Ancient Mariner', it is the killing of the Albatross, that results from such 
freedom. Suggestively, the dead bird remains on the horizon at first and later sinks 
into the depth:
The self-same moment I could pray:
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like lead into the sea.
It is intensely ironical that the attempt of linear ascent thus results in linear 
descent. If the mariner's departure from nature is the first Fall, this is the second 
Fall. But Coleridge leaves this problem almost untouched. The Mariner's voyage 
does not reach this depth, instead, it remains on the surface of the ocean. Coleridge 
thus gains his freedom by his departure from divine nature. And he finds himself 
incapable of dealing with its consequence. He addresses this problem in 'Confessio 
Fidei' (1810), in which he extensively rewrites Kant's ethics in Christian terms.43
III. It is very suggestive that in collaborating on Lyrical Ballads (1798), Coleridge 
takes 'the supernatural' and leaves 'the natural' to Wordsworth. According to the 
account he gives in Biographia Literaria,44 they are certainly aware of the basic
43 See Chapter 5, III.
44 BL, II, pp. 5-7.
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difference in their creativities and divide their collaboration accordingly. And they 
are confident in 'the practicability of combining both'. That is to say, they place the 
problem of two natures between themselves, and confidently speculate on the 
possibility of their union and the resolution of the problem. Coleridge describes his 
role:
it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters 
supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature 
a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows 
of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which 
constitutes poetic faith.
Obviously, he does not mean by 'supernatural' merely fanciful. It is 'supernatural' 
when he brings forth 'a human interest and a semblance of truth' from within. 
Therefore it necessarily falls outside 'a faithful adherence to the truth of nature'. He 
here argues that the plausibility of such a poem is not natural but human, and to the 
extent it represents 'inward' and 'human' nature, it procures the 'willing suspension 
of disbelief' in the reader. His phrase 'willing suspension of disbelief' allows 
further interpretation, for he has a personal need to procure it in himself. He 
experiences his departure from the natural to the supernatural as the Fall and, as a 
result, sees only 'shadows of imagination' which, when unaccompanied by 'a human 
interest' or 'a semblance of truth’, are nothing but nightmares. Therefore, if he 
endeavours to restore his own nightmares into some human reality by his poetic 
exercise, it is an attempt primarily at personal recovery. In this sense, his 'human 
interest' is an interest in salvation, the 'semblance of truth' then is the fictive 
reality of salvific story, and the 'willing suspension of disbelief' his own endurance 
to forbear entire disbelief in his poetic exercise.
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Coleridge's supernatural thus originates in his 'inward' nature which is strictly 
separate from nature. In contrast, Wordsworth, by choosing 'the natural', does not 
experience such a potentially problematic distinction. Wordsworth's poetic merit, 
as Coleridge describes in Biographia Literaria, is 'to give the charm of novelty to 
things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by 
awakening the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the 
loveliness and the wonders of the world before us'. But in doing so, Wordsworth does 
not lose the grounded certainty of 'things of everyday'. In seeking nature's 
'loveliness and wonders', he never loses the sight of the ground on which he stands. 
In this sense Wordsworth's supernatural is continuous with the natural, or rather, 
his 'feeling analogous to the supernatural' still remains within nature. Coleridge 
describes his original confidence in 'the practicability of combination' in Biographia 
Literaria. 'The sudden charm, which accidents of light and shade, which moon-light 
or sun-set diffused over a known and familiar landscape, appeared to represent the 
practicability of combining both.' But, as he says, 'These are the poetry of nature', 
that is, strictly Wordsworthian. There are two ways to combine the natural and the 
supernatural. What Coleridge attempts to do is not ascend from the natural towards 
the supernatural as Wordsworth does but come back from the supernatural to the 
natural. And it is as much difficult, even treacherous as the Mariner's return 
journey. As Wordsworth pulls out of the collaboration in 'The Wanderings of Cain' 
and 'The Ancient Mariner', Coleridge becomes the one who realizes the depth of the 
problem of two natures and the real difficulty of his task to reconcile them. 
Wordsworth's confidence comes from the fact that he does not experience the anxiety 
of groundless uncertainty of the supernatural world. Wordsworth's elevation from 
the natural to the supernatural does not presuppose the Fall. But Coleridge's 
recovery from the supernatural to the natural does, and all he can do to procure 
recovery is to endure the 'willing suspension of disbelief' first of all within himself 
and to hope that the supernatural will somehow merge into the natural.
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In the days of the collaboration there are frequent exchanges between Coleridge 
and Wordsworth on the topic of sin and evil. Paul Magnuson compares 'The Ancient 
Mariner1 with Wordsworth's 'Salisbury Plain poems' and argues that the former is 
the correspondent counterpart of the latter.45 The comparison, however, shows the 
basic difference between them in spite of their similarity of material and story. 
Most notably, one is located on the plain and the other on the ocean. The point is that 
in 'The Ancient Mariner' Coleridge depicts the vague, ominous anxiety which he 
personally experiences. In the later version of the poem, Coleridge writes:
With sloping masts and dipping prow,
As who pursued with yell and blow 
Still treads the shadow of his foe,
And forward bends his head,
The ship drove fast, loud roared the blast,
And southward aye we fled46
This vague anxiety goes through the whole of the poem from the beginning to the end, 
even after the Mariner's proclamation. The Mariner's only act, the shooting of the 
albatross, is known to have been suggested by Wordsworth. But Coleridge does not 
offer any resolution. He only absorbs it in the overall vague anxiety which begins 
with the Mariner's departure. Understandably, Wordsworth dislikes this vague 
anxiety and quickly withdraws from the collaboration. Wordsworth's dismissive 
note attached to 'The Ancient Mariner' in the second edition of Lyrical Ballads is an 
explicit statement of his aversion to it.
45 Paul Magnuson, Coleridge and Wordsworth (Princeton, 1988), pp. 33-45, 68- 
86.
46 Coleridge writes down these lines in 1806 and inserts them in the 1817 version. 
See Poems, p. 361.
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the Author was himself very desirous that it should be suppressed. This wish had 
arisen from a consciousness of the defects of the Poem, and from a knowledge that 
many persons had been much displeased with it. The Poem of my Friend had 
indeed great defects; first, that the principal person has no distinct character, 
either in his profession of Mariner, or as a human being who having been long 
under the controul of supernatural impressions might be supposed himself to 
partake of something supernatural: secondly, that he does not act, but is 
continually acted upon: thirdly, that the events having no necessary connection do 
not produce each other; and lastly, that the imagery is somewhat too laboriously 
accumulated.47
It is obvious that Wordsworth reads and criticizes the poem from his 'natural1 point 
of view. All that he lists as 'the defects' of the poem are certainly true. But 
Coleridge's point is to depict the figure of an outcast who is deprived of his personal 
character and action, and thrown out into a chaotic, meaningless, 'supernatural' 
ocean.
When he plans the hymns to the Elements Coleridge seeks for the departure from 
land to ocean, from the natural to the supernatural. When he finishes the first 
version of 'The Ancient Mariner' he desperately wishes to return from the 
supernatural to the natural. Since his departure results in 'the fall' into his own 
internal depth, he now seeks for a recovery which must be from within himself. In 
this context, he mentions the 'original sin' in a letter to his brother George on 10 
March 1978, exactly when he finishes the first version of 'The Ancient Mariner'. 
He writes:
47 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 7 797-1800, ed. James 
Butler and Karen Green (Ithaca and London, 1992) p. 791.
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Of GUILT I say nothing; but I believe most stedfastly in original Sin; that from our 
mothers1 wombs our understandings are darkened; and even where our 
understandings are in the Light, that our organization is depraved, & our 
volitions imperfect; and we sometimes see the good without wishing to attain it, 
and oftener wish it without the energy that wills & performs—48
Thus he finds 'original Sin' at the heart of his whole being. In this letter he also 
describes what he believes to be the recovery. He continues: 'And for this inherent 
depravity, I believe, that the Spirit of the Gospel is the sole cure—but permit me to 
add, that I look for the Spirit of the Gospel 'neither in the mountain, nor at 
Jerusalem'—'; that is, not in nature nor in society but in himself, in his 'will'. The 
optimistic overtone of the letter is dependent solely on his confidence in finding the 
Spirit of the Gospel in his own 'will'. Therefore, 'Of GUILT I say nothing'. And once 
he recovers confidence by referring to 'the Spirit of the Gospel', he regains lost 
nature and his formerly abandoned social idealism.
I love fields & woods & mountains] with almost a visionary fondness—and 
because I have found benevolence & quietness growing within me as that fondness 
[has] increased, therefore I should wish to be the means of implanting it in 
others—& to destroy the bad passions not by combating them, but by keeping 
them in inaction.
It is as if he is recollecting the Pantisocracy scheme. When he finds 'benevolence & 
quietness' within himself, he moves on to the amelioration of the whole human being. 
But this time the grand scheme is the extension of his recovery from within. First 
of all he has to recover 'benevolence & quietness growing within me'. He promises to
48 CL, I, pp. 394-8.
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devote himself 'in poetry, to elevate the imagination & set the affections in right tune 
by the beauty of the inanimate impregnated, as with a living soul, by the presence of 
Life—in prose, to the seeking with patience & a slow, very slow mind ... What our 
faculties are & what they are capable of becoming.—1
Coleridge confidently describes his recovery both poetically and politically and 
presents himself as a poet of nature and a political idealist. But there is also an ill 
omen in it. Obviously, he thinks he has successfully endured his illness which led 
him to think of the original sin. He writes, 'God be praised, the matter has been 
absorbed; and I am now recovering a pace, and enjoy that newness of sensation from 
the fields, the air, & the Sun, which makes convalescence almost repay one for 
disease.' However, he also writes, 'Laudanum gave me repose, not sleep: but YOU, I 
believe, know how divine that repose is—what a spot of inchantment, a green spot of 
fountains, & flowers & trees, in the very heart of a waste of Sand!' It is ominous 
that he uses almost the same description of landscape for what he thinks is the 
genuine recovery by 'the Spirit of the Gospel' and for the repose by opium. He will 
soon go through a long and agonizing personal experience for which he constantly 
chooses the latter in the place of the former. Opium thus intensifies the problem of 
two natures, and his addiction to it devastates his seeming confidence in his 'will'. 
Moreover, the sweet dream of artificial paradise effected by opium will soon turn 
out be a horrifying nightmare.49 All of these will force a radical reconsideration of 
what he here promises 'in poetry' and 'in prose'. That is, 'Of GUILT' he will say much 
more. And, as is frequently interpreted, his life becomes a grand enactment of 'The 
Ancient Mariner'.
49 For Coleridge's nightmare, see Chapter 4, II.
Chapter 3 'Dejection Ode' and the Theft of His Own 'Nature'
I. Coleridge's writing becomes prominently autobiographical after the composition 
of 'The Ancient Mariner' (1798). Later in his literary life he writes 'Dejection Ode' 
(1802), 'Confessio Fidei' (1810), Biographia Literaria (1817), Aids to Reflection 
(1825 ), and The Confession of Inquiring Spirit (1840, posthumous), all 
characteristically autobiographical and confessional. They are the result of his 
intense and painful self-reflection with one constant th e m e — recovery. 
Interestingly, he suggests that his autobiographical writings are derived from the 
ever growing and never executed plan, 'Soother of Absence'. In the Notebook in 
November 1803 he describes the plan of autobiography as 'the work which I should 
be wish to leave behind me, or publish late in Life' and writes: '2nd Vol.—Soother of 
Absence.—My Life & Thoughts.—Comic Epic.—Hymns, Sun, Moon, Elements, Man & 
God.'1 Shortly before that entry he writes, 'Seem to have made up my mind to write 
my metaphysical works, as my Life, & in my Life—intermixed with all the other 
events /or history of the mind & fortunes of S.T. Coleridge.'2
Coleridge's autobiographical, confessional narrative is the result of his self­
reflection, that is, the result of the loss of nature. He makes an clear description of 
his self-reflective mind in 'Frost at Midnight', a composition contemporary with 
'The Ancient Mariner'. While his child receives the abundant divine presence in 
nature, he finds his self-reflective mind expelled from it into darkness. He likens 
his mind to the restless motion of a film on a grate, 'the sole unquiet thing' at night. 
It, like his mind, acts only in darkness; its motion is noticeable only when total 
silence dominates.
1 CN, l, 1646. Here the plan 'the hymns to the Elements' merges into 'Soother of 
Absence', giving the latter an implicit theological dimension. For 'the hymns to the 
Elements', see Chapter 1, I and II. For 'Soother of Absence', see Chapter 1, IV.
2 CN, I, 1515.
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Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live,
Making it a companionable form,
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself,
And makes a toy of Thought.3
The self-reflective mind replaces the reciprocity between reception and response of 
'hymn1 with its own self-reciprocal, self-reflective act. By relating itself 
exclusively to its own phantom product, the mind confines itself in its own internal 
sphere. The self-reflective sphere is thus a negative, phenomenal sphere which lies 
outside divine nature, yet is, nevertheless, the only 'reality' for those who have 
fallen into it. It is 'his' world, individual, exclusively internal. He mentions 'the 
rv w d i aeavxov  from Heaven' for the first time when he acknowledges his 'poetical 
death' in a letter to Godwin on 25 March 1801.4 Although he does not adopt the 
explicit theological language for it until much later, self-reflection is implicitly a 
theological matter for him from the beginning.
In 'Dejection Ode'5 Coleridge explores, with considerable anxiety, where his 
self-reflection takes him. In the end of the poem he declares that self-reflection is a 
way to the promised recovery rather than to an endless regression from the original 
presence. He believes in the recovery from within and says, 'Ah! from the soul itself 
must issue forth A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud Enveloping the Earth—. 
Therefore he writes:
3 Poems, p. 138.
4 CL, II, p. 714.
5 Poems, 280-3.
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0  pure of heart! thou need'st not ask of me 
What his strong music in the soul may be!
What, and wherein it doth exist,
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist,
This beautiful and beauty-making power.
He calls this 'power' 'Joy' and writes, 'Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous 
cloud'. And around the time of the composition, 'luminous cloud' appears several 
times in descriptions of landscape in the Notebook. One of them is the entry which 
immediately precedes the draft of 'Apologia pro Vita sua'. The poem is possibly his 
first articulation of 'beauty-making power' which he believes to lie within poet's 
mind. The discovery of such power is the result of his nocturnal recollection of the 
landscape which he observed in daylight. He writes on 26 August 1800:
Wednesday, 26. Morning—six o'clock—Clouds in motion half down Skiddaw, 
capping & veiling Wanthwaite. No sun, no absolute gleam ... a mere gloom of 
cloudiness.—
N.B. What is it that makes the silent bright of the Morning vale so different from 
that other silence & bright gleams of late evening? Is it in the mind or 4ft is 
there any physical cause? ...
8 °clock—White Cloud rolling along on the edge of a green Sun-spot on the 
Bassenthwaite Extremity of Skiddaw— ...
A day of cloudiness—& the Sun known to have set by the-bet# clock only.6
'N.B.' is an important insertion. Viewing the similar cloud and light in the morning 
and in the evening, he wonders if he sees the difference between the landscape in the
6 CN, l, 789.
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morning and that in the evening because of his mind alone, while there is no 
external, 'physical' difference between them. He here raises the question concerning 
the extent of the participation of the active mind in viewing the landscape. He 
repeats a similar observation the next day and speculates the possibility of the act of 
the human mind which is independent of external nature. This time he goes on to 
observe the impressions of the landscape recollected in his mind at eleven o'clock and 
drafts 'Apologia pro Vita sua'.
Wednesday Thursday, Aug. 27. A morning of masses of clouds rolling in Sunshine 
the Grange well lighted up—. It rained a trifle.
Sunset lights slanted Newland Hollaectows—smoke flame over Wanthwaite 
& under that mass a wedge of light on the cliff—but soon the whole of Wanthwaite 
drunk with a black-hued scarlet— the distances of Borrodale duskily colored long 
after the set, & the end of the Lake a 4 was crimsoned during the Sunset...
Then the evening comes and darkness covers all the visible landscape. Yet he keeps 
observing the scene which is similar to the landscape of the day. He continues:
11 °clock at night—that conical Volcano of coal, half an inch high, sending 
ejaculating its inverted cone of smoke—the smoke in what furious wind, this 
way, that way—& what a noise!
The poet's eye in his tipsy hour 
Hath a magnifying power
Or rather be diverts 4ws eyes /  his soul emancipates his eyes 
Of the accidents of size /
In unctuous cones of kindling Coal 
Or smoke from his Pipe's hole
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His eye can see 
Phantoms of sublimity.7
He describes the coal fire as if it were the landscape. He assimilates the fire and the 
smoke in a dark room to the sun and the cloud he saw in daylight. Except for 'the 
accident of size1, the two sceneries are similar. 'The Idling Spirit' of 'Frost at 
Midnight' is said to produce 'a toy of Thought'. Here it produces a miniature 
landscape. The 'toy' produced within the internalized mind thus begins to assume 
'Sublimity' of the external landscape.
Coleridge writes in 'Dejection Ode', 'Joy that ne'er was given, Save to the pure, 
and in their purest hour'. Personally, however, he has a deep anxiety that he may be 
deprived of 'Joy'. It is not because his mind produces nothing in the 'genial hour' but 
because it may produce something other than 'Joy'. In fact, he is to lose his 
optimism about his own active mind soon. When he writes to Southey on 14 August 
1803, a month before the composition of 'Pains of Sleep', he happens to illustrate 
the 'act' of his mind with an expression similar to that in 'Apologia pro Vita sua'. He 
writes, 'The simplest Illustration would be the circle of Fire made by whirling 
round a live Coal—only here the mind is passive. Suppose the same effect produced 
ab intra—& you have a clue to the whole mystery of frightful Dreams, &
7 CN, I, 791. The final version of 1822 becomes:
THE poet in his lone yet genial hour 
Gives to his eyes a magnifying power:
Or rather he emancipates his eyes 
From the black shapeless accidents of size—
In unctuous cones of kindling coal,
Or smoke upwreathing from the pipe's trim bole,
His gifted ken can see
Phantoms of sublimity. Poems, p. 245.
It is important that in the later version he draws closer to his creative theory and 
names it 'Apologia pro Vita sua'. 'Phantoms of sublimity' is the achievement of poet's 
perception/creation by 'his gifted ken' in 'his lone yet genial hour'. For the word 
'genial', see below.
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Hypochondriacal Delusions.'8 The point is not that his mind is no longer passive but 
active. The problem is that his 'active' mind produces 'frightful Dreams, & 
Hypochondriacal Delusions' and not 'Joy'. He may still believe that he can produce 
'Joy' from within himself. Then the question is when or whether his mind stops 
producing fear and depression ab intra.
Coleridge's letter on 10 March 1799 to his wife from Germany already shows 
that he may fail in his attempt at 'internal' recovery. He writes:
I have thought & thought of you, and pictured you & the little ones so often & so 
often, that my Imagination is tired, down, flat and powerless; and I languish after 
Home for hours together, in vacancy; my feelings almost wholly unqualified by 
Thoughts. I have, at times, experienced such an extinction of Light in my mind, I 
have been so forsaken by all the forms and colourings of Existence, as if the 
organs of Life had been dried up; as if only simple BEING remained, blind and 
stagnant!—9
He recognizes that in exile he loses not only 'all the forms and colourings' of 
landscape but also the feminine. The idea and language he uses here resemble those of 
'Dejection Ode' to the extent of suggesting that he is rehearsing 'Dejection Ode' three 
years earlier, dedicating it to his wife. When he endeavours to recover the presence 
of his wife Sara, he soon discovers that the recovery of the feminine is as difficult 
and treacherous as that of landscape. He eventually succeeds in recovering the 
feminine within his mind, but she turns out to be another Sara. It strongly suggests 
that his problem with the two Saras is not necessarily the problem between Sara 
Fricker whom he ceases to love and Sara Hutchinson whom he begins to love. It is 
rather the problem between the real and the unreal woman, or, the woman
8 CL, II, p. 974. See Chapter 4: I, II for his further investigation of nightmare.
9 CL, I, p. 470.
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materialized without and the woman spiritualized within, his mind. This is in fact 
an ethical version of the problem of two natures.10
In the letter Coleridge discloses a hint of his metaphysics when he complains 
about 'an extinction of Light'. Without light in 'his' mind he has to live with 'simple 
BEING ... blind and stagnant'. Here again he expresses his anxiety that nature may 
turn out to be an amorphous mass.11 He admits that he has fallen into 'a strange 
state' and explains how it is like to be in it:
After I have recovered from this strange state, & reflected upon it, I have thought 
of a man who should lose his companion in a desart of sand where his weary 
Halloos drop down in the air without an Echo.—I am deeply convinced that if I 
were to remain a few years among objects for whom I had no affection, I should 
wholly lose the powers of Intellect—Love is the vital air of my Genius12
He says he has recovered from 'this strange state'. However, he, the metaphysician 
is destined to be 'a man who should lose his companion in a desart of sand'. His 
metaphysical research, as he describes it, is like a 'weary Halloos' to his lost 
partner. And when he finally gives up waiting for the response from his partner, he 
instead seeks for the 'Echo' of his own voice and his pursuit becomes 'self- 
reflective'. He writes in May 1799, 'The voice was in my heart you he it is only the 
echo which you hear from my Mouth'.13 And when he loses 'you' who hears him, his 
voice becomes entirely confined within himself and resonates only there. He is to
10 For the parallel of the absence of nature and that of Sara Hutchinson, see the 
discussion about 'Soother of Absence' in Chapter 1, IV.
11 Coleridge calls nature 'blind' and 'ideot' in the plan to write the hymns to the 
Elements. CN, I, 174: 16. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 1,1. He calls it also 'an 
immense heap of little things'. CL, I, p. 349. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 2, I.
12 CL, I, p. 470-1. For the word 'Genius', see below.
13 CN, I, 432: 13.
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write in December 1802, 'Take away from sounds &c the sense of outness—what a 
horrid disease every moment would become1.14
At first, however, Coleridge does not think that metaphysical research is 
necessarily destined to isolated self-reflection. He can still write to Sotheby on 13 
July 1802:
Metaphysics is a word, that you, my dear Sir! are no great Friend to/but yet you 
will agree, that a great Poet must be, implicite if not explicite, a profound 
Metaphysician. He may not have it in logical coherence, in his Brain & Tongue; 
but he must have it by Tact/for all sounds, & forms of human nature he must 
have the ear of a wild Arab listening in the silent Desart, the eye of a North 
American Indian tracing the footsteps of an Enemy upon the Leaves that strew the 
Forest—; the Touch of a Blind Man feeling the face of a darling Child—/ 15
It may or may not be the case that he regards himself as 'a profound Metaphysician1. 
The point is that 'a profound Metaphysician1 he mentions here is the one with acute 
perceptive sensitivity rather than strong productive power. 'A Wild Arab' is still 
listening to the external voice, faint though it may be, and 'a Blind Man1 cannot see 
his child but has no doubt that he is with his child. Metaphysics as well as poetry in 
this sense are still regarded as the matter of acute reception. But soon Coleridge 
betrays his personal desperation and indicates where the real origin and goal of his 
metaphysical research lie. Two months later he writes in the Notebook, 'Mother 
listening for the sound of a still-born child—blind Arab list'ning in the 
wilderness'.16 His metaphysical research thus begins with death, complete loss.
14 CN, I, 1307.
15 CL, II, p. 810.
16 CN, I, 1244.
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Because he experiences this loss as the fall into 'metaphysic depths'17 where he 
finds no light nor sound, his pursuit of recovery cannot remain merely perceptive. 
It will soon become productive, or rather, reproductive.
Coleridge's tour to Arabia is a metaphysical pilgrimage. He absorbs it into a plan 
to write a poem on Spinoza. He writes in November 1799:
If I begin a poem of Spinoza, thus it should begin/
I would make a pilgrimage to the burning sands of Arabia, or &c &c to find the 
Man who could explain to me there can be oneness, there being infinite 
Perceptions—yet there must be a oneness, not an intense Union but an Absolute 
Unity, for & C .18
Here he engages himself in the problem of the 'one' presence and infinitely 'many' 
perceptions. It is a paradox, but it is not a problem until he gets caught by an 
epistemological anxiety and thinks that 'many' perceptions are alienated from 'one' 
presence. And it becomes an insoluble problem when he begins to seek for 'one' 
presence within one of 'many' perceptions. He soon discovers the oneness of his own 
mind, but for him it is not the end of the problem but the beginning of still further 
confusion. 'One and many' immediately comes back to him as 'one' mind and 
infinitely fragmented 'many' minds of which his is one. It is a paradox to know that 
his mind is a fragmented 'one' and at the same time to find that it contains infinitely 
'many' perceptions within its own oneness. He writes in March 1800, 'a cracked 
Looking-glass—such is man's mind—Spinoza',19 and acknowledges that the mind's 
original passivity as a mirror is already fragmented, or, 'cracked'.29
17 BL, I, p. 17.
18 CN, I, 556.
19 CN, I, 705.
20 For Coleridge's later distinction between 'Mind' and 'Minds', see Chapter 7, II. 
For his definition of mind as 'Self-conscious Looking Glass', see Chapter 1, III note.
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Coleridge is to insist on a poetical solution to this ancient question. He writes in 
April-November 1801, 'Pomponatius de Immort. Animae.—says of abstract Ideas— 
universale in particulari speculatur—which is the philosophy of Poetry1.21 In 
Biographia Literaria he ascribes this solution to Aristotle. He writes, 'Aristotle has 
accordingly required of the poet an involution of the universal in the individual1.22 
But as seen above, Coleridge's 'one and many' can no longer be settled simply by 'the 
universal in the particular'. When he discovers the one and fragmented mind, the 
previous settlement between the universal and the particular gets invalidated from 
its base. Discovery of the one and fragmented mind causes a new and further 
complicated question: how does the one 'and' particular mind participate in the 
original one and universal while it contains now doubly 'particularized' many within 
itself?23 He thus needs a new poetics to reconcile 'one and many' on a new level. He 
writes again in October 1803:
Poem on Spirit—or on Spinoza—I would make a pilgrimage to the Deserts of 
Arabia to find the man who could make understand how the one can be many! 
Eternal universal mystery! It seems as if it were impossible; yet it is— & it is 
every where!—It is indeed a contradiction in Terms: and only in Terms!—It is the 
co presence of Feeling & Life, limitless by their very essence, with Form, by its 
very essence limited—determinate—definite.—24
He expresses the wonder and not the problem of 'one and many', that is, he is 
speaking poetically and not philosophically. It is as if he is recanting 'The Eolian
21 CN, I, 943.
22 BL, II, p. 185.
23 This is the question with which Coleridge reads Kant. And because of this 
question he remains unconvinced with Kant's argument. See the following Chapters.
24 CN, I, 1 561. For Coleridge's later speculation on 'Spirit', see Chapter 7: III, IV.
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Harp'25 and praising the harmony between 'one and many1. But by 1803 he must 
'personally' know that one and many is not 'a contradiction only in terms'. What he 
sees in his own mind is a sure sign that the contradiction takes place on a quite 
different level.
It is in this letter from Germany that he mentions the split between 'feeling and 
thinking' possibly for the first time. It is to this split that he ascribes the failure of 
his imagination, 'an extinction of Light in my mind'. This is an important 
observation in view not only of his early poetics he often discusses in letters around 
the time of composing 'Dejection Ode' but also of its further philosophical 
development. Later he redefines the split as the split between passivity and activity 
and places it at the centre of his philosophical and theological argument. In this 
letter he says, 'my feelings [are] almost wholly unqualified by Thoughts. I have, at 
times, experienced such an extinction of Light in my mind'. At this stage, however, 
he is not worried about this failure. He says, 'I have recovered from this strange 
state'. Even in 'Dejection Ode' he maintains that his imagination is not lost but 
temporarily suspended. He writes:
But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth,
My shaping spirit of Imagination.
It is with this optimism that he begins to formulate his poetics which simultaneously 
presupposes and aims at the original unity between feeling and thinking. He soon 
realizes , however, that the argument which presupposes such unity is poetical, but 
that which aims at it, that is, which acknowledges the split and seeks for its 
recovery is no longer poetical but metaphysical. And, as will be seen, it is in this
25 Poems, pp. 52-3.
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pursuit of recovery that he happens to overturn the precedence of feeling over 
thinking and admits that he has shifted the 'act' of his mind to a quite different 
level.26
Before the composition of 'The Ancient Mariner' in 1797 he could rely on the 
unquestioned unity of 'feeling and thinking' in himself. He writes to Thelwall on 17 
December 1796:
I feel strongly, and I think strongly; but I seldom feel without thinking, or think 
without feeling. Hence tho' my poetry has in general a hue of tenderness, or 
Passion over it, yet it seldom exhibits unmixed & simple tenderness or Passion. 
My philosophical opinions are blended with, or deduced from, my feelings: & 
this, I think, peculiarizes my style of Writing.27
Here he maintains the precedence of feeling over thinking. He says that his 
philosophy is 'deduced from' his feeling. Yet it is obvious that the precedence itself 
is not the matter of question since he takes their unity and reciprocity for granted. 
He continues, 'I have room enough in my brain to admire, aye & almost equally, the 
head and fancy of Akenside, and the heart and fancy of Bowles'. It is during his
26 For Coleridge's further philosophical speculation on 'feeling and thinking1, see 
Chapter 4, I. For further discussions about 'the precedence', see Chapters 6 and 7. 
It is important to remember that these questions originate in his poetical speculation 
on 'one and many'. In the Notebook entry about 'Poem on Spirit—or on Spinoza', he 
paraphrases a possible solution of 'one and many' as that of 'the co presence of 
Feeling & Life, limitless by their very essence, with Form, by its very essence 
limited—determinate—definite.' CN, I, 1561. See above. Later, discussing about 
poet's 'true genius' in Biographia Literaria, he writes, 'his feelings have been 
habitually associated with thoughts and images, to the number, clearness, and 
vivacity of which the sensation of self is always in an inverse proportion'. BL, I, p. 
43-4. Here he clearly implies that the split between 'feeling' and 'thinking' 
intensifies the problem of 'self. By this time he is well aware that Kant begins his 
'Deduction of the Pure Concept of the Understanding' with the question concerning 
'feeling and thinking', or, 'sensibility and representation' and leads his argument 
towards active self-representation. Coleridge's poetic argument in Biographia 
Literaria can be said to be his response to this Kantian argument. See Chapter 6.
27 CL, I, p. 279.
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repeated acknowledgment of the loss of poetry and intermittent speculations of its 
recovery that he shifts the point of argument from poetry to metaphysics. He writes 
to Poole on 1 February 1801:
I have begun to take Bark, and I hope, that shortly I shall look back on my long & 
painful Illness only as a Storehouse of wild Dreams for Poems, or intellectual 
Facts for metaphysical Speculation. Davy in the kindness of his heart calls me 
the Poet-philosopher—I hope, Philosophy & Poetry will not neutralize each 
other, & leave me an inert mass.28
Here the split between 'feeling and thinking' is paraphrased as that between 'Poetry' 
and 'philosophy'. He expresses the same fear as before that because of this split 
whole nature may become 'an inert mass', or, 'simple BEING ... blind and stagnant' as 
he said two year before. It should be noticed that even at this stage he seems to be 
unconcerned about the precedence of poetry over philosophy, or feeling over 
thinking. However, what he has in mind is not a simple 'co presence' of poetry and 
philosophy. The two days later, he writes to Davy:
what my heart within me burns to do—that is, concenter my free mind to the 
affinities of the Feelings with Words & Ideas under the title of 'Concerning 
Poetry & the nature of the Pleasures derived from it.'—I have faith, that I do 
understand this subject/and I am sure, that if I write what I ought to do on it, the 
Work would supersede all the Books of Metaphysics hitherto written/and all the 
Books of Morals too—29
28 CL, II, pp. 668-9.
29 CL, II, p. 671.
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He is no longer a poet who lives with the secret of poetry but a philosopher who 
intellectually investigates into that secret. This move strongly suggests that for him 
'the affinities of the Feelings with Words' has ceased to be self-evident, that it has 
become the mystery to be investigated. Subsequently, when he presents the figure of 
ideal poet in 1802, he overturns the precedence of poetry over philosophy and 
insists that philosophy should play the essential part of poetic creativity. Such 
philosophy is of course metaphysics. He writes to Sotheby on 13 July 1802 and 
says, 'a great Poet must be, implicite if not explicite, a profound Metaphysician'.30 
By this assertion, he virtually replaces poet with metaphysician. This metaphysical 
overturning does not change the idea of poet/metaphysician who unites feeling and 
thinking within himself. But it changes the way Coleridge presents the idea. He no 
longer describes what the poet 'is' but argues what he 'must be'. It is only a matter 
of time that this descriptive 'must be' becomes imperative 'should be'. Two month 
later on 10 September 1802 he writes to Sotheby again, 'A Poet's Heart & Intellect 
should be combined, intimately combined & unified, with the great appearances in 
Nature'.31 His decisive argument seems to show his confidence in it. But this is the 
letter in which he explains the circumstance of composing 'Hymn Before Sun-Rise'. 
As seen in the first chapter, his imperative poetics immediately reveals that he as a 
poet 'is not' what he 'should be'. Besides, the overturn of the precedence causes 
another problem. Even when a poet achieves what he should be, he can no longer be
30 CL, II, p. 810. Quoted and discussed above. It is not coincidence that with this 
assertion Coleridge begins to see the difference between him and Wordsworth. In 
this letter he criticizes Wordsworth for the first time and says, 'we begin to 
suspect, that there is, somewhere or other, a radical Difference [in our] opinions'. 
CL, II, p. 812. With this recognition Coleridge begins to impose his own idea on 
Wordsworth and 'tell' him what he should be. He writes to Wordsworth on 23 July 
1803, '[Wordsworth's] Picture gives them [Sir George and Lady Beaumont] an idea 
of you as a profound strong-minded Philosopher, not as a Poet—I answered (& I 
believe, truly—) that so it must needs do, if it were a good Portrait—for that you 
were a great Poet by inspirations, & in the Moments of revelation, but that you were 
a thinking feeling Philosopher habitually—that your Poetry was your Philosophy 
under the action of strong winds of Feeling—a sea rolling high.—' CL II, p. 957.
31 CL, II, p. 864. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 1 ,1.
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united with nature herself, but only with 'the appearances' of nature. Coleridge is 
left with a phenomenological problem even when he fulfils the requirement of his 
own poetics. He experiences the split between appearance and matter, between 
appearance which may or may not have anything to do with matter and matter which, 
without appearance, cannot but be 'an inert mass' or 'simple BEING ... blind and 
stagnant'.
Coleridge thus experiences the problem of mutually excluding feeling and 
thinking which makes poetry impossible. In 'Dejection Ode' he sees the problem as 
that of thinking unaccompanied by feeling rather than feeling without thinking. It is 
the act of his mind which is out of tune. He writes of the landscape:
I see them all so excellently fair,
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are!
In a letter to Godwin on 25 March 1801 he writes, 'I look at the Mountains (that 
visible God Almighty that looks in at all my windows) I look at the Mountains only 
for the Curves of their outlines; the Stars, as I behold them, form themselves into 
Triangles—'.32 Then he continues the letter: 'The Poet is dead in me—my imagination 
(or rather the Somewhat that had been imaginative) lies, like a Cold Snuff'. 
Therefore, when he seeks for recovery, he seeks for the 'visible God Almighty' who 
is no longer 'visible', or if he still is, has ceased to present anything to him. Two 
days earlier, he writes to Poole, 'My opinion is this—that deep Thinking is attainable
only by a man of deep Feeling, and that all Truth is a species of Revelation'.33 He
sounds as if he maintains the precedence of feeling over thinking even here. But this 
statement proves to be a decisive step towards the inception of an active, 'thinking'
32 CL, II, p. 714.
33 CL, II, p. 709.
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mind. In fact, it is in this letter that Coleridge hits the highest note for the activated 
mind. In criticizing Locke and Newton, he says:
Newton was a mere materialist—Mind in his system is always passive—a lazy 
Looker-on on an external World. If the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made 
in God's image, and that too in the sublimest sense—the Image of the Creator— 
there is ground for suspicion, that any system built on the passiveness of the 
mind must be false, as a system.34
Previously, he called the mind 'a Convex Mirror1 which quietly reflects the 'visible 
God Almighty'. In that, however, the mind was not merely passive since the 
reflection itself was its immediate response to the presence of the 'visible God'. It 
was passive only in maintaining the precedence of reception over response. The 
'active' mind inevitably overturns this precedence. It produces a response which is 
no longer response, or more precisely, it responds even after it loses the call to 
respond to. It is necessarily self-productive, that is, self-reflective. If man is 'the 
Image of the CreatorJ, he ultimately recapitulates the whole creation within himself. 
But at the same time by doing so he loses nature, the whole creation in which he still 
supposedly remains.
This is a paradox. Co-ordination between the original passivity of 'a Convex 
Mirror' and the secondary activity of self-reflective mind thus becomes the focal 
point of his speculation.
0 Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live:
34 Ibid.
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Receiving and giving both involve nature. But he insists that internal nature is only 
nature which is alive, that is, human recapitulation of the creation is only possible 
nature. The argument involves the reversal of the precedence of receiving over 
giving. But, as seen above, he does not find his personal problem solved even by this 
reversal. Personally, he admits that metaphysical research was originally adopted 
in order to cut off feeling from thinking. He writes to Southey on 29 July 1802, 'As 
to myself, all my poetic Genius ... is gone—and I have been fool enough to suffer 
deeply in my mind, regretting the loss—which I attribute to my long & exceedingly 
severe Metaphysical Investigations—& these partly to Ill-health, and partly to 
private afflictions which rendered any subject, immediately connected with Feeling, 
a source of pain & disquiet to me1.35 He then continues and quotes from 'Dejection 
Ode', italicizing 'think' and 'feel':
For not to think of what I needs must feet,'
But to be still and patient all, I can—
He thus reveals the unfortunate origin of his engagement in metaphysics. On the one 
hand it is adopted to cut off 'feeling' from 'thinking', and on the other it is expected to 
unite them again.
II. Coleridge shakes off his early naturalism in the process of activating his mind. 
Human mind is no longer a part of 'animated nature', one of 'Organic Harp diversely 
fram'd'. Or if it still is, it should be such a special part that it can recapitulate the 
whole creation within itself. He begins to denounce 'Hartley's system' which 
philosophically supported his poetic naturalism by the argument which presupposes 
no disjunction between divine nature and human nature. He writes to Godwin on 22
35 CL, II, pp. 831-2.
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September 1800, 'All the nonsense of vibrations etc you would of course dismiss1.36 
He is dissatisfied with it because it limits the function of the human mind into a 
passive automatic association and precludes its active, free function beyond i t  He 
begins to see it as the system of materialism in which association is predetermined 
by, in Kantian term, 'natural necessity'.37 In the letter he speculates on the act of 
the human mind which is independent of nature and asks whether such an act is 
'arbitrary'.
I wish you to write a book on the power of words, and the processes by which 
human feelings form affinities with them—in short, I wish you to philosophize 
Horn Tooke's System, and to solve the great Questions—whether there be reason 
to hold, that an action bearing all the semblance of pre-designing Consciousness 
may yet be simply organic, & whether a series of such actions are possible—and 
close on the heels of this question would follow the old 'Is Logic the Essence of 
Thinking?' in other words—Is thinking impossible without arbitrary signs? &— 
how far is the word 'arbitrary' a misnomer?38
This 'action' is human action. He argues that human action must be accompanied by 
human mind which is active and self-determining and not 'organic' or natural, that 
is, dependent on nature.39 Human mind, he suggests, possesses 'pre-designing
36 CL, I, p. 626.
37 For Coleridge's view on 'natural necessity' and its relation to human freedom, see 
Chapter 5, III.
38 CL, I, p. 625.
39 James C. McKusick paraphrases 'organic' as 'materialistic' and discusses this 
passage in relation to contemporary linguistic theories such as 'Horn Tooke's 
System'. See McKusick, Coleridge's Philosophy of Language (New Haven, 1986) p. 
41. In the first chapter, he summarizes the linguistic controversy of the day 
concerning the arbitrariness or the naturalness of language. Judging from several 
citations in his book, the basic question seems to be: is language related to nature?. 
If it is, language is somehow derived from nature and also dependent on it. If it is 
not, language is irrelevant to nature and therefore artificial and arbitrary. 
McKusick is right in stressing Coleridge's idealistic turn. But he is not quite
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Consciousness'. He then draws the example from logical thinking and suggests that 
thinking itself is not dependent on the signs, that on the contrary these signs are 'the 
semblance' of pre-designing thinking. They are 'arbitrary' only because they are 
abstract and independent of nature, but they can be 'necessary' as far as the action of 
the human mind is concerned. He then extends his observation to language in general 
of which logic is only an example. He continues:
Are not words &c parts & germinations of the Plant? And what is the Law of 
their Growth?—In something of this order I would endeavor to destroy the old 
antithesis of Words & Things, elevating, as it were, words into Things, & living 
Things too.40
He thus discloses that what he has in mind is 'the old antithesis of Words & Things' 
and its solution. When it is destroyed as he wishes, there will be no disjunction 
between 'the Creator1 and 'the Image of Creator\ between 'the "divine" pre-designing 
Consciousness' which creates 'Things' and 'the "human" pre-designing Consciousness' 
which articulates 'Words'.  If this is achieved, it will certainly lead to the 
restoration of Adamic language. But it is by this argument that Coleridge loses the 
point of his criticism of Hartley and gets caught in a circular argument. For it is 
Coleridge himself who has just brought in 'the old antithesis' against Hartley's
accurate when he paraphrases Coleridge's notion that words are living things as 
'words are themselves things—elements, that is, of an organized structure that 
imposes mental categories on the external world'. Ibid., p. 42. As seen below, by 
that notion Coleridge is not insisting on one-grounded naturalism nor simple 
phenomenal idealism. He is in fact speculating on the 'secondary' nature which 
human language produces for itself independently of nature. He writes in February 
1801, 'Words therefore become a sort of Nature to us, & Nature is a sort of Words. 
Both Words & Ideas derive their whole significancy from their coherence.' CL, II, p. 
698. He continues his speculation on language's creativity and arrives at the notion 
of the outness of language. He writes in March-July 1803, 'Language & all symbols 
give outness to Thought/& this the philosophical essence & purpose of Language/'. 
CN, I, 1387. For a further discussion on 'outness', see Chapter 6, I.
40 CL, I, p. 625-6.
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system. Hartley's system has essentially nothing to do with 'the old antithesis' 
precisely because of 'all the nonsense of vibrations'. Coleridge's dissatisfaction with 
it is because it merely presupposes the original unity and precludes from 
consideration the possible recovery from 'the old antithesis'. He insists that any 
system should acknowledge 'the old antithesis' first and then resolve it, and that 
Hartley's system does neither, while his system may. But it remains uncertain 
whether Coleridge's system can be any better than 'all the nonsense'.
It is not surprising that the argument of this kind assumes the language of
theological controversy. Coleridge writes to Poole on 16 March 1801:
I have not only completely extricated the notions of Time, and Space; but have 
overthrown the doctrine of Association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the 
irreligious metaphysics of modern Infidels—especially, the doctrine of 
Necessity.41
He abandons 'the irreligious metaphysics' in order to establish a religious 
metaphysic. He continues:
This I have done; but I trust, that I am about to do more—namely, that I shall be 
able to evolve all the five senses, that is, to deduce them from one sense, & to 
state their growth, & the causes of their difference—& in this evolvement to
solve the process of Life & Consciousness —
The aim of such metaphysics is to solve 'the old antithesis' between 'Things' and 
'Words', between 'Life' and 'Consciousness' and get to the 'one sense'. But the truly 
theological question is not answered. As seen above, this 'oneness' is not the end but
41 CL, II, p. 706.
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the beginning of the problem. For even when he discovers such 'one sense' and builds 
up a perfect system based on it, there will remain a question concerning the 
belonging of such 'oneness'. If it belongs to the human and not to the divine, how can 
a system built on it be a 'religious' rather than an 'irreligious' metaphysic?
Coleridge soon becomes aware that he has just shifted the problem to a different 
level. And on that level he fails to get to 'one sense' because he finds that human 
passivity and activity, or, feeling and thinking, are irreconcilably two. He writes to 
Godwin on 4 June, 1803:
I shall, if I live & have sufficient health, set seriously to w ork-in  arranging 
what I have already written, and in pushing forward my Studies, & my 
Investigations relative to the omne scibile of human Nature— what we are, & how 
we become what we are; so as to solve the two grand Problems, how, being acted 
upon, we shall act; how, acting, we shall be acted upon. But between me & this 
work there may be Death.42
'The two grand Problems' are in fact one theological problem: the Fall by which he 
ceases to be a poet. Because of the Fall the original unity between reception and 
response is disturbed; therefore it must be reconsidered and resettled in terms of 
passivity and activity. Ironically, however, while the distinction between reception 
and response can be solved in each poetical praxis, the distinction between passivity 
and activity keeps generating further metaphysical complications. Thus the 
dichotomy between passivity and activity immediately expands itself and becomes 
'the two grand Problems' and so on, generating the endless chain of self-reflection. 
The last sentence is very suggestive. Coleridge is to live longer than he expects at 
this time, but the problem he promises to solve turns out to be so big that his
42 CL, II, p. 948-9.
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unexpectedly long life is to prove still too short. It seems as if even the word 'Death' 
assumes a theological connotation.
Coleridge repeats basically the same criticism against Locke in letters he writes 
to Josiah Wedgwood in February 1801. The purpose is to report 'my meditations on 
the relations of Thought to Things'43 and show that Locke's fame and seeming critical 
edge over Descartes and others are the result of Locke's lack of criticism of his own 
inconsistency. Coleridge agrees with Locke that the mind has a passive and active 
function, and that its function is limited within experience. Coleridge quotes from 
Locke, 'external Objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible Qualities, which are 
all those different Perceptions they produce in us: and the Mind furnishes the 
Understanding with ideas of it's own operations.’44 But he disagrees with Locke's 
denial of 'innate ideas'. To represent Locke's view, Coleridge again quotes from him, 
'It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the Understanding 
certain Innate Principles, some primary notions, K o iv a l  e w o ic u ,  characters as it 
were stamped upon the mind of Man, which the Soul receives in it's very first being, 
and brings into the World with it.'43 Coleridge sees that by this argument Locke 
simply misrepresents the word 'innate'. He argues that so called innateness 'was a 
question of Psychogony not Psychology',46 that is, a question concerning mind's 
original function and not its product. Coleridge insists that no one from Pythagoras 
and Plato 'asserts, that any Ideas (in the present sense of the word) could be 
furnished originally or recollectively otherwise than by the mind itself or by this 
external to the Mind, i.e. by Reflection or Sensation.'47 What Plato calls 'Zw jtvpa ,  
living Sparks, & E v a v a p a r a ,  Kindle-fuel' should be understood as describing the
43 CL, II, p. 678.
44 CL, II, p. 680.
45 Ibid.
46 CL, II, p. 681.
47 CL, II, p. 680. Coleridge then say, 'The nihil in intellectu quod non prius in 
sensu of the Peripatetics is notorious'. For the further discussion on this maxim, 
see Chapter 7, III.
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mind's original act and not ideas it produces.48 Coleridge offers a fine illustration 
for Locke's failing to see this distinction. He writes:
By the usual Process of language Ideas came to signify not only these original 
moulds of the mind, but likewise all that was cast in these moulds, as in our 
language the Seal & the Impression it leaves are both called Seals. Latterly, it 
wholly lost it's original meaning, and became synonimous sometimes with Images 
simply (whether Impressions or Ideas) and sometimes with Images in the 
memory49
Coleridge argues that Locke confuses the mind's original act of impressing with the 
impressed ideas and fails to see the active priority of the impressing over the 
impressed. As a result Locke believes that the mind in its original state is a white 
paper. But Coleridge would argue that if the human mind is originally purely 
passive, its act itself remains an unresolved problem, and that Locke has no critical 
sensitivity to see that it is still unexplained. Coleridge says, 'What if instead of 
innate Ideas a philosopher had asserted the existence of constituent Ideas/the 
metaphor would not be a whit more gross, nor the hypothesis involved more daring 
or unintelligible, than in the former phrases'.50
Coleridge thus complains that while Locke denies innate or 'constituent' ideas, 
'nothing is more common in the Essay than such Sentences as these "I do not say there 
is no Soul in us because we are not sensible of it in our sleep" &—"actions of our
48 Coleridge's 'personal' problem, however, is not whether man in general indeed 
has this 'living Sparks' in his mind, but whether Coleridge himself is able to recover 
from its loss, 'an extinction of Light in my mind'. See above. It is this question that 
always leads him to the 'personal', theological argument. See below.
49 CL, II, pp. 682-3. Later, Coleridge repeats the same observation on the 
Sacrament. See Chapter 5, III.
50 CL, II, p. 696. Coleridge seems to repeat here Kant's argument against 
'constitutive ideas'. It is interesting to see him fifteen years later arguing 'for' them 
and expressing his theology in this context. See SM, p. 113-4, and Chapter 4, III.
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mind unnoticed by us["]'.51 Coleridge paraphrases it and shows how paradoxical it 
is. He writes, '(according to Locke's own definitions of mind & we) "actions of our 
consciousness, of which our Consciousness is unconscious.["]'. To Coleridge this 
paradox is the vindication of the active mind. And it demands a settlement. In a 
previous letter he extends a typical Coleridgean speculation and ascribes the active, 
self-reflective human mind to Descartes:
he [Descartes] found himself compelled to turn his view inward upon his own 
frame and faculties in order to determine what share they had in the making up 
both of his Ideas and of his Judgements on them. He now saw clearly, that the 
objects, which he had hitherto supposed to have been intromitted into his mind 
by his senses, must be the joint production of his Mind, his Senses, and an 
unknown Tertium Aliquid/all which might possibly be developments of his own 
Nature, in a way unknown to him.52
Here he does not press the alternative choice between passivity and activity of the 
mind. He maintains that there is 'an unknown Tertium Aliquid' which mediates the 
two. That is to say, the mind can be both passive and active. At the very end of these 
letters, he suddenly asks, 'What is the etymology of the Word M/nctf'53 Yet his real 
concern is not to establish the etymology of 'mind' but to speculate on the mind's 
reciprocal function. The conclusion of his private etymology is that the word 'mind' 
is related to German verb Mahen and that 'the word mahen is to move forward & 
backward, yet still progressively—thence applied to the motion of the Scythe in 
mowing—'.54 But if this means that the mind is both passive and active to itself, that
51 CL, II, p. 696.
52 CL, II, p. 688.
53 Ibid.
54 CL, II, p. 697.
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is, if there is nothing outside the mind for it to be passive and active to, it is hardly a 
settlement. His anxiety that 'all ... might possible be developments of his own 
Nature, in a way unknown to him' in fact brings him back to the starting point of the 
whole speculation. Certainly it is 'an unknown Tertium Aliquid' which may finally 
settle the paradox. But his speculation on it comes only during the latest stage of his 
life.55
III. Coleridge goes through this fundamental shift during the time between 'The 
Eolian Harp' (1795) and 'Dejection Ode' (1802). In March and June 1795 he 
describes the human mind as 'a Convex Mirror' which faithfully reflects the divine 
presence in nature.56 In August he describes it as 'the Eolian Harp'.
Full many a thought uncall'd and undetain'd,
And many idle flitting phantasies,
Traverse my indolent and passive brain 
As wild and various, as the random gales 
That swell or flutter on this subject Lute!57
'Convex Mirror' and 'subject Lute' are an 'indolent and passive brain' which receives 
the unquestionable presence. He keeps referring to both 'a Convex Mirror' and 'the 
Eolian Harp' as the metaphors of the original passivity of human mind. The central 
point is the immediacy between reception and response. The presence is always
55 Later, when referring to 'the mind or the power from within' in the thirteenth 
Philosophical Lecture, Coleridge mentions the two views concerning 'Tertium 
Aliquid' between the mind and body, or, activity and passivity of the mind. They are 
reconciled either 'by a miracle according to Descartes, or by some common thing 
between partaking of the nature both of body and soul, according to one Doctor Henry 
More.' Phil Lects, p. 387. For his later theological speculations on this point, 
especially in relation to Kant's phenomenology, see Chapters 6 and 7.
56 See Chapter 1, III.
57 Poems, p. 53.
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accompanied by the responses from a mirror or a lute, which are so direct and 
immediate, so enclosed in nature that there is no hint of potential disjunction 
between reception and response. Passivity of 'Convex Mirror1 or 'subject Lute' is in 
fact not 'indolence' if it is understood as inactive passivity. It involves activity, but 
only as response which follows reception. 'Full many a thought uncall'd and 
undetain'd' or 'many idle flitting phantasies' are the immediate responses from 'this 
subject Lute' which is still a part of the divine nature.58
However, Coleridge's first reference to the poem already reveals the potential 
instability of his status in nature. In a letter to Thelwall on 31 December 1796 he 
engages himself in a discussion of a possible definition of life. He says to Thelwall, 
'You, I understand, have adopted the idea that it is the result of organized matter 
acted on by external Stimuli', and he insists that their opinions are not 
irreconcilable since Thelwall's 'organized matter' is Coleridge's 'animal Life', and 
Thelwall's 'external Stimuli' Coleridge's 'one Intellectual Breeze'. He continues:
Monro believes in a plastic immaterial Nature—all-pervading—
And what if all of animated Nature 
Be but organic harps diversely fram'd
58 Therefore, it is not surprising when Coleridge later refers to the same poem in 
describing his rather idealistical position in the thirteenth Philosophical Lecture 
and quotes the lines 44-8  of the poem. He says, 'the idealist concedes a real 
existence to one of the two terms only—to the natura naturans, in Berkeley's 
language, to God, and to the finite minds on which it acts, THE NATURA NATURATA, or 
the bodily world, being the result, even as the tune between the wind and the Aeolian 
Harp.' Phil Lects, p. 371. Unless he expands this argument theologically, it is a 
restatement of the argument he made in the 'The Eolian Harp'. The theological 
questions are: which of the two minds, infinite or finite, plays on the 'Harp'? or if 
the tune is twofold, that is, both of them play simultaneously, why is the tune 
discordant? These are the questions he picks up from his early experiences and 
later deals with in philosophical and theological terms.
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That tremble into thought as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic & vast &c—
(by the bye—that is my favorite of my poems—do you like it?)
In the letter he examines various definitions of life by Thomas Beddoes, Erasmus 
Darwin, John Hunter and even Plato. He is unsatisfied with them and says:
And I, tho' last not least, I do not know what to think about it—on the whole, I 
have rather made up my mind that I am a mere apparition—a naked Spirit!—And 
that Life is I myself I! which is a mighty clear account of it.
When he says, 'I am a mere apparition—a naked Spirit1, he seems to imply that he 
has discovered an immaterial 'I' distinct from a material 'I1, and that 'a mighty clear 
account' is the reciprocal interaction between the two Ts, 'I myself I'. Satisfying or 
not, the attempt brings about a question of which he seems to be unaware at this 
time. The question is whether the interaction between the two 'I's is a part of the 
whole interaction between immaterial and material nature described in 'The Eolian 
Harp'. Here are an active, defining 'I* and a passive, defined 'I'. Similarly, there are 
active, immaterial nature, 'one intellectual Breeze' and passive, material nature, 
'organic harps diversely fram'd'. Man as 'this subject Lute' is a part of material 
nature which is responsive to the divine presence. Then the question is whether the 
immaterial 'I* is the same as 'one intellectual Breeze'. If the question is answered 
affirmatively, it means that the immaterial 'I' is not human but divine. But as seen 
in Chapter 2, I, his epistemological anxiety does not allow him to take this position. 
By declaring 'I myself I', he virtually accepts that the human mind is separated from
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the original divine creation.59 Thus by assuming an active role the human mind 
creates its own internal sphere in which it contains both activity and passivity 
within itself. In 'Frost at Midnight' the self-reflective mind is said to be 'Echo or 
mirror seeking of itself'. And he writes on 23 December 1802, 'Himself & his Idea 
of himself forms a compleat circle, like a one arched Bridge over a smooth clear 
stream'.60 Previously, echoing and mirror-reflection had taken place between the 
divine presence and the human response. Now the human self-reflective mind 
assumes both call and response, contains the 'compleat circle' within itself as the 
ideal form of its internal reciprocity.61
'Compleat circle', however, is not what Coleridge achieves in his self-reflection. 
In fact his self-reflection always fails to achieve such clarity and perfection. It
59 In November 1825, Coleridge recollects this event and makes a long Notebook 
entry. He writes, 'the human Subject "I Am" when as known in the act of Self 
reflection, is expressed in the formula, I affirm myself— Ipse me pono—the I 
representing the Subject, & the myself the Object, &  while the Ei|n, or Sum, is the 
Identity of both/'. CN, IV, 5280. For how he relates this 'human I am1 with the 
divine I AM, see Chapter 7, I. He also makes a postscript which reflects his 
philosophical endeavour for these years. He writes, 'The term "myself" is used, and 
of necessity, in two Senses—the first, the artificial & philosophic, that which few 
are capable of, and which can obtained only by an act of the will and an energy of the 
productive Imagination—I must abstract from all impressions, and leave only the 
attribute of impressibility—from all perceptions, and leave only percipiency—& so 
on till I obtain an idea of myself, as the Subject, Substance, Natura gemina quae fit et 
facit, format et formatur ... Second, the myself as modified by the circumjacent 
Objects irremovable, and of closest proximity—organic body, language &c—1 The 
postscript is particularly interesting in view of his response to Kant's argument for 
the original apperception. See Chapter 6. This is the entry in which he calls the 
human mind 'a self-conscious self-sentient Looking-glass'. See Chapter 1, III.
60 CN, I, 1308.
61 CL, I, pp. 294-5. Coleridge keeps working on the possible definition of lile till 
he finally drafts Theory of Life around 1820, which remains unpublished in his life 
time. Here he carefully excludes from the discussion man's 'special' status in the 
creation. He only says, 'Man himself is a syllepsis, a compendium of Nature—the 
Microcosm!', and refers to the 'sovereign Master, who made Man in his image, by 
superadding self-consciousness with self-government, and breathed into him a 
living soul'. TL, p. 423. The fact is that by this time he cannot mention his 'self- 
consciousness' without also mentioning his personal theology which is out of place in 
the context of Theory of Life. He mentions the possible definition of life also in the 
twelfth Philosophical Lecture. Phil Lects, pp. 355-9. But again he avoids referring 
to the problem of the human 'I' which such a definition inevitably involves. See 
below. He concludes the passage in the lecture by saying, 'Whatever life is, in its 
present state it cannot be brought to account for that which more especially 
constitutes us Man'.
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simply reveals that he is a disordered man. He writes to Davy on 11 January 1801 
of the peculiar physical sensation caused by his illness which is a good illustration of 
how he 'reflects' upon himself: 'I am so weak, that even from sitting up to write this 
note to you I seem to sink in upon myself in a ruin, like a Column of Sand informed & 
animated only by a Whirl-blast of the Desart'.62 A week later he repeats the same 
observation, this time using the word 'fall' for 'sink'. He writes to Poole on 19 
January 1801, 'But the sense of Lassitude, if I only sate up in bed, was worst of all— 
I seem'd to fall in upon myself in ruin, like a column of sand, that had been informed 
& animated only by a whirl blast of the desart—such & so treacherous were my 
animal spirits to me1.63 Soon 'sinking' becomes not only physical but personal and 
moral self-description. He writes to Davy on 4 May 1801:
'Sinking, sinking, sinking! I feel, that I am sinkingV—My medical attendant says 
that it is irregular Gout with nephritic Symptoms—. Gout in a young man of 29— 
!—! Swoln Knees, & knotty Fingers, a loathy Stomach, & a dizzy head—trust me, 
Friend! I am at times an object of moral Disgust to my own Mind.64
The days of illness is the time of intense self-reflection. His letter to Thelwall on 
23 January 1801 well exemplifies the pain of such an exercise. After a brief 
account on a series of disease he cries out, 'But I am weary of writing of this I—I—I— 
I—so bepatched & bescented with Sal Ammoniac & Diaculum, Pain & Infirmity. My 
own Moans are grown stupid to my own ears.'65 Thus he finds that the 'weary 
Halloos' in Arabian desert soon become the miserable 'Moans' in sickbed.
62 CL, II, p. 663.
63 CL, II, p. 664.
64 CL, II, p. 726.
65 CL, II, p. 667.
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Coleridge thus shuts himself up in his dreary self-reflection. And it 
immediately causes the disjunction between the external world outside and the 
internal world within his mind. He writes in 'Dejection Ode1:
A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,
A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief,
Which finds no natural outlet, no relief,
In word, or sigh, or tear—
The disjunction between 'within' and 'without' is the immediate result of his 'fall'. 
Before, the presence was said to be received by a mirror or a lute without any 
suggestions of such disjunction. He later inserts a passage to 'The Eolian Harp', 
obviously in search for the recovery from the disjunction between 'within' and 
'without1:
0! the one Life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where—66
Here he endeavours to reconcile between 'within' and 'without' and also to re-unite 
the audible presence and the visual presence. He attempts the same in 'Dejection 
Ode'. Once he discovers joy within, the whole presence will be recovered.
66 Poems, p. 52.
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And thence flows all that charms or ear or sight,
All melodies the echoes of that voice,
All colours a suffusion from that light.
But as he says in the poem, such joy is what he has lost, 'Joy that ne'er given save to 
the pure'. He experiences the gradual recession of the presence which results in the 
complete loss. The visual presence becomes mere 'outward forms' which he sees 
'with how blank an eye’, and he finds the audible presence violent and unbearable.
Those sounds which oft have raised me, whilst they awed,
And sent my soul abroad,
Might now perhaps their wonted impulse give,
Might startle this dull pain, and make it move and live!
If his soul is no longer sent abroad, he is but an '/€o!ian lute, which better far were 
mute1. Once externalized, the presence is irretrievably lost to him. These 'outward 
forms' and the wind 'that rav'st without', which are the last remnants of the original 
presence he receives in the evening, are to disappear into darkness and silence as the 
evening turns to midnight.
Therefore, it is of no consolation when Coleridge says:
0  Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live:
'Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud', he continues, and describes 
Wordsworth or Sara Hutchinson as a genuine poet and himself as a miserable 
metaphysician who is poetically dead. Thus his 'genial spirit failed'. But the 
seeming continuity between nature and dead nature remains. Even when he admits
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the loss, even when his 'genial spirits failed1 and he means all the possible 
implications of the word 'genial' which can be as inclusive as the word 'natural',67 
he does not become nothing. On the contrary he can be said to lose nothing: illness 
does not end his life, he gives up poetry but picks up metaphysics, and he is still in 
love, not with Sara Fricker his fiancee in 'The Eolian Harp' but with Sara Hutchinson 
his lover in 'Dejection Ode'. And it is precisely because of this seeming continuity 
that he is trapped in the treacherous duality between nature and dead nature, or, 
reality and unreality. Treacherous because they look interchangeable, and it is a 
great temptation for a man like Coleridge to recover the lost reality in the new, 
seeming reality.
And haply by abstruse research to steal
From my own nature all the natural man—
This was my sole resource, my only plan:
'Abstruse research' is his metaphysical research. As he acknowledges at once, this 
theft is the attempt at replacing reality with unreality. Once he steals 'the natural 
man' from nature, he confines himself in his own unreal world. He continues:
Hence, viper thoughts, that coil around my mind,
Reality's dark dream!
He steals 'all the natural man'. And by this theft he becomes for the first time 'I 
myself I'. In this sense what he calls 'my own nature' from which he steals 'all the 
natural man' is not yet his own. It is given to him as a gift, which, as he says, is 'not 
mine own, seemed mine.' But this stolen nature is indeed his own. He now
67 For the possible meaning of the word 'genial', see David Jasper, Coleridge as Poet 
and Religious Thinker (London, 1985) pp. 67-8.
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appropriates the gift and adapts it to his own need. Once this is done, everything 
seems to go smoothly. What he calls 'my shaping spirit of Imagination' which has 
been suspended because of disordered nature, will get freed from it and become 'my' 
shaping spirit of imagination. And through its free activity, it may eventually bring 
forth something like the original presence. But he calls it 'Reality's dark dream'. It 
is because he is still a poet, because he is still responding to the original presence, 
and in that, he cannot but realize that response to the gift and response to the booty 
are infinitely different and that the latter can never be response in the real sense, 
hymn. By his theft the presence has already turned to be the absence, but the 
absence as it is still insists that the stolen nature is not nature, unreality is not 
reality.68
It is by self-alienation from nature that Coleridge discovers his self-reflective 
sphere between the two M's. Yet it in itself is a mere emptiness. The spiritual 'I' is 
still 'a mere apparition— naked Spirit'. But it can extract its objects from the 
original presence and pose as the subject. Two problems rise immediately. The 
problem of these extracted objects is that they are but something 'like' reality. The 
problem of the extracting subject is that the very extraction is a theft. He rightly 
tries to solve the two problems at once. The result is life-long, ever-complicating, 
thinking.68
68 In a letter to Sara Hutchinson on 4 April 1802 Coleridge is more explicit about 
'Reality's dark dream'. He writes of his children:
Those little Angel Children (woe is me!)
There have been hours, when feeling how they bind 
And pluck out the Wing-feathers of my Mind,
Turning my Error to Necessity,
I have half-wished, they never had been born! CL, II, p. 797.
69 For a further discussion on this 'naked Spirit' and its possible relation to Kant's 
original apperception, see Chapter 6, II.
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IV. Coleridge thinks at night, in darkness or even in sleep. Thinking is the act he 
adopts when he finds himself in the the absence of all external nature, in that 
complete isolation. He believes that it is the same even in his son Hartley. He writes 
to Dorothy Wordsworth on 9 February 1801:
I asked him what he did when he thought of any thing—he answered—I look at it, 
and then go to sleep. To sleep?—said I—you mean, that you shut your eyes. Yes, 
he replied—I shut my eyes, & put my hands so (covering his eyes) and go to 
sleep—then I WAKE again, and away I run.—That of shutting his eyes, & covering 
them was a Recipe I had given him some time ago/but the notion of that state of 
mind being Sleep is very striking, & he meant more, I suspect, than that People 
when asleep have their eyes shut—indeed I know it from the tone & leap up of 
Voice with which he uttered the word 'WAKE.’70
The difference between Coleridge and his son is that Coleridge does not quite 'WAKE' 
from thinking. In the end of 'Dejection Ode' he vows to keep vigil and promises to 
abandon his 'abstruse research'. But, as the Ode ends in midnight, his waking is not 
to daylight but to darkness. Thus the darkness within merges into the darkness 
without and the difference between vigil and sleep becomes irrelevant. Along with 
the loss of nature he loses the sense of distinction between day and night, or, reality 
and dream. As he intensifies his metaphysical research, he replaces these 'natural' 
distinctions with an artificial one between thinking and unthinking. In fact the vigil 
he vows in 'Dejection Ode' is to remain thinking day and night, that is, to engage him 
in 'abstruse research' incessantly. In a letter to Poole on 16 March 1801 in which 
he promises to 'solve the process of Life & Consciousness', he also writes:
70 CL, II, p. 673.
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At Wordsworth's advice or rather fervent intreaty I have intermitted the 
pursuit—the intensity of thought, & the multitude of minute experiments with 
Light & Figure, have made me so nervous & feverish, that I cannot sleep as long 
as I ought & have been used to do; & the Sleep, which I have, is made up of Ideas 
so connected, & so little different from the operations of Reason, that it does not 
afford me the due Refreshment.71
The ill effect of the loss of sleep appears immediately. A month and half later, he 
begins to worry about the serious disorder both of his feeling and thinking. He write 
to Godwin on 28 April 1801:
I am not dissembling when I express my exceeding scepticism respecting the 
sanity of my own Feelings & Tone of Intellect, relatively to a work of Sentiment 
& Imagination.—I have been compelled, (wakeful thro1 the night, & seldom able, 
for my eyes, to read in the Day) to seek resources in austerest reasonings—& 
have thereby so denaturalized my mind72
He loses the sense of sound sleep because of nightmare. His whole life then becomes 
as it were a wakeful dream, divided only between thinking, or, rational dream and 
nightmare. Towards the end of the same year he seriously wonders whether he is 
awake or asleep during the night. He writes in December 1801:
To fail asleep— is not a real event in the body well represented by this phrase—is 
it in excess, when on first dropping asleep we fall down precipices, or sink 
down, all things sinking beneath us, or drop down, &c—Is there not a Disease 
from deficiency of this critical sensation/when people imagine, that they have
71 CL, II, p. 7 0 7 . See above.
72 CL, II, p. 7 2 5 .
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been awake all night/& actually lie dreaming, expecting & wishing for this 
critical Sensation?73
By the time he writes 'The Pains of Sleep' (1803), he completely loses the 
distinction between reality and dream. The only significant distinction is that 
between dream and nightmare. He writes to Welles on 13 September 1803:
My Disorder I believe to be atonic Gout: my Sufferings are often sufficiently 
great by day; but by patience, effort of mind, and hard walking I can contrive to 
keep the Fiend at arm's length, as long as I am in possession of Reason & Will. 
But with Sleep my Horrors commence; & they are such, three nights out of four, 
as literally to stun the intervening Day, so that more often than otherwise I fall 
asleep, struggling to remain awake. Believe me, Sir! Dreams are no Shadows 
with me; but the real, substantial miseries of Life.74
Yet Coleridge still believes that it is in this inward darkness that he has buried 
his reality. He writes in November 1803, 'Month after month, year after year, the 
deepest Feeling of my Heart hid & wrapped up in the depth & darkness—solitary 
chaos—& solitariness'.75 Therefore he is determined to remain a dreamer, a 
solitary seafarer through his internal chaos. It is during this voyage that 
'possession of Reason & Will' in dreaming becomes the crucial matter. He begins to 
have 'rational' dream in which he recovers vivid internal 'nature'. In December 
1803 he writes:
73 CN, I, 1078.
74 CL, II, p. 986.
75 CN, I, 1670.
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When in a state of pleasurable & balmy Quietness I feel my Cheek and Temple on 
the nicely made up Pillow in Caslibe Toro meo, the fire-gleam on my dear Books, 
that fill up one whole side from ceiling to floor of my Tall Study—& winds, 
perhaps are driving the rain, or whistling in frost, at my blessed Window, 
whence I see Borrodale, the Lake, Newlands—wood, water, mountains, omniform 
Beauty—0 then as I first sink on the pillow, as if Sleep had indeed a material 
realm, as if when I sank on my pillow, I was entering that region & realized 
Faery Land of Sleep—0  then what visions have I had, what dreams—the Bark, the 
Sea, the all the shapes & sounds & adventures made up of the Stuff of Sleep & 
Dreams, & yet my Reason at the Rudder/O what visions, <nacnoi> as if my Cheek 
& Temple were lying on me gale o' mast on—Seele meines Lebens!—& I sink down 
the waters, thro1 Seas & Seas—yet warm, yet a Spirit—/
<O l>
Pillow = mast high76
Kathleen Coburn gives the details of the feminine implication of the classic words and 
puns: Caelibe Toro meo: on my celibate couch, iiacnoc. breasts, me gale o' mast on: 
j.i£YocA.o[xaaTov = large breasted. Pillow = mast high: mast-oi = breasts. They all 
reveal what he believes he has buried in the depth of his inward darkness, what he 
expects to recover in the end of the journey at the bottom of chaos after chaos. It is 
the feminine and nature which he hopes to discover in 'Faery Land of Sleep'. Thus, in 
spite of all epistemological and ethical difficulties, he still retains the hope he 
expresses at the end of 'Dejection Ode'.
76 CN, I, 1 71 8 .
Chapter 4 Trinitarianism: 'Symbol' and Human Trinity
I. Coleridge's trip to Malta frorp April 1804 to August 1806 is very much like that 
of an exile. It is probably one of the most painful experiences in his life, certainly 
much more so than the trip to Germany five years earlier. But it is in these painful 
days in Malta that he 're-discovers' several crucial words such as 'symbol', 'logos' 
and 'Trinity' which are to become the key terms in his later thinking. It might be 
useful to trace the circumstance in some detail.
Coleridge's problem with 'I the naked Spirit'1 was not appeased by the 
composition of 'Dejection Ode' in 1802, in spite of his effort to work it out into a 
optimistic conclusion in the end of the poem. Two years later when he is preparing 
for his voyage, his mind is still occupied with the same problem in a graver tone. He 
writes to Sir George Beaumont on 6 April 1804, three days before his departure 
from Portsmouth:
My Spirits are low: and I suffer too often sinkings & misgivings, alienations 
from the Spirit of Hope, strange withdrawings out of the Life that manifests 
itself by existence—morbid yearnings condemn’d by me, almost despis'd, and yet 
perhaps at times almost cherish'd, to concenter my Being into Stoniness, or to be 
diffused as among the winds, and lose all individual existence.2
He is still perplexed with 'strange withdrawings out of the Life'. This 'Life that 
manifests itself by existence' is obviously nature, what he calls 'animated nature' in 
'The Eolian Harp'. When he 'withdraws' from nature, or in his word, 'Life', and 
acknowledges his 'individual existence', he finds himself in a personal ontological 
anxiety. He finds that to be a person is to be separate from nature, that is,
1 CL, I, p. 295. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 3, III.
2 CL, II, p. 1122.
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'individuation' is synonymous with 'denaturalization', the fall from nature, which he 
would rather avoid.3 In a letter to the Wordsworths five days earlier he states 
clearly that his reluctance and fear of his personal existence is the cause of the 
problem. He writes, 'every thing, that forcibly awakes me to Person & Contingency, 
strikes fear into me, sinkings and misgivings, alienation from the Spirit of Hope, 
obscure withdrawings out of Life ... a wish to retire into stoniness & to stir not, or to 
be diffused upon the winds & and have no individual Existence.'4 Here again he 
contemplates the two alternative solutions, either to abandon the process altogether 
or to complete individuation to its end, in his words, either 'to be diffused as among 
the winds, and lose all individual existence' or 'to concenter my Being into 
Stoniness'. These two 'morbid yearnings' are in fact nostalgia and despair. He was 
once a poet, a child of nature who was 'diffused among the wind' and did not yet have 
'individual existence'. And when he finds himself 'individuated' or 'denaturalized', 
and unable to stop the process, he soon arrives at 'Stoniness', the complete solipsism 
in despair. These extremes are certainly 'morbid', and he needs remain suspended 
somewhere between them if he is to live. But these yearnings are tempting, and his 
attitude towards them is characteristically duplex. They are 'morbid yearnings', he
3 Coleridge develops his theology from the fact that he experiences 'individuation' 
and 'denaturalization' simultaneously. He uses the word 'individuation' in a marginal 
note to Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten where he writes, 'we must master the principle 
of Individuation in general, and then the principle of Personality—Action + Passion'. 
CM, III, p. 266. Thus his lifelong quest for the reconciliation of passivity and 
activity begins with this experience. The note is quoted in full and discussed in 
Chapter 5, III. 'Individuation' is the key term of Theory of Life. See Chapter 1, II 
note. He thinks that 'the principle of individuation' involves the human mind. He 
says in the thirteenth philosophical lecture, 'when reflecting ourselves as 
intelligences and therefore individualizing spirit OR power, that which affirms its 
own existence and whether mediately or immediately that of other being, we call 
Mind'. Phil Lects, p. 370-1. However, he precludes from the argument of Theory of 
Life his personal experience that his mind, when individualized, is also 
denaturalized. Yet he acknowledges this privately. He writes to Godwin on 28 April 
1801, 'I ... have thereby so denaturalized my mind'. CL, II, p. 725. The passage in 
the letter is quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 3, IV . The word 
'Denaturalization' appears in a Notebook entry where he investigates his nightmare. 
See below.
4 CL, II, pp. 111 5-6.
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says, which are 'condemn'd by me, almost despis'd, and yet perhaps at times almost 
cherish'd'. As he discovers, 'individuation' keeps bringing forth chains of paradoxes. 
And he can neither complete the process nor altogether undo it. All he can do is to 
remain in suspense, or rather, in process.
Exactly one month later, still on board, he makes a Notebook entry which is 
strikingly similar to the above quotation. Strikingly, because here he is describing 
his nightmare.
these Sleeps, these Horrors, these frightful Dreams of Despair when the sense of 
individual Existence is full & lively only <for one> to feel oneself powerless, 
crushed in by every power—a stifled boding, on abject miserable W retch/yet 
hopeless, yet struggling, removed from all touch of Life, deprived of all notion of 
Death/strange mixture of Fear and Despair—& that passio purissima, that mere 
Passiveness with Pain (the essence of which is perhaps Passivity—& which our 
word—mere Suffering—well comprizes—) in which the Devils are the Antithesis 
of Deity, who is Actus Purissimus, and eternal Life, as they are an ever-living 
Death.5
Similarity between the description of life and that of dream does not suggest that the 
distinction between reality and unreality is blurred. On the contrary, it means that 
the distinction between the original reality from which he has fallen and the 
secondary reality in which he is 'crushed' is ever severe, and that within the latter, 
within the powerless, dejected passivity which he describes above, his life and his 
nightmare become ominously close.6 Here the distinction between pure activity and 
pure passivity becomes a polarized contrast. Thus in spite of, or because of, his
5 CN, ll, 2078.
6 Coleridge writes to Welles on 13 September 1803, 'Believe me, Sir! Dreams are 
no Shadows with me; but the real, substantial miseries of Life.' CL, II, p. 986. See 
also CL, VI, 767.
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attempt 'to solve the two grand Problems, how, being acted upon, we shall act; how, 
acting, we shall be acted upon1,7 the problem itself becomes more personal and still 
more urgent. In fact, he almost achieves one of the two 'yearnings', that is, 'to 
concenter my Being into Stoniness'. He is 'crushed in by every power', 'removed 
from all touch of Life', and left in 'ever-living Death'. At the same time, however, 
he comes to a turning point and begins to seek for the recovery. It should be noted 
here that he uses the theological language to describe his problem between pure 
activity and pure passivity.
Coleridge wrote of this dejected passivity to Godwin on 22 January 1802, two 
months before the verse letter to Sara Hutchinson which was to become 'Dejection 
Ode'.
Partly from ill-health, & partly from an unhealthy & reverie-like vividness of 
Thoughts, & (pardon the pedantry of the phrase) a diminished Impressibility 
from Things, my ideas, wishes, & feelings are to a diseased degree disconnected 
from motion & action. In plain & natural English, I am a dreaming & therefore 
an indolent man—. I am a Starling self-incaged, & always in the Moult, & my 
whole Note is, Tomorrow, & tomorrow, & tomorrow.8
Once 'passive' feeling and 'active' thinking cease to be united, they are no longer 
feeling and thinking in the proper sense. Feeling becomes 'a diminished 
Impressibility from Things', and thinking sinks into 'reverie-like vividness of 
Thoughts'. As a result, what was the united feeling and thinking, what he here calls 
'my ideas, wishes, & feelings', that is, his whole being, stands still without 'motion 
& action'. He is 'an indolent man'. And this 'indolence' is totally different from the 
one he describes in 'The Eolian Harp', in which the very unity between feeling and
7 CL, II, p. 949. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 3, II.
8 CL, II, pp. 782-3.
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thinking is called 'indolence'. One is the indolence in the undoubted presence of God 
and the other is that in the utter absence. The poem might have been a piece of a day 
dream, but certainly not of a nightmare. He continues the letter:
The same causes, that have robbed be to so great a degree of the self-impelling 
self-directing Principle, have deprived me too of the due powers of Resistances 
to Impulses from without. If I might so say, I am, as an acting man, a creature of 
mere Impact. 'I will' & 'I will not' are phrases, both of them equally, of rare 
occurrence in my dictionary.
'The Eolian harp' lacks 'I will & I will not' too. There is no need for it since the 
reception of 'Impulses from without' is a blessing and not condemnation. That is, the 
lack of 'I will & I will not' is not a problem at first. But here, unlike 'the Eolian 
harp', he merely suffers 'Impulses from without' and is unable to return any 
response. It is in this situation that the lack of 'I will & I will not' becomes a 
problem. When he loses the faith in the benevolence of reception, he has to rely on 
his own 'will'. And at this moment, he discovers he has no 'will'. Thus the discussion 
concerning 'I will & I will not' is a questionable, problematic matter from the 
beginning. He concludes his self-analysis as follows:
I evade the sentence of my own Conscience by no quibbles of self-adulation; I ask 
for Mercy indeed on the score of my ill-health; but I confess, that this very ill- 
health is as much an effect as a cause of this want of steadiness & self-command; 
and it is for mercy that I ask, not for justice.
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As he says 'Misery is a Misery-maker',9 the lack of will is both the cause and effect 
of his deprivation. He has no alternative but to recover 'will' and regain 'steadiness 
& self-command'. Yet with such will he ceases to receive 'Impulses from without' 
and begins to resist and counteract it. Thus when he finds 'will', the problem of 
passivity and activity shifts to a different level. When he recovers his will and 
begins instead to participate in 'Actus Purissimus', the whole dimension shifts from 
epistemology to ethics, and even further.
As seen above, Coleridge's first shift in early 1801 from Hartley's passive 
principle to Fichtean active principle is an obvious failure. When he says 'quibbles 
of self-adulation' in the letter quoted above, it is likely that he has Fichte's 'I' in 
mind. When he read Fichte for the first time, however, he was taken into Fichte's 
argument. He wrote to Dorothy Wordsworth on 9 February 1801:
As I have given you Hartley's Metaphysics I will now give you a literal 
Translation of page 49 of the celebrated Fichte's Uber den Begriff der 
Wissenshaftslehre [1794]—if any of you, or if either your Host or Hostess, have 
any propensity to Doubts, it will cure them for ever/for the object of the author 
is to attain absolute certainty.10
This 'absolute certainty' is of course derived from 'the absolute I'. He is probably 
aware that Fichte's 'absolute I' involves the negation of the whole material creation, 
nature. But he is unaware that he is to experience the painful 'denaturalization' 
when he practices Fichte's active principle. At this stage he seems to think that the 
issue is only epistemological. It is in this letter to Dorothy Wordsworth that he 
reports how impressed he was by his son Hartley when he described 'thinking' as
9 CL, II, p. 985.
10 CL, II, p. 673.
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'shutting eyes and sleeping'.11 In the same month he makes the following Notebook 
entry:
—and the deep power of Joy 
We see into the Life of Things—
i.e.— By deep feeling we make our Ideas dim—Si this is what we mean by our 
Life—ourselves. I think of the Wall—it is before me, a distinct Image—here. I 
necessarily think of the Idea & the Thinking I as two distinct & opposite Things. 
Now <let me> think of myself— of the thinking Being—the Idea becomes dim 
whatever it be—so dim that I know not what it is—but the Feeling is deep & 
steady—and this I call I — the identifying the Percipient & the Perceived—.12
The entry is certainly related to his attempt to define 'Life' which resulted in 
defining it as 'I myself I1.13 Here it is as if he thinks that idea passively impressed 
to the mind must be made dim so that he can grasp himself as 'I1, as the identity of the 
percipient,'I', and the perceived, 'myself1. That is to say, such identity may 
presuppose the withdrawal from immediacy of the given object, such as 'the wall'. 
And if he applies this measure not only to each object but to the whole of nature, 'the 
Thinking I', the mind activated and elevated to its sublimest status as 'the Image of 
the CreatorJ,14 may at the same time get completely alienated from the immediacy of 
the external, material creation.
11 Quoted and discussed in Chapter 3, IV.
12 CN, I, 921. G. N. G. Orsini traces the source of 'the wall' to Fichte. See Orsini, 
Coleridge and German Idealism: A Study in the History of Philosophy with 
Unpublished Materials from Coleridge's Manuscripts (Carbondale, III., 1969) pp. 
178 -8 3 .
13 See Chapter 3, III.
14 CL, II, p. 709. Quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 3 II.
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In Malta, Coleridge reworks this simple dichotomy between 'feeling' and 
'thinking', or between pure passivism and pure activism, and shifts it into a new 
phase. He makes a Notebook entry on this subject on 27 December 1804, which 
shows both his decisive move from passivism and still persistent hesitation towards 
activism. The entry begins with listing 'the three distinct classes of psychological 
Facts' and then goes on to examine the three ways to unify them.
Dec. 27. 1804— 1. we feel. 2. we perceive or imagine. 3. we think.
These are the three distinct classes of psychological Facts, which all men are 
conscious of and which all languages express. Hartley, and his followers and the 
French Philosophers endeavor to resolve the latter two into the first//Leibnitz 
and Wolff the 1st & 3rd into the second, "der Grundkraft (der einzige) ist der 
Vorstellungskraft"—and (as far as Thought may be considered as aft self-activity 
of our Being), = the <Will = the Ich or />/Stahl & Fichte (and as I believe, 
Plotinus, &c to Proclus) resolve the 1st & 2nd into the third.15
By 'Hartley and his followers and the French Philosophers' he obviously means 
various forms of passivism which he now regards as materialism. Opposed to this is 
activism of Stahl and Fichte. And epistemology is left in the middle between feeling 
and thinking, or more precisely, at the junction where passive perception and active 
imagination meet in the second class. But the way he describes this epistemology is 
clearly inclined towards activism. He writes, "'der Grundkraft (der einzige) ist der 
Vorstellungskraft"—and (as far as Thought may be considered as aft self-activity of 
our Being), = the <Will = the Ich or A>'. And he admits that his 'Faith is with Fichte'. 
However, he resists unification in complete activism, not by clinging to Hartleyan
15 CN, II, 2382.
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passivism, but by arguing against unification itself and insisting on keeping the 
distinctions between the three classes. He says, 'Still however the distinction must 
remain, alike in all—nor can any one be affirmed hitherto to have succeeded in 
explaining the three into one1. He states towards the end of the first half of the 
entry, 'never let me lose my reverence for the three distinctions, which are human 
& of our essence'.16 The latter half of the entry is spent in showing his very subtle 
but persistent argument against pure activism. He continues:
Shall we add a 4th, Willing? No. Because it is yet indefinite in the common 
nonsense speculations of <speculative> mankind whether -it the Will be not a 
combination of all three as wishing evidently is[;] whether wishing & willing 
are more than degrees of the same operation/And those who hold otherwise make 
it the Being itself, the absolute I or Self, not a modification of faculty—or if ever 
they <may have> identified 4t with the Third,/we still could not add it, we could 
only substitute it.—
Here he argues that 'willing', if without the acknowledgement of 'the absolute I' 
should be called 'wishing'. And if such acknowledgement should be made, he still 
avoids the loss of distinction in total activism by proposing to substitute 'willing' for 
'thinking', which in fact he overtly does with his 'Faith in Fichte'. He acknowledges 
'willing' but at the same time accommodates it in the whole. Thus the whole remains 
human, in distinction and in 'wishing'. He repeats exactly the same argument in 
terms of action.
16 The full quotation is 'My Faith is with Fichte, but never let me lose my reverence 
for the three distinctions, which are as human & of our essence, as those of the 5 
senses on which indeed a similar process has been tried.' Coleridge attempted to 
deduce the five senses from 'one sense' when he was abandoning Hartley's 
associationism. See Chapter 3, II.
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But to act, is not that a necessary 4th?
Answer. I would, that it were the grand comprising Term in Psiology for 
all the three; but a fourth it cannot make, inasmuch as "action," taken in the 
usual sense, implies willing, superadding motion;—and motion is either the 
first—i.e. feeling; or the 2 nd—i.e. image (or ro perceptum definite) or both 
combined. And abstracted from outward contingency, action is the same as 
"willing"; or at all events (for I perceive a distinction) it cannot be admitted, 
till "the Will" either as a Thing per se, or <else as> = Ego, Anima, have been 
admitted.
His fine sense of balance between passive and active involvement prevents him from 
slipping into pure activism. In spite of his 'Faith in Fichte1 and his own inclination 
towards ethical activism, he here remains in the middle of the two extremes and 
retains a Leibnizian epistemological position.17 But surprise comes in the end. This 
is how he ends the whole speculation:
Better 5. We 1. feel: 2. perceive, whether things or their representation in 
the Imagination. 3. think or conceive: 4. wilt. 5. move & impress motions.
Suddenly he not only includes 'will' and 'act' which he has resisted in order to resist 
the tendency towards unification, but also paraphrases 'act' as 'move & impress 
motion' to the omission of attention towards 'outward contingency'. Certainly this is 
no longer a mere classification of 'psychological Facts'. The key to explain this 
change lies in his rewriting of the third class. Previously, to think meant to think 
actively, or almost, to will, but here to think actively is coupled with to conceive 
passively. This forces the rewriting of the second class to the loss of the junction
17 For Coleridge's early association with Leibnizian theory, see Chapter 1: III, IV, 
for his later speculation on the theory, see Chapter 7, III.
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between passive perception and active imagination. The whole second class is now 
changed into passive perception of either 'things or their representation'. Thus he 
actually unifies the previous three classes of 'psychological Facts' into passivity and 
subsequently introduces will and decisive action as the fourth and fifth classes. 
Obviously he is shifting the whole dimension and seeing the relationship between 
epistemology and ethics at a different level. The matter in question is 'outward 
contingency'. The question is whether 'psychological Facts' have anything to do with 
'physical Facts'. The system of 'psychological Facts' now expanded into the five 
classes may still touch 'physical fact', passively at the first class and actively at the 
fifth. But if he disregards 'outward contingency' at both ends, these five 
psychological classes constitute one complete and purely psychological, that is, 
unreal, circle.18 Fichte would argue that it should be so in order to overcome 
'outward contingency'. But as seen above, Coleridge 'fears' contingency. That is, 
while adopting a similar principle Coleridge tends to 'avoid' rather than 'overcome' 
contingency. Therefore, his failure to adopt Fichtean principle brings him back to 
'outward contingency' with increasing 'fear'.
Coleridge’s attempt at omitting contingency is not maintained long. Soon he takes 
up the question of contingency again in his speculation on 'Luck'. Acknowledgement of 
luck, he insists, is inevitable as long as 'human affairs' are concerned. He writes, 
'Luck has a real existence in human affairs, from the infinity of co-existences and 
the co-existence of contingencies in an endless Flux with Necessities & general 
Laws'.19 It should be noticed that he relates necessity and contingency by 'co­
existence' and not by mutual exclusion, as if he should insist that contingency 
inherent in 'human affairs' should not be necessarily contradictory with overall 
necessity of the whole. In the same entry he develops this argument for human 
contingency in two ways, in perception and in action.
18 See discussions on 'Miss Theta' below and Chapter 6 ,1.
19 CN, II, 2439, f  13-14.
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Luck = the coexistence of infinite actions with each other, and the co-existence of 
those which from the multitude or the subtlety of the causes which produce them 
or determine them are called contingencies, wffeb or of those which Virtue 
commands us to consider as really such, so far as they are the effects of the 
*Arbitrement *(Arbitrium = ego, et agens, not Voluntas = modificatio mei per 
alterum, et passio—hoc patior, istud ago; et distinctio manet sacra et immota etsi 
nulla sit nec esse possit, divisio, etsi etiam patiendo agam, necesse est, et agendo 
patiar)20—of infinites eoe the simple co-existence, and the co-existence of true 
or fancied contingencies with some one -of more any regular and necessary 
Phaenomenon ... produces coincidences,
His sense of balance is preventing him from plunging into passive necessitarianism 
or exulting in its active counterpart. 'Infinite actions with each other' perceived 
within the limit of human perception may well appear contingent. Man's act is in no 
sense decisive in itself and therefore open to contingency. To this point there is no 
problem. But if one finds between divine necessity and human contingency not 'co­
existence' but mutual exclusion, in other words, if he finds himself caught by the 
problem of evil, then there are problems everywhere. Coleridge writes to the 
Wordsworths, 'Every thing, that forcibly awakes me to Person & Contingency, 
strikes fear into me1.21 To acknowledge contingency in perception is to admit its 
deprivation of necessity, and to insist on contingency in action is no longer 'Virtue' of 
humbleness but vice of irresponsibility. The problem is that he cannot but accept 
contingency as a 'human' condition while he is theologically vulnerable to it.
20 The editor supplies translation: 'Will (Arbitrement) is myself acting, not [the 
same as] Choice [which] is a modification of myself by something else, and so a 
submission—in the latter case I submit, in the former I act, and the distinction 
remains sacred and steadfast even though there neither is nor can be division, even 
though of necessity I act by submitting and submit by acting.'
21 CL, ll, p.1115. Quoted above.
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II. There are many evidences that Coleridge's primary concern in epistemology is 
not of a mere intellectual curiosity. His investigations, especially when related with 
his problem of nightmare, show his personal and desperate concern in it. If his 
investigation fails, he loses not only his intellect but also his morality. It is to him a 
question not only of certainty but of sanity. With this sense of crisis he begins to 
accuse his own early devotion to Hartley's passive associationism. The Notebook 
entry on 28 December, 1803 is an example.
I will at least make the attempt to explain to myself the Origin of moral Evil 
from the streamy Nature of Association, which Thinking = Reason, curbs & 
rudders/how this comes to be so difficult/Do not the bad Passions in Dreams 
throw light & shew of proof upon this Hypothesis?—Explain those bad Passions: 
& I shall gain Light, I am sure—22
The epistemological question here is not the existence or the proper limit of active 
human reason but its failure. The ethical question is not its proper application but 
its inherent deprivation. Coleridge's question is why nightmare or 'the streamy 
Nature of Association' takes place in him at all. He detects 'bad Passions' as the 
cause. But he has to face the question whether he is actively distorting, or passively 
deprived of, sound perception. He continues the entry in the same evening:
I I  °clock/—But take in the blessedness of Innocent Children, the blessedness of 
sweet Sleep, &c &c &c: are these or are they not contradictions to the evil from 
streamy association?—I hope not: all is to be thought over and into— but what is 
the height, & ideal of mere association?—Delirium.—But how far is this state 
produced by Pain & Denaturalization? And what are these?—In short, as far as I
22 CN, I, 1770.
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can see any thing is this Total Mist, Vice is imperfect yet existing Volition, 
giving diseased Currents of association, because it yields on all sides & yet is—So 
think of Madness:—0 if I live!
Either by active distortion or passive deprivation, 'the blessedness1 is lost. As he 
does not get into a thorough comparison between 'the blessed sweet Sleep' and the 
fearful 'streamy association', it is undecided whether delirium is the result of active 
distortion or of passive deprivation. Yet towards the end of the entry he accepts 
'vice' as 'imperfect yet existing Volition'. As far as it is 'volition', it distorts 
perception actively. But at the same time it is 'imperfect', or rather imperfected 
and diseased, and to that extent it is a passion.23
In Malta Coleridge describes this passion as 'a horrid touch of Hatred' which he 
'actually' suffers.
dreams interfused with struggle and fear, tho' till the very last not-stf Victors— 
and the very last which awoke me, & which was a completed Night-mair, as it 
gave the idea and sensation of actual grasp or touch contrary to my will, & in 
apparent consequence of the malignant will of the external Form, actually 
appearing or (as sometimes happens) believed to exist/in which latter case tho' I 
have two or three times felt a horrid touch of Hatred, a grasp, or weight, of Hate
23 With the problem of nightmare, Coleridge begins to argue against the view that 
the mind is merely passive, which he ascribes here to Hartley. Later he ascribes it 
to Democritus and says, 'It is sufficient for our purposes to know that the 
fundamental positions of ancient materialism were first, that motion and sensation 
are properties of a specific kind of atoms, and that mind is but a species of sensation, 
and all the processes of perception is but a species of sensation, and all the acts (or 
more accurately all the phenomena or appearances of life, just as the seeming acts of 
a dream) are wholly mechanical or produced by necessitating antecedents.' Phil 
Lects, pp. 347-8. As seen above and below, he has the personal need to deny this 
view and to find a clue to the recovery from his own nightmare.
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and Horror abstracted from all (Conscious) form or supposal of Form/an 
abstract touch/an abstract grasp—an abstract weight—24
He calls his experience 'a completed Night-mair' when its supposed insubstantiality 
becomes irrelevant. What he describes as 'an abstract touch/an abstract grasp—an 
abstract weight' is now coming out of its insubstantial state and giving him a 
concrete, 'actual grasp or touch'. This 'touch' ends any epistemological neutrality 
and makes irrelevant any question concerning its objective reality or unreality. It 
becomes the question not of 'external form' but of 'the malignant will' which 
produces this 'external form'. The completed nightmare is certainly the worst 
possible horror. But when he detects 'the malignant will' as it is, he also finds the 
way to get out of it. He finally finds 'his' will resisting the 'touch' of the malignant 
will to which he has been utterly subjected. Ineffective though it may be, it is a step 
out of pure passivity.
In investigating the cause of nightmare, Coleridge always keeps in mind 'hymn of 
Joy1 and constantly refers back to 'Innocence', the time when reality and the divine 
presence in nature were synonymous. Contrasted with original noumenon, 
phenomenon in itself is a failure caused by 'moral Evil', a degraded amorphous 
unreality at best, at worst a nightmare.
So akin to Reason is Reality, that what I could do with exulting Innocence, I can 
not always imagine with perfect innocence/for Reason and Reality can stop and 
stand still, by new Influxes from without counteracting the Impulses from 
within, and poising the Thought. But Fancy and Sleep stream on; and (instead of 
outward Forms and Sounds, the Sanctifiers, the Strengtheners!) they connect 
with them motions of the blood and nerves, and images forced into the mind by the
24 CN, II, 2468.
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feelings that arise out of the position & state of the Body and its different 
members.
All the above-going throw lights on my mind with regard to the origin of Evil. 
<vkr] = confusio = passio = finiri—//Reason, Action, Forma efformans. (= 
means "the same as": //"opposed to".)>25
In the days of innocence the divine presence appeared as the unquestioned affinity 
between 'new Influxes from without1 and 'the Impulses from within'. 'So akin to 
Reason is Reality' that he was completely innocent of their potential breakup. This 
affinity is prior to the distinction between passivity and activity in the sense that 
both 'Influx from without' and 'Impulse from within' are simultaneously passive and 
active at their meeting point. That is to say, if there is no disjunction between 
within and without, there is no paradox between activity and passivity. But he loses 
such affinity when he begins to 'denaturalize' himself. He still finds activity and 
passivity within himself, but no longer in coherent unity. As a result, his internal 
reflection loses formal cause and streams on; he loses the poising thought between 
'Reason' and 'Reality'; and his mind becomes confined within streamy fancy, or, 
'images forced into the mind' only by 'the Impulses from within'. His being is almost 
cut off from nature and deprived of most of the flux and reflux of 'One Life'. Yet it is 
not completely cut off so as to be dead immediately. A ligated body does not die but 
decays, and, as his body gradually loses 'Life', his internal vision turns to be a 
nightmare. This is Coleridge's unbearable passivity. The measure he takes for
25 CN, II, 2543. Before the formula in the end, Coleridge makes investigation into 
dreaming and suggests its relevance with day-dreaming, or, imagination. He writes, 
'I have acted done innocently what afterwards in absence I have <likewise>day- 
dreamed innocently, during the being awake; but after the Reality was followed in 
Sleep by no suspicious fancies, the latter Day-dream has been. Thank Heaven! 
however/Sleep has never yet desecrated the images, or supposed *Presences, of 
those whom I love and revere. *There is often a dim sense of the Presence of a 
Person in our dreams, whose form does not appear.'
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recovery is to separate mind from matter and activate it. As he puts into the formula 
with which he ends the entry, phenomenon is 'vkt] [matter], confusio, passio, finiri1. 
And in opposition, mind is 'Reason' and 'Action' as 'Forma efformans'. Mind is not 
only activated but united with 'Reason' to make itself 'Forma efformans'. It is the 
formal cause he expects to find within his activated mind under the complete 
suspension of matter. It is certain that when he expands the three classes of 
'psychological Facts' into five, what he has in mind is 'Forma efformans'. Here with 
the admission of 'Forma efformans' his theory of imagination begins to shape itself 
into an aesthetical and potentially ethical argument. By this formation, however, 
nature becomes irretrievably split between matter and mind, or, passivity and 
activity.
Thus the formula reinforces the split of nature into two, but it should be 
remembered that it is originally a measure of recovery, pointing at 'imagination 
with perfect innocence', contrasting itself with streamy fancy.26
III. Coleridge's reading in Kant must have influenced his formulation of 'Forma 
efformans'. In Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant abstracts the formal function of 
mind at the beginning of his whole argument:
In der Erscheinung nenne ich das, was der Empfindung korrespondiert, die
M a t e r i e derselben, dasjenige aber, welches macht, daG das Mannigfaltige der
26 Thus the split between passivity and activity, between without and within is the 
cause of the split of nature. Coleridge later notes in The Friend, 'The word Nature 
has been used in two senses, viz. actively and passively; energetic (= forma 
formans), and material (= forma formata).' Friend, I, p. 467. The point is repeated 
in the thirteenth Philosophical Lecture with the reference to the distinction between 
within and without. He says, 'in speaking of the world without us as distinguished 
from ourselves, the aggregate of phenomena ponderable and imponderable, is called 
nature in the passive sense,—in the language of the old schools, natura NATURATA— 
WHILE THE SUM OR AGGREGATE OF THE POWERS INFERRED AS THE sufficient causes of THE 
former... is nature in the active sense, or natura naturANS.' Phil Lects, p. 370.
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Erscheinung in gewissen Verhaltnissen geordnet werden kann, nenne ich die 
F o r m  der Erscheinung.
[That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but 
that which so determines the manifold of appearance that allows of being ordered 
in certain relations, I term the form of appearance.]27
But Coleridge's 'Forma efformans' is not Kant's categories. As Coleridge later makes 
clear, he thinks his 'Forma efformans' to be constitutive and different from Kant's 
categories which are merely regulative.28 In Kant, the suspension of materiality is 
a single procedure which should be done at the beginning once for all, but in 
Coleridge the suspension and the recovery of materiality is an endlessly repeating 
process. Kant continues:
Da das, worinnen sich die Empfindungen allein ordnen, und in gewisse Form 
gestellet werden konnen, nicht selbst wiederum Empfindung sein kann, so ist uns 
zwar die Materie aller Erscheinung nur a posteriori gegeben, die Form derselben
27 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Frankfurt, 1968), and Norman 
Kemp Smith, trans., Critique of Pure Reason (Hampshire, 1929) B 34. Coleridge 
used and annotated the fifth edition (1789) which is on the whole the same as the 
second edition. See CM, III, p. 241. For this reason throughout the thesis the second 
edition's pagination will be repeated.
28 Later, in Appendix E of The Statesman's Manual Coleridge writes, 'Whether Ideas 
are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise CONSTITUTIVE, and 
one with the power and Life of Nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus ... is the 
highest problem of Philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature.1 SM, p. 114. Here 
he ascribes his view to Plato and Plotinus. But the biblical quotation he attaches to it 
is more important than such a dubious ascription. In editor's translation from 
Coleridge's Greek, he writes, 'In the Word was life; and the life was the light of men.' 
Thus quoting from John 1. 4, he expects 'AN IDEA' to reconcile human mind with 
'Nature'. His view is in fact anticipated in the way he defines 'AN IDEA'. He writes, 
'that which is neither a Sensation or a Perception, that which is neither individual 
(i.e. a sensible Intuition) nor general (i.e. a conception) which neither refers to 
outward Facts nor yet is abstracted from the FORMS of perception contained in the 
Understanding; but which is an educt of the Imagination actuated by the pure Reason, 
to which there neither is or can be an adequate correspondent in the world of the 
senses—this and this alone is = AN IDEA.' SM, pp. 113-4. This mediatory function 
of 'AN IDEA1 is the same as that which he expects of 'Reason'. See Chapter 6, II.
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aber mufc zu ihnen insgesamt im Gemiite a priori bereit liegen, und dahero 
abgesondert von aller Empfindung konnen betrachtet werden.
[That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, 
cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all appearance is 
given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a priori 
in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation.]29
By abstracting the mind's active function, Kant seems to be able to suspend his own 
materiality together with matter in general. But Coleridge is always conscious of his 
diseased body. As he writes in the formula, 'vkrj [matter], confusio, passio, finiri' 
is the decisive pretext for the inception of 'Forma efformans'. Therefore once 
'Forma efformans' is separated from the confused body it has to be reunited with it in 
the hope of restoring the lost order. Thus in him both the complete separation of 
mind from body and the complete unity of them are equally untenable. He has to keep 
turning this paradox round and round. Later he writes in his marginal note to Kant's 
Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde, 'Body: i.e. Matter + Spirit or rather perhaps M = Sp. 
+ Sp. = Matter.'30 His self-reflection, or rather self-oscillation between mind and 
body is thus impossible to logically admit, but also impossible to ignore.
Coleridge reads Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft in winter 1800-1. It is the 
time when he begins to criticize Locke and Hartley. It is likely that he absorbed 
Kant's phenomenological argument to the extent that he thinks Lockean empiricism 
unsatisfactory. However, it should be pointed out that Coleridge is unconvinced by 
Kant's transcendentalism from the beginning. He says of transcendental deduction, 
'p. 129 to 169 comprehended the most difficult and obscure passages of this 
Critique—or rather the knot of the whole System. If they are not comprehended, the
29 Kant, ibid., and Smith, ibid.
30 CM, III, p. 2 7 6 .
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whole Philosophy of Kant, as Kant's philosophy, remains unknown1.31 It seems as if 
Coleridge is caught by the Kantian 'knot'. But he clearly sees where Kant's basic 
argument lies. He writes, 'it is not the system of mere Receptivity, like that of 
Epicurus and Hartley—it is not the System of innate Aptitudes or preformation, nor 
any from of pre-established Harmony'. It is rather that he finds in Kant the sort of 
problem he has to take up, and that while absorbing Kant's idea and argument he does 
not fully agree with Kant's a priori argument. As he acknowledges in Biographia 
Literaria, he is to remain unconvinced with this part of Kritik even after repeated 
perusal.32 And he eventually reworks on Kant's argument and formulates his own 
version of transcendentalism in the thirteenth chapter of Biographia Literaria.33
At this stage Coleridge thinks he can just untie the Kantian knot 'poetically'. He 
writes:
The mind does not resemble an Eolian Harp, nor even a barrel-organ turned by a 
stream of water, conceive as many tunes mechanized in it as you like—but 
rather, as far as Objects are concerned, a violin, or other instrument of few 
strings yet vast compass, played on by a musician of Genius. The Breeze that 
blows across the Eolian Harp, the streams that turned the handle of the Barrel 
Organ, might be called ein mannigfaltiges, a mere sylva incondita, but who would 
call the muscles and purpose of Linley a confused Manifold?34
He simply argues that when 'an Eolian Harp' is no longer played by 'one intellectual 
Breeze', it should be played by a human genius, that the divine artist should be
31 CM, III, p. 242. For further discussions on this 'Kantian knot', see Chapters 6 
and 7, II.
32 See BL, I, p. 1 53.
33 See Chapter 6.
34 CM, III, p. 248. The editor's note: 'Thomas Linley the younger (1756-78), one 
of the finest violinists in Europe in his day.'
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replaced with the human counterpart if the latter is aesthetically superior. 
Describing this shift with the artistic metaphor, he sounds little concerned with its 
ontological and even theological problems which such shift inevitably involves. 
When he thinks philosophically, however, he clearly sees that there is an impasse 
between passivity and activity of human mind at what he calls the Kantian knot. In 
another marginal note he writes:
was ist Erfahrung? What do you mean by a fact, an empiric Reality, which alone 
can give solidity (inhalt) to our Conceptions?—It seems from many passages, 
that this indispensable Test is itself previously manufactured by this very 
conceptive Power—and that the whole not of our own making is the mere 
sensation of a mere Manifold—in short, mere influx of motion, to use a physical 
metaphor.35
This sort of autonomy of the human mind is what Coleridge has just argued in artistic 
terms for human genius. But when he reminds himself the need of 'Test1, he realizes 
that the argument lacks the due attention to the passive side of mind. He continues:
Fichte I understand very well—only I cannot believe his System. But Kant I do 
not understand—i.e. I have not discovered what he proposes for my Belief.—Is it 
Dogmatism?—Why then make the opposition between Phaenomena and Things in 
themselves—xa ovxa  ^ ovxa? Is it Idealism? What Test then can I find in the 
<different> modifications of my Being to verify and substantiate each other? 
What other distinction between Schein and Erscheinung, Illusion and Appearance 
more than the old one of—in one I dream to myself, and in the other I dream in
35 CM, III, pp. 248-9.
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common: The Man in a fever is only outvoted by his Attendants—He does not see 
their Dream, and they do not see his.36
It should be remembered that Coleridge is to resist Fichte's system in order to 
remain 'human1. He here repeats the same objection to Kant by asking 'What Test 
then can I find?'. From Coleridge's point of view Kant's system does not provide the 
occasion of attestation. By 'Test' Coleridge does not mean empirical verification of 
Kant's categories. It is the test of the reference towards noumenon, the reference 
back to the original passivity which, Coleridge believes, any phenomenal judgment 
must convey. Because his system lacks this reference, Kant fails to propose 'Belief'. 
As a result, according to Coleridge, he as well as everyone else is first made aware of 
being in a dream and then left to dreaming endlessly.37 But even this might not be 
the most serious problem. For the real problem of 'the Man in a fever' is not the 
worry of being 'outvoted by his Attendants' but the fear of being unable to get out of 
his own nightmare.
Coleridge reads Kant's ethical works in December 1803 and makes several 
transcriptions from Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten in the Notebooks. His
36 CM, III, p. 249. As the editor points out, Coleridge repeats the story of the 
outvoted man in Biographia Literaria. See BL, I, p. 262.
37 It would be hardly convincing for Coleridge when Kant assures the autonomous 
certainty of human understanding and says, 'the only question is whether there is 
truth in the determination of the object or not. But the difference between truth and 
dreams is not decided by the nature of the representations that we refer to objects, 
for they are the same in both, but by the connection of theses representations 
according to the rules that determine the combination of them in the concept of an 
object, and how far they can or cannot stand together in an experience.' [es fragt sich 
nur, ob in der Bestimmung des Gegenstandes Wahrheit sei oder nicht. Der 
Unterschied aber zwischen Wahrheit und Traum wird nicht durch die Beschaffenheit 
der Vorstellungen, die auf Gegenstande bezogen werden, ausgemacht, denn die sind in 
beiden einerlei, sondern durch die Verkntipfung derselben nach denen Regeln, welche 
den Zusammenhang der Vorstellungen in dem Begriffe eines Objects bestimmen, und 
wiefern sie in einer Erfahrung beisammen stehen konnen oder nicht.] Immanuel 
Kant, Prolegomena zu jeder ktinftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird 
auftreten konnen (1783) in Sammtliche Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein, 8 vols (Leipzig, 
1867) vol. IV, p 39 and Peter G. Lucas, trans, Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science (Manchester, 1953) p. 
47.
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reading is critical. It seems that his personal experience in the preceding autumn of 
going through a series of grave nightmares determines how he reads Kant's ethics. 
He is quick in picking up Kant's argument, which by proceeding from a priori 
necessary categories of understanding (Verstand) to the a priori necessary 
categorical imperative of reason (Vernunft) establishes the absolute autonomy of 
'the good will' of man. He disagrees with Kant's ethics for the same reason that he 
remains unconvinced with Kant's epistemology. It is again a closed system. He 
writes:
Der Wille, says Kant, ist nicht anderes, als practisches Vernuntf [Vernunft]. 
This I doubt/My will & I seem perfect Synonimes—whatever does not apply to the 
first, I refuse to the latter/—Any thing strictly of outward Force I refuse to 
acknowledge, as done by me/it is done with me. Now I do not feel this perfect 
synonimousness in Reason & the Wille. I am sure, Kant cannot make it out. 
Again & again, he is a wretched Psychologist.38
38 CN, I, 1717. Coleridge expresses his dissatisfaction with Kant's 'psychology' in a 
marginal note dated by him '14 Dec. 1805 Naples'. He writes, 'It is one of Kant's 
greatest errors that he speaks so slightingly of Psychology and the weakest parts of 
his System are attributable to his want of the habits and facts of Psychology which 
with all its imperfections and uncertainty is next to necessary in order to prevent 
Metaphysics from passing into Theosophy and Theurgy—i.e. Dreaming and 
Conjuring.' CN, IV, 4517 note. The basic difference between Kant and Coleridge is 
that Coleridge experiences the problem of two natures in the way Kant does not. See 
above, especially Chapter 2, II, and Chapter 6, I. For Coleridge it is a theological 
problem. What he sees lacking in Kant is the due attention to this problem. It is 
inevitable, when he, always aware of the problem and seeking for a theological 
solution, reads Kant's 'Metaphysics' in which Kant from his point of view ignores the 
problem in the first place, that he deems him as 'Dreaming and Conjuring'. 
However, one may argue that it is Coleridge himself who pushes Kant's argument 
beyond the limit set by Kant and subsequently complains about it. Later he writes in 
a marginal note to Baxter's Reliquiae Baxterianae (London, 1696), 'Before the 
Revolution, Metaphysics without experimental Psychology ... Since the Revolution, 
Experimental Psychology without Metaphysics', and argues that both are 'almost 
equi-distant from true Philosophy', implying his intention to reunite them at the 
middle point. CM, I, p. 281 and 298. When he mentions Kant's lack of 'Psychology' 
in his ethical argument, he seems to imply that Kant too is metaphysician without 
'Psychology'. It is worth remembering that he points out the affinity between Kant 
and 'our genuine divines, and philosophers, before the revolution'. BL, I, p. 173. 
Quoted in Chapter 2, I note. Coleridge has no intention to propagate Lockean
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Kant does not know the sort of conflict between what is done 'by me' and what is done 
1 with me' as Coleridge does. Kant argues that man should and can overcome 'what is 
done with me', but Coleridge dismisses it because it is impossible unless he falls into 
what he is to call 'concentration of my Being into Stoniness'. Coleridge seems to pay 
little attention to the fact that Kant presents the 'perfect synonimousness' not as a 
statement but as a maxim, that is, he does not ignore the problem of 'outward Force' 
in the way Coleridge seems to imply he does. But this is understandable, for 
Coleridge's sole hope is for a reconciliation between what is done 'by me' and what is 
done ' with me', and not for the complete dominance of the former over the latter as 
Kant argues, or of the latter over the former as a Hartleyan empiricist may insist. 
Coleridge is soon to call the inclination towards such completion as two 'morbid 
yearnings'.
It is during his reading of Kant's ethics that Coleridge mentions the Trinity 
possibly for the first time. He makes another transcription from Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten with a commentary.
Reverence for the LAW of Reason/now this truly is a feeling, but says Kant it is a 
self-created, not a received passive Feeling— it is the Consciousness of the 
Subordination of the Will— Examine this: for in Psychology Kant is but 
suspicious Authority.—As an imposed Necessity it is Fear, or an Analogon of Fear; 
but as a Necessity imposed on us by our own Will it is a species of lnclination/& 
in this word, as in many others, Man's double Nature appears, as Man and God. I 
am fully persuaded, that all the Dogmas of the Trinity & Incarnation arose from 
Jesus asserting them of himself, as man in genere/39
'Experimental Psychology without Metaphysics' here. His objection to both Kant and 
’our genuine divines and philosophers1 is that without the due attention to the 
problem of two natures, a system, irrespective of its being divine or human, is 
bound to become closed. See below. He repeats basically the same argument in 
’Confessio Fidei'. See Chapter 5, III.
39 CN, I, 1710. For Coleridge's 'Theanthropism1, see Chapter 5, III.
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Kant's activism is clear when he says, 'But even if 'reverence' is a feeling, it is not a 
passive one received through influence, but a self-created one effected by means of a 
concept of reason'40 [Allein wenn Achtung gleich ein Gefiihl ist, so ist es doch kein 
durch Einfluss e m p f a n  g e n e s ,  sondern durch einen V e rn u n ftb e g riff  
sel  b s t g e w i  r k t e s  Gefiihl].41 Coleridge would argue that Kant can insist on 
overriding his passion by his action only because he has no doubt about the  
onefoldness of his will.42 But for Coleridge, 'outward Force' is willingly malignant, 
actively contrary to his own will. Therefore, he argues, 'LAW' has be imposed from 
both within and without, that is, it has to cause in him both 'Fear' and 'Inclination'. 
What he calls 'Man's double Nature' is in fact man's contradictory nature.
Coleridge wrote in early 1801, probably under the influence of Kant, 'To think 
of a thing is different from to perceive it, as "to walk" is from "to feel the ground 
under you"—<perhaps, in the same way too—namely,> a succession of perception 
accompanied by a sense of nisus & purpose.' Now he is at pains to place 'nisus & 
purpose' of ethics outside the enclosed psychological sphere. He is right in detecting 
behind Kant's activism the tendency towards closed self-consistency. Kant quotes 
from Luke 18: 19 with characteristic modification, 'why do you call me (whom you 
see) good? No one is good (the archetype of the good) but the only God (whom you do 
not see.)' [was nennt ihr mich, (den ihr sehet,) gut; Niemand ist gut (das Urbild des 
Guten), als der einige Gott, (den ihr nicht sehet.)]43 Coleridge calls Kant's 
modification a 'new exposition of the Text'.44 By this 'new exposition' Kant virtually
40 CN, I, 1710 note.
41 Kant, Werke, IV, p. 249 note.
42 According to Oxford English Dictionary, 'onefold' is a current word especially in 
nineteenth century, meaning 'consisting of only one member or constituent; single; 
simple'. One of the examples which the Dictionary provides is: 'The simplicity ... 
which is opposed to duplicity, and which may be called one-foldness.' Library 
Magazine, May 149 (1887).
43 Kant, ibid., pp. 256-7.
44 Coleridge writes, 'God der Wille— Christ Logos— new exposition of the Text. Why 
callest thou me good?—' CN, I, 1705 [b].
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paraphrases God as the archetype of the good and situates Him in the a priori human 
reason (Vernunft). However, Coleridge's awareness of 'Man's double nature' 
prevents him from taking this step. He has in mind the distinction between 'Maxim' 
and 'Law1. 'Maxim', according to him, involves volition, and therefore is solely 
human and ultimately unreliable. 'Law', on the contrary, is both divine and human. 
He writes:
Maxim always implies a voluntary Rule/Laws are not maxims, tho1 a good man 
may by Habit perhaps elevate his Maxim into a Law for himself.—Maxim = the 
ultimate Principle of action ... /to  do unto others as you would be done by, is the 
Maxim of a good man—but it is not a Law, nor was taught as a Law. The Law is, Be 
ye perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect.45
In the note to this entry, Kathleen Coburn supplies an interesting marginal note of 
Coleridge to Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie II. Coleridge writes, 'neither 
Socrates nor Christ, who prescribed the same ultimate end to our Aim (Be ye perfect 
even as your heavenly Father is perfect) asserted its absolute realizability in this 
life'. Thus he reintroduces the possibility of theological attestation as the final 
purpose of ethics and rewrites Kant's system to make it an open system. And at the 
same time he admits that such attestation is to keep the system open and not to set up 
another, theologically closed system.
Coleridge's dissatisfaction with Kant is that Kant refrains himself from speaking 
theologically. Nevertheless, he keeps long and constant reverence for Kant. It can be 
seen in a Notebook entry in January 1804 where he seems to describe a Kantian 
figure. He writes', 'Of a great metaphysician/he looked at (into?) his own Soul with 
a telescope/what seemed all irregular, he saw & shewed to be beautiful
45 CN, I, 1722.
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Constellations & he added to the Consciousness hidden worlds within worlds.'46 He 
seems to have in mind a passage in the conclusion of Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft.47 But that being the case, Coleridge himself is no longer certain about the 
sure correspondence between the constellations above and moral laws within. He has 
to rely on the theological language because he has lost the sort of serenity with which 
Kant can conclude his ethics. He parodies Kant's phrase 'an unbounded magnitude of 
worlds beyond worlds' [das unabsehlich Grosse mit Welten iiber Welten] as 'hidden 
worlds within worlds' and hints at his own introverted investigation. But the truth 
is that he has already lost his internal constellation, and that 'discovery' is no longer 
possible even with the largest telescope. It is Coleridge himself who wavers between 
looking 'at' and looking 'into'. It is as if he implicitly admits that the primary 
concern is no longer 'how to search' but 'what to search for', that is, 'what to 
recover'.
From here Coleridge turns back once again to the consideration of the human 
mind's original passivity. He makes a Notebook entry in January 1804 about 'the 
dignity of passiveness' which, as Coburn points out, conveys a close parallel to 
Wordsworth's 'wise passiveness'. He writes, 'The dignity of passiveness to worthy 
Activity when men shall be as proud within themselves of having remained an hour 
in a state of deep tranquil Emotion'.48 'Worthy Activity' here is not human but
46 CN, I, 1798.
47 Kant writes, 'TWO things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens 
above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek 
them as though obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my 
horizon: I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of 
my own existence.' [Zwei Dinge erfullen das Gemiith mit immer neuer und 
zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je ofter und anhaltender sich das 
Nachdenken damit beschaftigt: der b e s t i r n t e  H i mme l  iib e r m i r ,  und  
das mor a l  i sche  Geset z  in mi r .  Beide darf ich nicht als in Dunkelheiten 
verhiillt, oder im Ueberschwenglichen, ausser meinem Gesichtskreise, suchen und 
bios vermuthen, ich sehe sie vor mir und verkniipfe sie unmittelbar mit dem 
Bewusstsein meiner Existenz.] Kant, Werke, V, pp. 167-8 and Lewis White Beck, 
trans., Critique of Practical Reason: And Other Writings in Moral Philosophy 
(Chicago, 1949) p. 258.
48 CN, I, 1834.
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divine, to which the human mind is passive and receptive. But unlike Wordsworth, 
he is acutely aware that such passivity can be at odds with the human mind's activity. 
He continues:
0  how few can transmute activity of mind into emotion/yet there are who active 
as the stirring Tempest & playful as a May blossom in a Breeze of May, can yet 
for hours together remain with hearts broad awake, & the Understanding asleep 
in all but its retentiveness and receptivity/yea, & the Latter evinces as great 
Genius as the Former/
'The latter' is a genius of the Wordsworthian type, or, that which Coleridge advocated 
in his early poetics. And the former, which he admits to be 'few1, is the other type of 
genius which he has been trying to be himself after Kant's or Fichte's model. It is 
unlikely that he at this stage forces on himself the alternative choice between the 
two, since he knows with personal experience that each cut off from the other is 
doomed to serious defect. He already failed to make himself a Wordsworthian genius. 
And now he finds himself falling off from the Kantian or Fichtean type of genius, too. 
Therefore, no matter how meagre its real practicability might be, the only 
possibility left for him is to reunite the two within himself and recover both at once 
by that reunion.
In Malta Coleridge reconsiders the relationship between epistemology and ethics. 
He writes in December 1804:
Think of all this as an absolute Revelation, a real Presence of Deity—& compare 
it with historical traditionary religion. Two Revelations, the material & moral, 
& the former not to be seen but by the latter, as S1 Paul has so well observed— 
"By philosophy worldly wisdom no man ever arrived at God; but having seen him 
by the moral Sense then we understand the outward World, even as a Book/no
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Book of itself teaches a language in the first instance, but having by symp. of Soul 
learnt it we then understand the Book—i.e. the Deus minor in his work.49
Kant's influence may be seen in his separating morality from materiality and 
arguing for the priority of the former. But by 'moral revelation' Coleridge means 
not the categorical imperative but the teachings of 'historical traditionary religion', 
that is, the story of the Fall and salvation. He thinks that 'material revelation' is 
lost because of the Fall and that 'moral revelation' is needed for the recovery. For 
him, therefore, 'material revelation' is not what he overcomes but what he loses, and 
accordingly, the purpose of 'moral revelation' is not the absolute autonomy of human 
reason but the recovery of 'material revelation' through moral engagement. He says, 
'by the moral sense then we understand the outward World'. What is remarkable 
here is the change of his stance towards 'Presence of Deity'. He says, 'no Book of 
itself teaches a language in the first instance'. If he were to maintain his early 
poetics, he should have argued that the book of nature was readable precisely because 
he did not know how to read. He here admits that such presence is lost, that is, that 
the divine language in nature is no longer readable because he now learns how to 
read. And there is no alternative but to hope for recovery through this 'moral 
reading'.50 It is very suggestive that he makes a distinction between 'philosophy' 
and 'worldly wisdom'. Here he seems to imply that the possibility of recovery lies 
not in 'worldly wisdom' but in 'philosophy', that is, not in 'understanding' but in 
'reason'.51 Finally his statement about 'historical traditionary religion' requires a
49 CN, II, 2326.
50 Coleridge has come a long way. In 1795 he could say, 'Thus the existence of 
Deity, and his power and his Intelligence are manifested, and I could weep for the 
deadened and petrified Heart of that Man who could wander among the fields in a 
vernal Noon or summer Evening and doubt his Benevolence! The Omnipotent has 
unfolded to us the Volume of the World, that there we may read the Transcript of 
himself.' Lects 1795, p. 94. See also Chapter 1: I, II.
51 Coleridge repeats this point in Biographia Literaria, again generally quoting 
from I Corinthian 1: 20-21. Concerning 'mere intellect' which cannot reach 'a holy 
and intelligent first cause1, he reminds the reader of 'St Paul's assertion that by
159
little clarification. He seems to identify 'moral revelation1 with 'historical 
traditionary religion'. But the implicit purpose of 'moral revelation' is the 
recovery of episteme, which is by definition not confined in 'tradition' nor in 
'history*. The statement therefore is his declaration that in order to find the way of 
recovery he needs engage himself in 'historical traditionary religion'.52
IV. Coleridge's decisive move from associationism strictly coincides with his also 
decisive move from Unitarianism. He sees the inadequacy of the former as it fails to 
account for the split between noumenon and phenomenon. The inadequacy of the 
latter is that it does not admit 'Man's double Nature' which 'appears, as Man and 
God'.53 As the active mind at once recognizes the epistemological problem and 
attempts to solve it, it also detects the theological problem inherent in Unitarianism 
and tries to work it out. The inception of 'Forma efformans' thus opens up to him a 
new dimension not only of epistemology but also of theology.
In January 1805 he re-reads his Notebooks and adds new comments to two 
previous transcriptions done in his Notebook in December 1797. One transcription 
is on epistemology and the other on theology.
wisdom (more properly translated by the power of reasoning), no man ever arrived 
at the knowledge of God'. BL, I, pp. 201-2. For the development of this argument in 
artistic terms, see Chapter 6, III.
52 Coleridge is to write in January-April 1817, 'The two Factors of the Christian 
Faith Religion, the one indispensable to faith, and the other no less so to the faith of a 
CHRISTIAN, are: 1. The Philosophy concerning Christ, < = T « >  nepi xov Aoyov xov  
Geavdp(ojrov. 2. The History of Jesus Christ. The different ages of Christianity may 
be conveniently classed and characterized according to the due co-inherence of these, 
or the undue predominance of the one or the other: while the entire subtraction of 
either destroys Christianity altogether, even as the subtraction either of Hydrogen 
or Oxygen would destroy Water.' CN, III, 4340. Coleridge's theanthropic Christology 
which he develops in this ten years thus enables him to write decisively of the 
possible reunion of 'material' and 'moral' revelations, of epistemology and ethics. 
For a further discussion about his theanthropism, see Chapter 5, III.
53 CN, I, 1710. Quoted and discussed above.
160
We should judge of absent things by the absent. Objects which are present are 
apt to produce perceptions too strong to be impartially compared with those 
recalled only by memory. Sir J. Steuart./<True! and 0  how often the very 
opposite is true likewise—namely, that the objects of memory are often so dear & 
vivid, that present things are injured by being compared with them, vivid from 
dearness, &c—>54
The latter addition clearly reflects his new epistemology attained in Malta. He here 
asserts the vividness not of materially present objects but of materially absent 
objects. It is certainly the active mind which vivifies these absent objects. With the 
same stroke he adds a comment on Christianity to the following quotation.
Xstianity an imposture, the scriptures a forgery, the worship of God 
superstition, Hell a fable, Heaven a dream, our Life without providence & our 
death without Hope—&c.
<1 wrote this quotation from Bentley Dec. 1797. with what different thoughts I 
re-peruse it Jan. 1805.—yet the Feelings the same.>55
'The same feelings' are very likely to be his anti-orthodox stance. He wrote in 
April-May 1797 'Unitarian/travelling from Orthodoxy to Atheism—why,—&c'. And 
he certainly retains his criticism on the established orthodoxy. Then the different 
thought must be that this 'Atheism' is no longer atheism. He used to find 
Unitarianism not far from atheism because of its strong orientation towards 
humanistic, rationalistic concerns. He had an opportunity in his Unitarian days to 
explain how close his position was to that of John Thelwall the atheist:
54 CN, I, 308.
55 CN, I, 312. This transcription is to reappear in Statesman's Manual when he 
attacks 'such philosophers and truth-trumpeters' as in 'French literature under 
Lewis XV'. SM, p. 83.
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You entirely misunderstood me as to religious matters.—You love your wife, 
children, & friends, you worship nature, and you dare hope, nay, have faith in, 
the future improvement of the human Race—this is true Religion/your notions 
about the historical credibility or non-credibility of a sacred Book, your assent 
to or dissent from the existence of a supramundane Deity, or personal God, are 
absolutely indifferent to me/mere figures of a magic Lanthern.56
But in Malta, Coleridge becomes deprived of all of that he listed as 'true Religion'. 
When he loses the reality of this humanistic religion, his previous faith becomes 
virtually empty. It is during this theological vacuum when restoration of his active 
mind takes place in the other side of materiality. Accordingly, what he called 'mere 
figures of a magic Lanthern' in the letter begins to receive a new description. He 
writes in September 1804, 'God, Soul, Heaven, the Gospel, miracles, &c are 
themselves a sort of poetry.'57
Coleridge revives the Trinity essentially as poetry, the product of 'Forma 
efformans'. He writes in February 1805, 'the inanity of Jehovah, Christ, and the 
Dove admits the adorable Tri-unity of Being, Intellect, and Spiritual Action, as the 
Father, Son, and coeternal Precedent'.58 His procedure to 'rename' Jehovah, Christ, 
and the Dove shows a close parallel with that of Kant when he 'renames' God, man and 
nature as 'Theological Idea', 'Psychological Idea', and 'Cosmological Idea'.59 But here 
he seems to follow John Scotus Erigena whom he read a year before. He 'received
56 CL, II, p. 667.
57 CN, II, 2194.
58 CN, II, 2444. 'Inanity' as Coburn reads is more likely in this context than Basil 
Willey's objection that it should be 'unity1. See Willey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(London, 1972) p. 107 note.
59 Interestingly, in Kant, 'Psychologische Idee' comes first, followed by 
'Kosmologische Idee' and 'Theologische Idee'. Kant, Prolegomena, in Werke, IV, pp. 
81-96. Later, Coleridge mentions Kant's procedure of renaming in the thirteenth 
Philosophical Lecture. See Phil Lects, p. 389.
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great delight & instruction1,60 and made an Notebook entry, quoting from De 
divisione naturae (Oxford, 1681) with comments. He wrote:
Creation explained by Jo. Scot. Erig. as only a manifestation of the unity of God in 
forms—et fit et facit, et creat et creatur. Lib. I. p. 7.—
p. 8. a curious & highly philosophical account of the Trinity, & 
compleatly Unitarian—God exists is, is wise, & is living. The Essence we call 
Father, the Wisdom Son, the Life the Holy Spirit.—and he positively affirms that 
these three exist only as distinguishable Relations— habitudines—and he states 
the whole Doctrine as an invention & condescension of The[o]logy to the Intellect 
of man, which must define & conseq. personify in order to understands must 
have some phantom of Understanding in order to keep alive in the heart the 
substantial Faith.61
Coleridge detects behind this insight the confessional acknowledgment of 
incomprehensibility of God itself. He continues:
p. 10 & 11. a curious confession, that we cannot affirm any thing of God, but as a 
pia fraus to make our intellect instrumental to Faith by a rule of false—nudam 
omnique propria significatione relictam, divinam essentiam talibus vocabulis 
vestit— scil[icet] bonitate, sapientia, essentia &c &c—and adds that Theology is 
affirmative in superficie, & for the purpose of exciting pious affection; in
60 CL, II, p. 954. In this letter Coleridge indicates the direction of thinking which 
leads him to his later theology. He writes, 'I have received great delight & 
instruction from Scotus Erigena. He is clearly the modern founder of the School of 
Pantheism—indeed he expressly defines the divine Nature, as quae fit et facit, et 
creat et creatur—& repeatedly declares Creation to be manifestation—the Epiphany 
of Philosophers.' In Coleridge's later theological speculation, the notion that 
creation is the divine manifestation becomes crucial. See Chapter 6 and 7.
61 CN, I, 1382.
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pronunciatione formam affirmativae obtinet, in intellects verb virtutem  
abnegativae/—62
It is the recognition of negativity which reveals the fictitiousness of theology. But he 
no longer sees its fictitiousness as 'fraud'. On the contrary it is the necessity of 
theology. In Malta he looks back the process of his 'conversion' as if he had followed 
Erigena's argument step by step:
it burst upon me at once as an awful Truth what 7 or 8 years ago I thought of 
proving with a hollow Faith and for an ambiguous purpose, my mind then 
wavering in its necessary passage from Unitarianism (which as I have often said 
is the Religion of a man, whose Understanding Reason would make him an Atheist 
but whose Heart and Common sense will not permit him to be so) thro' Spinosism 
into Plato and S* John/No Christ, No God!—This I now feel with all its needful 
evidence, of the Understanding: would to God, my spirit were made conform 
thereto—that No Trinity, no God—63
His 'God', his 'Trinity' are still 'a sort of poetry' with 'mere figures of a magic 
Lanthern', but this theology is now what he desperately needs to develop.
Coleridge's major concern in his doctrine of Trinity is human participation in it. 
That is why 'Jehovah, Christ, and the Dove' have to be rewritten as 'Being, Intellect, 
and Spiritual Action1. In a long entry made in the same month on Trinity, he repeats
62 CN, I, 1382 and note. The editor supplies translation, 'pia fraus': a pious fraud, 
'nudam omnique propria significatione relictam, divinam essentiam talibus 
vocabulis vestit— scil[icet] bonitate, sapientia, essentia': it clothes divine essence 
with such designations although it is naked and untouched by every proper 
signification—called goodness, wisdom, essence, '[ita ut] in pronunciatione formam 
affirmativae obtinet, in intellectu vero virtutem abnegativae': it obtains the form of 
affirmation in the enunciation, but it actually retains in the mind the force of 
negation.
63 CN, II, 2448.
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the same procedure to de-figure and philosophize the three persona. The entry 
begins with the statement: 'The Platonic Fathers, instead of the Uarrjp, Yiogand
Ayiov TLvevfia, used Tov &eov, tcai rov Aoyov avrov , tcai rrjgHoQiag avrov .— Qeog, 
Aoyog, 2o<j>ia, Avdpionog .64 Coleridge agrees with them because 'this seems as 
precise and true as human words can be applied to so recondite a subject.' But when 
he states his trinity, 'Being, Reason and holy action', his human concern is no longer 
on the level of naming.
1. Being, the eternal evermore I am = Deity, or eternal Life, or as we well say 
the Supreme Being (which word Supreme is most often most grossly 
apprehended, as synonymous to the Sublimest or Sovran, whereas it is equivalent 
to the Absolutest)— Z. Reason, Proportion, communicable Intelligibility 
intelligent and communicant, the WORD—which last expression strikes me as the 
profoundest and most comprehensive Energy of the human Mind, if indeed it be 
not in some distinct sense eveovnua deojiaoadorov. 3. But holy action, a Spirit of 
holy Action, to which all holy actions being reducible as to their Sine qua non, is 
verily the Holy Spirit proceeding at once from Life and Reason, and effecting 
all good gifts, what more appropriate Term is conceivable than Wisdom: which in 
its best & only proper sense, involves action, application, habits and tendencies 
of realization
'The WORD' is not only divine but also human, and it 'strikes me as the profoundest 
and most comprehensive Energy of the human Mind'. 'Wisdom' is said to 'involve 
action, application, habits and tendencies of realization' of man. Thus in the second 
and third persona the divinity and humanity are at once distinguished and related.65
64 CN, II, 2445.
65 Coleridge continues the entry and emphasizes the human involvement in the 
Trinity, 'why the Son should both create and redeem ... is of no very difficult 
solution, seeing that no <true> energies can be attributed to an Ov akoyov; the
165
Coleridge goes on and makes the same related duplexity between God and man at 
the first person. By this procedure he establishes symmetry between the divine 
Trinity and its human counterpart. The human trinity is called 'Miss Theta1.
All little Miss Thetas, the 0  being a Circle, with the Kentron [Kentrum], or 
central Point, creating the circumference & both together the infinite Radii/— 
the Central point is primary Consciousness = living Action; the circumference = 
secondary Consciousness <or Consc: in the common sense of the word> and the 
passing to and fro from the one to the other Thought, Things, necessary 
Possibilities, contingent Realities/= Father, Son, Holy Ghost/the T o  O v , o Aoyog, 
7] 2o0i«/—The • is I which is the articulated Breath drawn inward, the o is the 
same sent outward, the 0  or Theta expresses the synthesis and coinstantaneous 
reciprocation of the two Acts, the Dualism of Thought by Distinctions, the Unity 
of Thing by Indivisibility/and then the Radii, AKrTveg = Res in Theta (or perhaps 
Delta) =  A yio  (acta) ev floret (or Tau)66
This description of the human trinity is identical with that of the divine Trinity. It 
is known to be human only because it can be plural, 'All little Miss Thetas'. But 
Coleridge seems to maintain the distinction between the original Trinity and the 
human trinities on the ontological/theological level. He writes, 'the Radii = Res in 
Theta (or perhaps Delta)', that is, 'Miss Theta' is a full circle as the form of 'theta' 
and yet an half of the full circle as the form of delta. 'Miss Theta' is a full in itself, 
but yet a human, phenomenal circle, therefore only a half of the whole.67
moment we conceive the divine energy, that moment we co-conceive the Aoyog. But 
tho' this may redeem, i.e. procure for us the possibility of salvation, it is only the 
Spirit of holy Action, manifested in the habits of Faith and good works, (the wings of 
the brooding Dove) that sanctifies us, the Redeemer still co-operating in the 
completion of that work of which himself is the Corner Stone—in truth, the A and Q, 
seeing that the redeemed & sanctified become finally themselves Words of the Word1.
66 CN, II, 2784.
67 For further references to Miss Theta, see Chapter 5, II, and Chapter 6, I.
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Miss Theta's 'halfness' is certainly beyond the mathematically consistent 
definition of a circle. But this 'illogical* halfness is the source of her life. Miss 
Theta is a complete circle, a self-centring and self-radiating whole. But she is not a 
static whole, as her self-centring is inspiration and her self-radiation respiration. 
As he puts it in the entry, 'the • is I which is the articulated Breath drawn inward, 
the O is the same sent outward, the 0  or Theta expresses the synthesis and 
coinstantaneous reciprocation of the two Acts'. And 'the breath' keeps uniting within 
and without from both ends reciprocally. Thus Miss Theta is alive as far as she 
participates in the exchange of inspiration and respiration, that is, as far as she 
keeps in touch with the source of inspiration and the recipient of respiration which 
is not within her. Here are two perfect circles, divine and human, the centres of 
which, however, can neither be separated to make them two separate circles, nor be 
identified to make them the one whole. Logical repugnancy is not reduced even when 
it is paraphrased as each circle is simultaneously the whole and the half. But this 
impossibility well describes the fact of Miss Theta's breath. Her breath takes her 
beyond logical consistency, or, such consistency becomes complete only when she 
stops breathing.68 That is, by her breath the divinity and the humanity in theology, 
and noumenon and phenomenon in epistemology, reciprocally refer to each other 
through 'a Symbol'.
Coleridge begins to see 'Symbol' as a possible and probably an only way through 
the ontological/theological impasse. He writes:
68 Coleridge restates this point in the ethical term in June 1810, probably as a 
preparation for 'Confessio Fidei' 1810. He writes in the Notebook, 'God's free Love 
acting on a living, conscious, and conscienced Being, i.e. on a Person, must of 
necessity require some accompaniment on the part of the person, its subject (the 
materia subjecta of the operation) But such accompaniment in a moral subject is 
called, an indispensable condition—as Lungs to the vis vitae, or as vital air to the 
Lungs Respiration, not the proper or efficient cause, but the necessary condition of 
its action.1 CN, III, 3905. For his further speculation on 'breath', see Chapter 7, III 
and IV.
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Saturday Night, April 14, 1805—In looking at objects of Nature while I am 
thinking, as at yonder moon dim-glimmering thro1 the dewy window-pane, I 
seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking, a symbolical language for something 
within me that already and forever exists, that observing any thing new. Even 
when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an obsewecure feeling as if 
that new phaenomenon were the dim Awaking of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my 
inner Nature/It is still interesting as a Word, a Symbol! It is Aovoc. the 
Creator! <and the Evolver!>69
By this formulation, he gains the possibility of both symbolical annunciation from, 
and symbolical reference to, 'the Creator1. By this he finds the hope for a mediation 
between God and man. But it should be noticed that he arrives at the idea of 'symbol' 
through an aesthetic speculation. He writes in November 1804, five months prior 
to the above theological formulation of symbol, 'Hard to express that sense of the 
analogy or likeness of a Thing which enables a Symbol to represent it, so that we 
think of the Thing itself—& yet knowing that the Thing is not present to us.'70 And 
he continues, 'Surely, on this universal fact of words & images depends by more of 
less mediations the imitation instead of copy which is illustrated in very nature 
shakespearianizecf. From here he develops the famous distinction between imitation 
and copy and writes in Biographia Literaria, 'the composition of a poem is among the 
im itative  arts; and imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in the  
interfusion of the SAME throughout the radically DIFFERENT, or of the different 
throughout a base radically the same'.71 It is crucial to see that his theological, or 
rather, salvific, symbolism which he develops throughout his life is essentially the 
same as his aesthetical symbolism. That is to say, he virtually restates his poetic
69 CN, II, 2546.
70 CN, II, 2274.
71 BL, II, p. 72.
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aspiration when he calls logos 'a Symbol1 and anchors on its mediatory function all 
the hope of recovery from the problem which turns out to be insoluble either 
ontologically or theologically. Thus, poetic symbolism is indeed a 'universal fact of 
words & images1.72
Coleridge hails 'the dim Awaking of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner 
Nature' and calls it 'Aovoc. the Creator! <and the Evolver!>' But it is only a 
symbolic creator and not 'the Creator' in its full sense. He is well aware of Miss 
Theta's fullness and halfness. Human mind may achieve the phenomenal wholeness as 
a full circle, but even so, there remains the other, noumenal whole, to which his 
phenomenal whole is only a half. The fate of active human mind is well described in 
the following Notebook entry from the same period.
Of the Devil with a Memory, the first sinner/in order not to be baffled by the 
infinite ascent of the heavenly Angels he feigned that all, the T'Ayaflon, <i.e. God 
himself,> included, spring from nothing—& now he has a pretty task/to multiply 
without paper or slate the exact number of all the animalcules, & eggs, & 
embryos, of each Planet by those some other, and the quotient product by a third, 
that quotient product by a fourth and he is not to stop till he has gone thro' Half of 
the Universe, the number of which being infinite, it is considered by the Devils 
in general as a great Puzzle.—A dream in a Doze/3
The 'pretty task' assigned to the devil is to repeat 'creatio ex nihilo' on his own at the 
loss of the whole of the divine creation. But he is allowed a hope that, no matter how
72 Coleridge is to write in The Statesman's Manual (1816) of 'that reconciling and 
mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and 
organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling 
energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in 
themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors.' 
SM, p. 29.
73 CN, II, 2455.
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far away the goal might be, he may eventually complete the fictive half of the whole 
creation and rest in his seventh day. The task itself, however, is to him still and 
ever 'a great Puzzle'.
Chapter 5 'Hypopoeesis' and 'Confessio Fidei'
I. Coleridge responds to the problem of matter and mind both philosophically and 
theologically.1 His shift in theology from 'material revelation' to 'moral revelation1 
is the equivalent of that in philosophy from materialism to idealism. It is under the 
obvious influence of German Idealism which he reads extensively around 1801 that 
he began to refer to Locke-Newtonian empiricism as 'materialism'.2 He then argued 
against the view that mind was a merely passive recipient of sensations, a passive 
mirror only to reflect 'material revelation'. But he soon finds himself disillusioned 
with the ultimate form of idealism when he realizes that it inevitably leads to 
solipsism which denies 'material revelation1 altogether. Thus he comes back to the 
original problem of matter and mind and suggests that 'matter' and 'mind', regarded 
as mutually exclusive, make 'nature' impossible. He writes in a Notebook in May- 
July 1811:
How got the Atheist his Idea of that God which he denies?—I have always held Des 
Cartes' Proof the best & tenable. The Materialist is the Idealist of the intelligible 
World—as the Idealist constrains the realities ab extra into illusions ab intra, so 
the Mat. the realities in us into reflexes and echoes of things without us.—To the 
one the Universe is but an echo-chamber of the Soul; to the other the Soul is but 
an empty echo-chamber or Whispering Labyrinth of the World—. Both alike 
deduce the "Is" from the "Appears", the Substance from the Shadow, the Sound 
from the Echo—both mistake analysis for preformation—3
1 As seen in Chapter 3, III, Coleridge personally experiences the split of matter and 
mind. The split is first of all his 'personal' problem. Therefore, whenever he deals 
with the it he is always 'personal', that is, in his case, theological as well as 
philosophical.
2 The point is stated in a letter to Godwin on 25 March 1801. CL, II, p. 714. Quoted 
and discussed in Chapter 3, ll.
3 CN, III, 4087.
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Thus nature becomes split between 'within' and 'without'. Nature is either received 
'ab extra' or produced 'ab intra', or, in his words, it is either 'forma formata' or 
'forma formans',4 but never both at the same time. He argues that both 
'materialism' and 'idealism' are a form of reductionism, as they 'deduce' nature 
either 'ab extra' or 'ab intra'. His argument resembles Kant's criticism on both 
Locke and Leibniz. Kant complains in Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
Anstatt im Verstande und der Sinnlichkeit zwei ganz verschiedene Quellen von 
Vorstellungen zu suchen, die aber nur in  V e r k n u p f u n g  objektivgultig von 
Dingen urteilen konnten, hielt sich ein jeder dieser grofcen Manner nur an eine 
von beiden, die sich ihrer Meinung nach unmittelbar auf Dinge an sich selbst 
bezoge,
[Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of 
representations which, while quite different, can supply objectively valid 
judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men 
holds to one only of the two, viewing it as in immediate relation to things in 
themselves.]5
Coleridge's position is that there are the realities within the human mind which 
cannot be deduced from without and also the realities without the human mind which 
cannot be deduced from within. It should be noted here that to state his position he 
uses spatial distinction between 'without' and 'within', or more accurately, 'from 
without' and 'from within', or, passivity and activity of human mind. It is 
particularly interesting that he attempts to reintroduce Cartesian 'proof' as a 
possible mediation between materialism and idealism. Descartes himself thinks that 
both matter and mind are substance and are created by God. And a metaphysician like
4 Friend, I, p. 467. See also Chapter 4, II.
5 Kant, op. cit., and Smith, op. cit., B 327.
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Coleridge has to maintain the similar view and argue that there are both 'material' 
substance and 'mental' or spiritual substance and that they are somehow related. 
However, between Descartes and Coleridge lies the metaphysical controversy over 
the possibility of metaphysics itself. It is rather ironical that reductionism is the 
inevitable consequence of the attempted Cartesian 'proof'. Both the materialist and 
the idealist are prompted to reductionism either in materialistic or idealistic terms, 
either dissolving 'the realities within' into 'the realities without' or including the 
latter in the former. Coleridge's task is to argue that the two are unrelated in the 
sense that one is not the derivative of the other. But he cannot but argue at the same 
time that the two are somehow related. His task therefore is to relate, or rather, 
mediate, the two different kinds of 'realities'.
Coleridge develops his argument basically in theological terms. Trying to relate 
'the realities within' and 'the realities without', he eventually identifies the problem 
of their relatedness and unrelatedness as a variation of the problem of sameness and 
difference between God and man. The final form of this argument can be seen in 
Theory of Life where he writes:
It is the duty and the privilege of the theologian to demonstrate, that space is the 
ideal organ by which the soul of man perceives the omnipresence of the Supreme 
Reality, as distinct from the works, which in him move, and live, and have their 
being; while the equal mystery of Time bears the same relation to his Eternity^
Here 'the realities' within space and time, or, 'the realities' within the human mind 
are contrasted with those without the human mind. Nature, or, 'the works, which in 
him move, and live, and have their being'7 is neither within nor without but
6 TL, p. 394. See also CN, IV, 4775. Quoted in Chapter 6 , 1.
7 This passage is from Acts 17: 28. It should be noted that Coleridge applies this 
passage, which is originally applied to man, to the whole nature. His theology begins 
when he recognizes that by the distinction between matter and mind the human mind
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somewhere in the middle. He positively argues that 'the Supreme Reality' and 'space' 
are related in the same way as 'Eternity and 'Time' are related. 'Nature', which is 
placed in the middle of the two, is possible only when the two are somehow related. 
However, he explains such relation no further and just calls it 'mystery'.
Because of this inherently theological argument, Coleridge is particularly 
sensitive to the problem of 'subjective space'. His final view concerning the 
subjective space appears in a passage in the Logic where he recapitulates in 
philosophical terms his inherent theological argument. After a brief summary of the 
controversy between Leibniz and Newton-Clarke 'respecting the ideality of space', he 
writes:
The truth is that it [space] is the subjective condition of all objectivity, and 
whatever reality is attributed to outward experience must a fortiori belong to 
that without which no outward experience is possible. If therefore we use the 
term "real" in opposition to "fantastic", or if we use "objective" as the contrary 
of "accidental", in order to distinguish from the result of individual 
peculiarities, then space is in this sense an undoubted reality, and eminently 
objective; but if we use the word "real" in opposition to "mental", or "objective" 
in opposition to "subjective" in its widest sense, then we must reverse the 
position.8
This is basically a restatement of Kant's argument of space. In fact he had already 
written in 1800-1801: 'Space—is it merely another word for the perception of a 
capability of additional magnitude—or does this very perception presuppose the idea 
of Space?—The latter is Kant's opinion.'9 But Coleridge is essentially different from
excludes itself from this divine presence in nature. For other occasions of the same
quotation, see Chapter 1, I and 7, I.
8 Logic, p. 160.
9 CN, I, 887.
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Kant in maintaining the 'duality1 of space. While following Kant's argument for the 
subjective space, Coleridge keeps suggesting that the subjective space as such is a 
problem. In a marginal note to Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde, Coleridge 
clearly illustrates his point. Kant writes, 'space in general does not belong to the 
properties or relations of things in themselves ... but belongs merely to the 
subjective form of our sensible intuition of things or relations' [der Raum 
iiberhaupt nicht zu den Eigenschaften oder Verhaltnissen der Dinge an sich selbst... 
sondern bios zu der subjectiven Form unserer sinnlichen Anschauung von Dingen 
oder Verhaltnissen]. To this Coleridge responds:
But there must be a cause ab extra, why I see this Hop that, the Beans in the 
opposite direction. What does that mean? We see nothing in itself, but only by 
its action on us modified by our own laws of Perception. K. should have shewn 
how our "subjective Form of sensuous Intuition" came to be called into action. To 
common minds the facts would appear instances in proof of the reality, = 
objectivity, of Space.10
In other words, Kant should have shown how the distinction between space 'without' 
and space 'within' came forward and how they can be related. As seen above, his 
distinction between 'the Supreme Reality' and 'space' corresponds with the 
distinction between space 'without' and space 'within', or, between divine 'noumenal' 
space and human 'phenomenal' space. Unlike Kant's 'things in themselves', 
Coleridge's 'Supreme Reality' does not necessarily have 'material' meaning. It is 
rather a space which contains the material nature, or in his words, 'the works, 
which in him move, and live, and have their being'. However, the duality between 
'the divine noumenal space without' and 'the human phenomenal space within' is still
10 CM, III, p. 270.
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a problem, and he eventually adopts the word 'mystery' to explain it. While 
'mystery' does not explicate anything, it allows him to restate his basic theology in 
philosophical terms. In Malta he writes, 'Space <is one of> the Hebrew names for 
God/& it is the most perfect image of Souf.11
Coleridge is well acquainted with seventeenth-century metaphysical controversy 
about space first between Descartes' 'material extension' and Henry More's 
'spiritual extension' and later between Leibniz's 'relative space' and Newton's 
'absolute space'.12 As to the former he reads A Collection of Several Philosophical 
Writings of Dr. Henry More (1 6 6 2 ),13 which includes the correspondence between 
Descartes and More over the question whether the extension is only material or also 
spiritual. As to the latter he summarizes Leibniz-Newton controversy in the Logic 
and presents his own view.14 It is very likely that Coleridge picks up the notion of 
'divine space', which he maintains all through his argument and eventually works 
into a theological argument, from his reading of More. It seems that when Coleridge 
writes 'Space <is one of> the Hebrew names for God' he has in mind More's passage in 
Enchiridium metaphysicum (1671). More writes:
There are not less than twenty titles by which the Divine Numen is wont to be 
designated, and which perfectly fit this infinite internal place (locus) the 
existence of which in nature we have demonstrated; omitting moreover that the 
very Divine Numen is called, by the Cabalists, MAKOM, that is, Place (locus).
11 CN, II, 2402.
12 See Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, 
1957) pp. 110-154, and 235-276.
1 3 Coleridge borrows More's work from Carlisle Cathedral Library from 4 April 
1801 to July 1802. See CN, I, 938 note.
14 See above.
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Indeed it would be astonishing and a kind of prodigy if the thing about which so 
much can be said proved to be a mere nothing.15
The last of these twenty titles which More lists up is 'Pure Act'. And Coleridge 
writes 'Space <is one of> the Hebrew names for God/& it is the most perfect image of 
Soul, pure Soul— being indeed to us nothing but unresisted action.'16
More's 'spiritual substance', or spiritual extension which he posits against 
Descarte's material extension, is to play an essential role in the history of 
philosophy. When it is passed on to Locke and Newton, it is appropriated to defend 
their agnostic, empirical sentiment. In the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, Leibniz 
argues that 'there is no real Space out of the material Universe' and deems Newton- 
Clarke's 'infinite empty space' as 'the revival of the odd imagination of Dr. Henry 
More'.17 Both parties are in agreement as to what it is they should argue about. It 
is the absolute, infinite space, that is, ultimately, the transcendent God. Therefore, 
says Leibniz, it is impossible. But with the same reason More and Newton deem it 
necessary. The following remark of Koyre well summarizes the basic difference 
between them: 'the God of Leibniz is not the Newtonian Overlord who makes the world 
as he wants it and continues to act upon it as the Biblical God did in the first six days 
of Creation. He is ... the Biblical God on the Sabbath Day, the God who has finished his 
work and who finds it good'.18 That is, while Leibniz is determined to remain within
15 Quoted from Koyre, ibid, p. 148. Max Jammer reports that 'As far as his theory 
of space is concerned, More himself refers to the cabalistic doctrine as explained by 
Cornelius Agrippa [von Nettersheim] in his De occulta philosophia, where space is 
specified as one of the attributes of God.' Jammer, Concepts of Space: The History of 
Theories of Space in Physics (Cambridge, Mass., 1954) p. 39.
16 CN, II, 2402. Coleridge had written in December 1803, 'Free unresisted action 
(the going forth of the Soul) Life without Consciousness, properly infinite, i.e. 
unlimited—'. CN, I, 1771.
17 Koyre, ibid, pp. 260, 303 note 25.
18 Ibid, p. 240.
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the created world, Newton sends his speculation beyond the limit of the created world 
towards the absolute space in which ' the Will of Gocf prior to the creation resides.19
Finally, Kant humanizes this Newtonian absolute space and initiates his 
phenomenology. Coleridge would at this point argue that Kant leaves unsolved the 
problem between matter and mind and simply adds another insoluble problem 
between the divine and human minds. Coleridge begins his theological speculation 
precisely from this point. Kant writes, for example, in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
'Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. 
For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to 
something in another region of space from that in which I find myself) ... the 
representation of space must be presupposed.' [Der Raum ist kein empirischer 
Begriff, der von au&eren Erfahrungen abgezogen worden. Denn damit gewisse 
Empfindungen auf etwas auKer mich bezogen werden (d. i. auf etwas in einem andern 
Orte des Raumes, als darinnen ich mich befinde) ... dazu muS die Vorstellung des 
Raumes schon zum Grunde liegen.]29 Coleridge would argue that Kant here 
implicitly admits the duality of space without properly problematizing it. He would 
never fail to detect the duality between the space ’in which I find myself1 and that 
'outside me' and point out that such duality is essentally a theological problem. In 
doing so he appropriates More's argument. In fact, Coleridge's distinction between 
the divine space without and the human space within is a restatement of More's 
distinction between 'space' and 'soul'. More writes in An Antidote Against Atheism 
(1 653):
19 In a letter on 11 January 1826, Coleridge ascribes the Leibnizian understanding 
of the immanent space to 'our Divines' and writes that for them 'The Deity ... was to 
the Divinities ... as Space to the Diagrams for the Geometrician. The space exists 
absolutely in each ... but only in these does it exist at all.' That is, they did not 
understand 'the Absolute, or Causa sui ... essentially unutterable, deeper than all 
Idea'. Here he claims that he learned this 'deeper philosophy', 'the only one 
compatible with a Moral religion', from the fourth Gospel. CL, VI, p. 537. 'The 
Absolute' here is 'Prothesis' of the Pentad. See Chapter 7 ,1.
20 Kant, ibid, and Smith, ibid, B 38.
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Wherefore we being assured of this, that there is a spiritual substance in 
ourselves in which both these properties do resides, viz., of understanding and of 
moving corporeal matter, let us both enlarge our minds so as to conceive as well 
as we can of a spiritual substance that is able to move and actuate all matter 
whatsoever never so far extended, and after what way and manner soever it 
pleases and that it has not the knowledge only of this or that particular thing, but 
a distinct and plenary cognoscence of all things; and we have indeed a very 
competent apprehension of the nature of the eternal and invisible God, who like 
the soul of man does not indeed fall under sense, but does everywhere operate so, 
that his presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward 
senses.21
Coleridge's difficulty is that he has to argue that 'his presence is easily to be 
gathered from what is discovered by our outward senses' after accepting Kant's 
phenomenological argument. In order for that, he first accepts Kant's distinction 
between matter and mind, and, as the result, subjective human space. And then he 
also makes a distinction between matter and divine mind, and, as the result, re­
introduces objective divine space. Thus he quietly shifts the point of argument from 
the distinction between matter and mind to that between divine and human minds. 
And by this shift he attempts to get beyond the limit which Kant sets for his 
phenomenology.22 In Malta he attempts to 'enlarge our minds so as to conceive as
21 Quoted from Gerald R. Cragg, ed., The Cambridge Platonists (New York, 1968) p. 
193. Coleridge repeatedly reads and quotes in the Notebooks from More's An Antidote 
Against Atheism.
22 Kant's argument that 'limits' are different from 'boundaries' is based on the 
distinction between matter and mind. His phenomenology argues that mind is 
'limited' in its own space, but the space itself has no 'boundaries'. In the 
Prolegomena, Kant writes, 'Boundaries (in extended beings) always presuppose a 
space which is found outside a certain determined place and encloses it; limits do not 
need any such thing but are mere negations which affect a quantity in so far as it does 
not have absolute completeness. But our reason sees so to speak around it a space for 
knowledge of things in themselves, although it can never have determined concepts of 
them and is limited merely to experience [appearances] ... human reason recognises
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well as we can of a spiritual substance that is able to move and actuate all matter 
whatsoever never so far extended'.
Coleridge is strongly affected by the sky of Malta. In one occasion he has an 
opportunity to enact his speculation on space when observing the Maltese sky. He 
writes in the Notebook:
I have found occasion to meditate on the nature of the sense of magnitudes; and its 
absolute dependence on the idea of Substance', the consequent difference between 
magnitude and Spaciousness; the dependence of the idea of substance on doulbe- 
touch/& thence to evolve all our feelings & ideas of magnitude, magnitudinal 
sublimity, &c from a scale of our own bodies—23
The entry begins with the distinction between what appears to be Kant's 'human' 
space and More's 'divine' space, or rather, between phenomenal 'magnitude' and 
noumenal 'spaciousness'. With this distinction in mind he suggests that space is not 
necessarily phenomenal as Kant argues, that is, it is not necessarily dependent on 'a 
scale of our own bodies'. He writes:
why do I seek for mountains when in the flattest countries the Clouds present so 
many so much more romantic & spacious forms, & the coal-fire so many so much
limits, but no boundaries; i. e. it recognises that something lies outside it, to which 
it can never reach [Grenzen (bei ausgedehnten Wesen) setzen immer einen Raum 
voraus, der ausserhalb einem gewissen bestimmten Platz angetroffen wird und ihn 
einschliesst; Schranken bediirfen dergleichen nicht, sondern sind blose 
Verneinungen, die eine Grosse afficiren, sofern sie nicht absolute Vollstandigkeit hat. 
Unsere Vernunft aber sieht gleichsam um sich einen Raum fur die Erkenntniss der 
Dinge an sich selbst, ob sie gleich von ihnen niemals bestimmte Begriffe haben kann 
und nur auf Erscheinungen eingeschrankt ist ... erkennt die menschliche Vernunft 
zwar Schranken, aber keine Grenzen, d. i. zwar, dass etwas ausser ihr liege, wohin 
sie niemals gelangen kann]. Kant, Prolegomena, in Werke, IV, p. 100, and Lucas, op. 
cit., p. 119. Coleridge's attempt, in this context, can be described as an attempt to 
resolve 'the limited space' into 'the unlimited space'. See below.
23 CN, II, 2402.
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more varied & lovely forms?—And whence arises the pleasure from musing on 
the latter/do I not more or less consciously fancy myself a Lilliputian, to whom 
these would be mountains—& so by this factitious scale makes them mountains, 
my pleasure being consequently playful, voluntary poem in hieroglyphics or 
picture-writing— "phantoms of Sublimity" which I continue to know to be 
phantoms?—And form itself, is -it not its main agency exerted in individualizing 
the Thing, making it this, & that, & thereby facilitating this shadowy 
measurement of it by the scale of my own body?
Drawing on his 'Apologia pro Vita sua', he here tries to show that perception of space 
is independent of 'the scale of my own body'. In the draft of 'Apologia pro Vita sua' he 
writes:
his soul emancipates his eyes 
Of the accidents of size /  24
'Factitious' scale in the fifth line of the passage quoted above is likely to be a slip for 
'fictitious' scale. Since it is 'fictitious', it is free from 'the accident of size'. Then he 
discloses his intention of this observation. Once he frees his soul from 'the scale of 
my own body', he finds the possibility of dissolving his soul into divine space, that 
is, in More's words, 'enlarging our minds so as to conceive as well as we can of a 
spiritual substance'. He continues:
Yon long not unvaried ridge of Hills that runs out of sight each way, it is 
spacious, & the pleasure derivable from it is from its running, its motion, its 
assimilation to action/& here the scale is taken from my Life, & Soul— not from
24 CN, I, 791. Quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 3, I.
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my body. Space <is one of> the Hebrew names for God/& it is the most perfect 
image of Soul, pure Soul— being indeed to us nothing but unresisted action.— ... 
and thus from the positive grasp to the mountain, from the mountain to the Cloud, 
from the Cloud to the blue depth of Sky, that which, as on the top of Etna in a 
serene atmosphere, seems to go behind the Sun, all is gradation, that precludes 
division indeed, but not distinction/
In viewing the landscape, he shifts his vision from 'the positive grasp to the 
mountain, from the mountain to the Cloud, from the Cloud to the blue depth of Sky1. 
It is a vision which aspires to larger and larger expansion until it vanishes into the 
depth of the sky, that which in its expansion restores the fragmented many into one 
tableau of gradation. But when he directly looks up the sky, he finds nothing which 
separates the eye from the sky. At that moment he experiences the immediate union 
of the sky and the eye, of the depth of 'space' and that of 'soul'. He writes in another 
Notebook entry:
0  that Sky, that soft blue mighty Arch, resting on the mountains of solid Sea-like 
plain/what a aweful adorable omneity in unity. I know no other perfect union of 
the sublime with the beautiful, that is, so that they should both be felt at the 
same moment tho' by different faculties yet each faculty predisposed by itself to 
receive the specific modification from the other. To the eye it is an inverted 
Goblet, the inside of a geld sapphire Bason; = perfect beauty <in shape and color>; 
to the mind <it is> immensity, but even the eye <feels as if it were to> look thro1 
with dim sense of the non -dtfferresistence/it is not exactly the feeling from a 
given to the organ by solid & limited things/the eye itself feels that the 
limitation is in its own power not in the Object.25
25 CN, II, 2346.
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In 'Apologia pro Vita sua1 he writes of 'the poet's eye' which 'hath a magnifying 
power', which emancipates itself from 'the accidents of size.'26 And here it is 
'emancipated' even from the objects of vision and immediately dissolved into the 
depth of the sky. It is as if the space within are diffused to the space without and 
their distinction resolved. He soon gives this experience a rapturous expression.
Friday-Saturday 12-1 °clock/What a sky, the not yet orbed moon, the spotted 
oval, blue at one edge from the deep utter Blue of the Sky ... such profound Blue, 
deep as a deep river, and deep in color, & those two <depths> so entirely one ... 
Unconsciously I stretched forth my arms as to embrace the Sky, and in a trance I 
had worshipped God in the Moon/the Spirit not the Form ... 0  not only the Moon, 
but the depth of Sky!—the Moon was the Idea; but deep Sky is of all visual 
impressions the nearest akin to a Feeling/it is more a Feeling than a Sight/or 
rather it is the melting away and entire union of Feeling & Sight/27
He almost embraces the sky. In the end, however, he fails to do so. Or rather, at the 
moment he embraces the sky, the whole vision turns inside out and brings him back 
to the point where he had begun the whole speculation, the rigid distinction between 
within and without. This is how he ends the entry:'And did I not groan at my 
unworthiness, & be miserable at my state of Health, its effects, and effect-trebling 
Causes? 0  yes!—Me miserable! 0  yes!—Have Mercy on me, 0  something out of me! 
For there is no power, (and if that can be, less strength) in aught within me! 
Mercy! Mercy!' Suddenly he is drawn back to confinement within his diseased body, 
and again his soul is confined within his body. The depth of soul may be dissolved 
into the depth of the sky only when there is nothing material between them. That is, 
matter prevents the immediate union of space and soul. But matter may also mediate
26 CN, l, 791.
27 CN, II, 2453.
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the space without and the soul within. In pursuit of such possibility, he gradually 
develops his later theological speculation. And in that the recovery of nature usually 
means the reconciliation between the divine space without and the human soul within 
on the horizon of nature.28
II. Coleridge's spatial distinction between 'within' and 'without' the human mind 
causes two major questions. One is the question concerning the distinction between 
passivity and activity of human mind, or, the distinction between action 'ab extra' 
and action 'ab intra'. In this sense what he calls 'materialism' and 'idealism' are 
based on respectively action 'ab extra' and action 'ab' intra'. The other question is 
whether 'substance' is given 'ab extra' or gained 'ab intra', that is, whether it is 
given to passive mind or produced by active mind. In the above observation he 
mentions 'the dependence of the idea of substance on double-touch'. 'Double-touch' in 
this context represents the fictive creativity of the active human mind, as he 
includes it among the topics he promises in the twelfth chapter of Biographia 
Literaria.29 His investigation into 'double-touch' provides him with a clue to
28 See the following chapters.
29 BL, I, p. 293. Coleridge's speculation on 'double-touch' begins in January 1804. 
He makes a Notebook entry and writes, ’My Skin deadened, the effect of violent 
Diarhcea/My Speculations thence on double Touch—the generation of the Sense of 
Reality & Life out of us, from the Impersonation effected by a certain phantasm of 
double Touch, &c &c &c, and thence my Hope of making out a radical distinction 
between this Volition & Free Will or Arbitrement, & the detection of the Sophistry of 
the Necessitarians/as having arisen from confounding the two.1 CN, I, 1827. Here 
he draws the distinction between 'Volition' and 'Free Will', that is, between passive, 
unwilling automatism which produces 'phantasm' and active, willing 'generation of 
the Sense of Reality & Life'. He takes up 'double Touch' again in January 1811 while 
investigating his nightmare. In this observation he adopts idea and language similar 
to those he uses for imagination in Biographia Literaria. It suggests that he sees 
'dreaming' and 'imagination' as basically the same phenomenon distinguished only by 
the difference between 'Volition' and 'Free Will'. He writes in a Notebook, 'Night- 
mair is, I think, always—even when it occurs in the midst of Sleep, and not as it 
more commonly does after a waking Interval, a state not of Sleep but of Stupor of the 
outward organs of Sense ... while the volitions of Reason i.e. comparing & c, are 
awake , tho' disturbed. This stupor seems occasioned by some painful sensation ... 
which withdrawing the attention to itself from its sense of other realities present 
makes us asleep to them indeed but otherwise awake ... transmits-single double Touch 
as double single Touch: to which the Imagination therefore, the true inward Creatrix,
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pursue the possibility of a metaphysic 'ab intra1, or, a creative fiction of the active 
human mind. In July-September 1809 he discusses such possibility in a long 
Notebook entry. There he names 'metaphysic ab intra' as 'Hypopoeesis'.
Hypothesis: the placing of one known fact under others as their ground or 
foundation. Not the fact itself but only its position in a given certain relation is 
imagined. Where both the position and the fact are imagined, it is Hypopoeesis 
not Hypothesis, subfiction not supposition ... Gravitation therefore is a just 
philosophical Hypothesis; but the Leibnitzian Monad = punctum physicum, is a 
fiction—& when applied to the causal explication of phaenomena a suffiction— 
hypopoiesy.30
Here are implicit criticisms both on Newtonian cosmology and Leibnizian 
monadology. Coleridge detects in the former the unacknowledged participation of 'the 
imaginative power of man [imaginatrici humana]'31 which suggests that the 
Newtonian system is only a hypothesis in spite of Newton's claim to the contrary. To 
the latter he denies any metaphysical certainty which it claims. He calls it 
'hypopoiesy' which begins with fiction and deduces the rest from that fiction.32 The
instantly out of the chaos of the elements <or shattered fragments> of Memory puts 
together some form to fit it—which derives an over-powering sense of Reality from 
the circumstance, that the power of Reason being in good measure awake, most 
generally presents to us all the accompanying images exactly as we very nearly as 
they existed the moment before, when we fell out of anxious wakefulness into this 
Reverie— ' CN, III, 4046. One may say that 'single Touch' and 'double Touch' 
respectively correspond to 'the primary imagination' and 'the secondary 
imagination'. Coleridge suggests that 'single Touch' changes to 'double Touch' when 
'single Touch' is suspended by 'stupor' and replaced with 'double Touch' supported by 
'the true inward Creatrix'. But this change involves the fall from 'realities' into 
'Reverie . And whether this 'Reverie'' provides a fuii recovery from !Tne chaos of 
elements' remains uncertain. For the possible relation of his speculation on 
'double-touch' to the secondary imagination, see Chapter 6 ,1 note.
30 CN, III, 3587.
31 Ibid.
32 For Coleridge's further references to 'hypopoiesy', see Chapter 7, III note.
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former begins with 'fact' and ends in 'fiction1; but the latter postulates 'fiction' in 
the beginning and by the fictive deduction it only multiplies its own fictitiousness. 
He continues the entry and examines the extent of the applicability of this fictive 
human creativity.
Query therefore/whether the assumption of a Deity as the cause of the Universe 
by those who deduce the idea of God from the Universe, and deny that it is a fact of 
itself, res posita, sive, datum per se, ever deserves the name of an Hypothesis. 
For what is the res posita that quae hie supponitur—? mens humana: as in the 
former case the fall of heavy bodies—. Well, extend the latter in universum, but 
only add nothing—& what becomes of creation?
Leibniz may or may not 'deny' God as 'a fact of itself'. But what Coleridge 
understands as Leibnizian deduction certainly generates the impression that 'the idea 
of God' is somehow dependent on that deduction. Coleridge is at pains to deny the 
certainty of the metaphysical claim of the Leibnizian system which originates in 'the 
human mind' and refers back to God. But he is in no sense dismissive of the system 
itself. On the contrary, he believes that once the system is successfully purged of 
the undue claim, once it is properly regarded as nothing but 'suffiction', it deserves 
a further examination. He believes that he can 'extend' the human fiction 'in 
universum'. Certainly it would 'add nothing'. And he asks the question concerning 
the belonging of the whole creation. He wonders whether it lies 'within' or 'without' 
the human mind; he asks, 'what becomes of creation?' Then he continues:
—I here take in the fact that these same deducers deny the spontaneity of the Will. 
For let it be granted, that in the higher Volition, (facultas volitionis superior— 
das obere Begehrungs-vermogen) not only the form but even likewise the Stuff 
or Matter is produced (= hervorgebracht) we doubtless get farther on toward a
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first hypothesis—For that the thing produced is spiritual in the one, and material 
in the other, even supposing that we were under the necessity of affirming the 
absolute heterogeneity of Matter & Mind, & that it were not possible (as it is in 
reality not only possible but more easy) to conceive the World as an aggregate of 
Representations, or modifications of Mind—
To his own question he provides a Fichtean answer that everything originates from 
the human mind. He says, 'we assuredly are justified in magnifying this power, & 
universalizing it1.33 Kathleen Coburn points out that 'das obere Begehrungs- 
vermogen' comes from the second edition of Fichte's Versuch einer Kritik aller 
Offenbarung (Konigsberg, 1793), which he reads and annotates repeatedly.34 But 
he also expresses his reluctance to accept this argument and refers to'the necessity 
of affirming the absolute heterogeneity of Matter & Mind'. What he does is to call the 
human mind 'a first hypothesis' and implies that all the Fichtean principle is 
'suffiction'. Thus even after agreeing with Fichte's argument and admitting the 
ethical dimension concerning 'the spontaneity of the Will', he still believes that 
there is something beyond the human mind, that the human mind is originally 
passive to that 'something'. That is, he still believes that fictive creation of the 
human mind is 're'-creation.35
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., note.
35 Coleridge writes the following marginal note in the first two pages of his copy of 
Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung presumably at the beginning of his reading. 
He writes of 'inward & indescribable experiences' that 'they all alike are sensations, 
which, whether desired or undesired, make the Mind passive—for tho' we in common 
usage we appropriate suffering to that, which we suffer unwillingly (or considered 
in itself) yet -it in fact we suffer pleasure even as we suffer pain—They are within 
us as if yet they were without—& stand as the supporting stratum of the Perceptions, 
which there too are properly within us or rather on the surface, yet represent 
themselves as without'. And he concludes the note as follows, 'Perception = 
sensations so minute as to excite the activity of the mind by its re-action on the 
momentary passion—' CM, II, p. 639.
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Thus Coleridge carefully distinguishes his version of Leibnizian ’Hypopoeesis1 
both from Newtonian 'hypothetic' cosmology and from Fichtean idealism. He 
certainly sees that such distinction is a necessary procedure when he 'extends it in 
universum'. Then he continues the entry and gradually discloses what he has in 
mind.
But it will be my business to set forth an orderly proof, that Atheism is the 
necessary Consequence or Corollary of the Hartleian Theory of the Will conjoined 
with his Theory of Thought & Action in genere—Words as distinguished from 
mere pulses of Air in the auditory nerve must correspond to Thoughts, and 
Thoughts is but the verb-substantive Participle Preterite of Thing ... If 
therefore we have no will, what is the meaning of the word? It is a word without 
a Thought—or else a Thought without a Thing, which is a blank 
contradiction/reata absque re— materiata sine materia. Verba viventia—imo, 
literae viventes—natural music— natural dancing—gestures or natura  
mxvro^ iLfXLKa. Refer to Lord Bacon's impressio communis—unum vestigiesum in 
sensus varios—/
It turns out that he has been trying 'to destroy the old antithesis of Words & 
T h i n g s ' 3 6  That is, he has been arguing that there is no possibility of 'Words' in the 
Newtonian system, and that there is no possibility of 'Things' in the Fichtean 
idealism. This etymological speculation is in fact his doctrine of 'Words' which, he 
believes, brings back the reconciliation between thing and thought, between 
passivity and activity, between the present and the past, or, the presence and the
36 CL, I, p. 625. See Chapter 3, II. That 'Thoughts is but the verb-substantive 
Participle Preterite of Thing' is the point which Coleridge later repeats in the Logic. 
Consideration of its theological implication eventually leads him to the formation of 
the Pentad. See Chapter 7, III.
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absence, all at once.37 But in attempting to re-introduce the Leibnizian system, he 
avoids making it exclusively divine or human. He admits into the system 'the  
spontaneity of the Will'. That is, implicitly, he admits the essential twofoldness of 
'the Will' between God and man.38 Therefore, the reconciliation he pursues here is 
ultimately a theological one. From a human point of view, it is the reconciliation 
between 'I am thinged and 'I thing or think', or, between body and mind. Coleridge's 
self-denaturalization, his painful alienation from all the wonders in nature thus 
turns out to have been the search for the creative will within himself which 
produces, and cannot but produce 'pantomimic nature'. That is to say, when he finds 
what he seeks for, when he completes his 'denaturalization', the whole recovery of 
very nature begins anew in the form of 'Hypopoeesis'. He continues:
By what steps am I to ascend?— 1. To abstract whatever is common to all, that is, 
to discover some definition which will apply to all and each—Idea generica, 
universalis. This will be the giant difficulty.
2. primary Association. 3. Accidental association. 4. Analogy, 5. 
Analogical Wit. N.B. In what stage commences the agency of the vis imitativa? 
In the first? or as a connecting Link between the first & second?. A stringed 
Instrument—the wind sweeps at once over all the strings, and all parts of each at 
once—2: One or one part of it, is struck—& yet propagates the vibration thro' all.
37 The passage quoted above has a detailed Latin etimology concerning 'thinging' and 
'thinking' which is the expansion of the one he adopted in describing Miss Theta. He 
writes, 'So in Latin/Res, a thing—reor, I think—and observe the passive termination 
of the verb, which is a verb middle or deponent, i.e. an active-passive—an action 
upon a passion. Res = thing: res in prassenti = thinking, i.e. thinging, or thing out of 
me = a thing in me—it is a thing-thing— reata, res preterita, a thought—a thing 
representative of what was but is not present—Thought is the participle past of 
Thing—a thing acts on me but not on me as purely passive, which is the case in all 
affection, affectus, but res agit in co-agentem—in the first, I am thinged, in the 
latter I thing or think—Rem reor—reatam rursus reor.' For the description of Miss 
Theta, see CN, II, 2784 . See also Chapter 4, IV and Chapter 6 , 1.
38 Coleridge works on this problem in 'Confessio Fidei' 1810. See below.
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3. The facilitation of the latter from the precedence of the former—N.B. The 
spontaneity of man, what share has it? how does it act, if at all?
Active human mind causes the change in the direction of action. He illustrates this 
change by drawing on 'a stringed Instrument1, probably an Eolian harp, which is no 
longer played 'ab extra' but also 'ab intra'. When the human mind ceases to be played 
'ab extra', it begins to play on itself 'ab intra' and produce either 'Hypothesis' or 
'Hypopoeesis'. Both 'Hypo'thesis and 'Hypo'poeesis are secondary and 'fallen' in that 
sense. The only difference is that while 'Hypothesis' cannot but remain fallen, 
'Hypopoeesis' gives an opportunity to ascend again. In spite of its 'giant difficulty', 
the first step of ascent has already been taken, at least theoretically, in Malta with 
the inception of the active human mind as 'Forma efformans'. Now it becomes the 
first creative will and aims at its goal, 'Analogical Wit', that is, wisdom in fiction. 
Here its act ranges from producing 'mere pulses of Air' to achieving 'Analogical Wit', 
from making vocal sound to making sense, in short, all that is to speak. With this 
interpretation of 'Word', what he saw in a dream in Malta, the assignment given to 
Devil to imitate 'creatio ex nihilo', here becomes clearly salvific. But he is still a 
quester. He asks the question which brings the whole of the above speculation back to 
the starting point, 'the giant difficulty'. He asks, 'the spontaneity of man, what share 
has it? how does it act, if at all?'
III. Coleridge's 'Confessio Fidei' (1810) is the first substantial statement of his 
Trinitarian theology.39 It is a compilation of two arguments, one theological and the 
other philosophical. The theological argument proposes that his Trinitarian theology
39 CN, III, 4005. Coleridge's dejection is probably at the deepest in 1810. See 
Jasper, op. cit., pp. 93-4. It is the time when his hope for personal recovery gets 
finally shattered in the real sense. Separation from Sara Hutchinson in March and 
quarrel with Wordsworth in October mean to him the end of his lingering hope. In 
this sense 'Confessio Fidei' is an expression of his hope which he can only express in 
a theological language.
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is different from Unitarian theology which he ceases to regard as theology. The 
philosophical argument proposes that Kantian ethics is essentially insufficient for a 
man like Coleridge who believes that his personal problems may be dealt with only 
in theological terms. At the heart of these arguments is the problem of two natures, 
in his word, the problem of 'Man's double Nature ... as Man and God'.40 In the 
theological context, it is the problem of 'the original corruption of our nature'.41 He 
argues in 'Confessio Fidei' that Unitarianism does not deal with the problem in the 
first place, and that Kantian ethics fall short of settling the problem.
It is around 1800 that Coleridge begins to reconsider his early devotion to 
Unitarianism. It is the time when he begins to struggle with the problem of 'two 
natures'. When he recognises the problem, he immediately attempts to settle it by 
referring to 'the nature & being of Christ' and gradually departs from Unitarianism. 
He mentions his 'Confessio Fidei' for the first time in a letter to John Prior Estlin, a 
Unitarian minister, on 26 July 1802. There he declares, 'you will see my Confessio 
Fidei, which as far as regards the Doctrine of Trinity is negative Unitarianism—a 
non liquet concerning the nature & being of Christ—but a condemnation of the 
Trinitarians as being wise beyond what is written.42 It is quite accurate to describe 
his position as 'negative Unitarianism' when his personal problems demand a radical 
reconsideration of his early belief in Unitarianism. It should be noted here also that 
he shows no intention of accepting 'conventional' Trinitarianism. As he makes clear 
later, his Trinitarian theology is the result of the reconsideration of his own 
Unitarianism .43 The difference between Coleridge's Trinitarianism and 
Unitarianism is closely related to the different understanding of the Fall. For the
40 CN, I, 1710. Quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 4, III.
41 CL, II, p. 821-2. Quoted in full and discussed below.
42 CL, II, p. 821.
43 On 23 June 1834 he is recorded to say, 'I owe, under God, my return to the faith
to my having gone much further than the Unitarians, and so came round to the other
extreme.' TT, I, pp. 488-9.
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problem of two natures, understood by Coleridge, is the problem of corrupt human 
nature caused by the Fall. In the letter he continues:
On the subjects of the original corruption of our Nature, the doctrines of 
Redemption, Regeneration, Grace, & Justification by Faith my convictions are 
altogether different from those of Drs. Priestley, Lindsey, & Disney—neither do I 
conceive Christianity to be tenable on the Priestleyan Flypothesis ... My dear 
Friend—believe no idle Reports concerning me/Zfl differ from you, & wherein I 
differ from you, it will be that I believe on the whole more than you, not less—
From his point of view 'Drs. Priestley, Lindsey, & Disney' are Unitarians who fail to 
deal with the problem of 'the original corruption of our nature'. The problem, he 
would argue, is at the centre of Christian theology. In 'Confessio Fidei', calling the 
Unitarian a 'Psilanthropist', he declares, 'if the Trinitarian Theanthropist is a 
Christian, the Psilanthropist cannot be so'. According to him, the latter is not 
Christian because he avoids the problem of two natures in the first place and ignores 
all the subsequent theological attempts to settle the overwhelming problem of 
'theanthropy'. It is of interest that Coleridge paraphrases 'Trinitarian' as 
'Theanthropist'. It clearly indicates that his 'Trinitarianism' is theanthropism, and 
that it is the result of the theological modification of his early Unitarianism.44
Coleridge repeats the same argument in a letter to his brother George, an 
Anglican priest. Fie writes to him on 1 July 1802 and says, 'I ... have convinced 
myself, that the Socinian & Arian Flypotheses are utterly untenable; but what to put 
in their place? I find [nothing so] distinctly revealed, that I should dare to impose 
my opinion as an article of Faith on others—on the contrary, I hold it probable that 
the Nature of the Being of Christ is left in obscurity1.45 What he has in mind is
44 See CN, I, 1710. Quoted in Chapter 4, III.
45 CL, II, p. 807.
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Original Sin, or, 'an original corruption in our nature'. Thus, he speculates that 
discussion on 'the Nature of the Being of Christ' may have something to do with the 
recovery from that corruption. He continues:
My Faith is simply this—that there is an original corruption in our nature, from 
which & from the consequences of which, we may be redeemed by Christ—not as 
the Socinians say, by his pure morals or excellent Example merely—but in a 
mysterious manner as an effect of his Crucifixion—and this I believe—not 
because I understand it; but because I feel, that it is not only suitable to, but 
needful for, my nature.
Here he expresses his hope of recovery 'in a mysterious manner' which is 
essentially different from recovery by 'pure morals'. When he makes a distinction 
between his Trinitarian theology and Kantian ethics, he repeats basically the same 
argument. In 'Confessio Fidei' he writes of Original Sin, 'This fearful Mystery I 
pretend not to understand—I cannot even conceive the possibility of it—but I know, 
that it is so!' Thus Coleridge's Trinitarianism involves a 'mysterious' fall and an 
equally 'mysterious' recovery. And this is the point at which he draws the 
distinction between his theology and Kantian ethics.
In order to make this point clear, Coleridge argues in 'Confessio Fidei' that 
'Natural Religion' is different from 'Revealed Religion': in his words, that Adam's 
religion is different from Coleridge's religion. In this argument, he first rewrites 
Kantian ethics into Adam's religion, and then draws the distinction between it and his 
own, 'Revealed Religion'. He writes at the end of the first half of 'Confessio Fidei':
Here ends the first Table of my Creed, which would have been my Creed, had I 
been born with Adam; and which therefore constitutes what may in this sense be
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called Natural Religion, i.e. the Religion of all finite rational Beings. The second 
Tables contains the Creed of Revealed Religion, my Belief as a Christian.
'Natural Religion1 in 'Confessio Fidei' is arguably a recapitulation of Kantian 
ethics, for it begins with the assertion of human freedom. But Coleridge rewrites 
two crucial points of Kant's argument in order to make it Adam's religion. First, he 
rewrites Kant's phenomenological argument as follows:
The wonderful Works of God in the sensible World are a perpetual Discourse, 
reminding me of his Existence, and Shadowing out to me his perfections. But as 
all Language presupposes in the intelligent Hearer or Reader those primary 
notions, which it symbolizes, as well as the power of making those combinations 
of these primary notions, which it represents & excites us to combine—
Kant's phenomenology begins when such 'a perpetual Discourse' ceases. He 
repeatedly argues that 'those primary notions' which are inherent in 'the intelligent 
Hearer and Reader' do not presuppose such 'a perpetual Discourse'. That is, man is 
'free' from it. In fact, Kant repeatedly argues for the a priori status of 'those 
primary notions' over such 'a perpetual Discourse'. But Coleridge, while postulating 
human freedom in the beginning, remains indecisive about human 'priority'. He 
here suppresses Kant's argument that human 'priority1, or independence, is 
necessary for human freedom. Obviously, if he follows Kant's argument for human 
freedom and accepts human 'priority' over 'a perpetual Discourse', he cannot write 
of Adam's religion. Secondly, while Kant argues for the ethical autonomy of man, 
Coleridge maintains that the human will should be balanced with the divine will. He 
writes in 'Confessio Fidei', 'all holy Will is coincident with the Will of God, and 
therefore secure in its ultimate Consequences by his Omnipotence1. It is the same 
indecisiveness which holds him from taking human freedom as the first principle.
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Here by saying 'coincidence' he retains the possibility of arguing that human freedom 
is secondary to divine freedom.46
It is his reluctance towards human autonomy that allows him to write of Adam's 
religion. He has to hold divine creation prior to human perception, divine 
providence prior to human ethics, in order to do so. There is another example of 
such an attempt from The Friend (1809). Quoting the passage from 'Frost at 
Midnight' which is dedicated to his 'babe', he writes:
With this Faith all Nature
____________________all the mighty World
Of Eye and Ear_________________________
presents itself to us, now as the Aggregate Materials of Duty, and now as a Vision 
of the Most High revealing to us the mode, and time, and particular instance of 
applying the realizing that universal Rule, pre-established in the Heart of our 
Reason: as
That lovely shapes and sounds intelligible 
Of that Eternal Language, which our God
46 In The Friend (1809) Coleridge makes the same attempt to situate Kant's 
argument in the theological framework. He writes, 'God created Man in his own 
Image: to be the Image of his own Eternity and Infinity created he Man. He gave us 
Reason and with Reason Ideas of its own formation and underived from material 
Nature, self-consciousness, Principles, and above all , the Law of Conscience, which 
in the power of an holy and omnipotent Being commands us to attribute Reality— 
among the numerous Ideas mathematical or philosophical, which the Reason by the 
necessity of its own excellence, creates for itself—to those, (and to those only) 
without which the Conscience would be baseless and contradictory; namely, to the 
Ideas of Soul, the Free Will, Immortality, and God.' Friend, II, pp. 78-9.
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Utters: Who from Eternity doth teach 
Himself in all, and all things in Himself!47
Here is a hint of Leibnizian pre-established harmony which integrates human 
perception within divine creation, human freedom within divine providence. But 
there comes the moment when man ceases to be a 'babe', or, Adam. It is the moment, 
according to Coleridge, when the human nature becomes separate from the divine 
nature, that is, when man moves from 'Natural Religion1 to 'Revealed Religion'.
It is interesting to see how Coleridge's acceptance of Kantian phenomenology and 
freedom eventually leads him to his Trinitarianism. It is distinctly different from 
Kantian ethics. But they are closely related to the extent that Coleridge's theology is 
a rewriting of Kant's ethics. In September-October 1810, a month before he writes 
'Confessio Fidei', he expresses his phenomenological anxiety and suggests a 
theological resolution to it. He writes in a Notebook:
all Perception—i.e., intuition is sensuous—ergo, passive—ergo, not in God—ergo, 
Space & Time not in God—But except under the forms Space and Time we can 
predicate nothing, can bring no one even of the most abstract intellections to 
consciousness—What follows?—That concerning God we can neither talk sense or 
nonsense—except as far we talk piously or impiously—that is—that which 
relatively to human nature in genere, & not in accidental associations, elevates & 
creates Love & Awe towards him/48
As seen above, when he follows Kant and accepts the phenomenological argument, he 
'frees' himself from the divine 'perpetual Discourse'. The difference between Kant 
and Coleridge is that in Coleridge what follows after accepting this freedom is not
47 Friend, II, pp. 79-81
48 CN, III, 3973.
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triumphant human autonomy nor self-reliance but piety. That is, Coleridge still 
sees human freedom not so much as liberation but as loss of the divine 'perpetual 
Discourse'. Putting this point aside, Coleridge accepts Kant's phenomenological 
argument and acknowledges agnosticism. About the same time he illustrates two 
distinct ways to respond to agnosticism. He writes:
The more I read & reflect on the arguments of the truly philosophical Theists & 
Atheists, the more I feel convinced that the ultimate difference is a moral rather 
than intellectual one ... an acknowledged Insufficiency of the Known to account for 
itself, and therefore a something Unknown—but to which the Theist dedicates his 
noblest feelings of Love, & Awe, & by a moral syllogism connects & unites it with 
his Conscience & Actions—while the Atheist leaves it a blank in the Heart, 
because it is a Blank in his Understanding.49
He here makes an arguably 'Kantian' ethical argument and draws a 'moral' distinction 
between those who aim at 'Conscience & Actions' and those who do not. But it is 
Coleridge who places the argument in an overtly theological context. Moreover, he 
quietly suggests that 'Love & Awe' may be prior to 'Conscience & Actions'.
Coleridge fully accepts Kant's argument for freedom. He writes in January- 
February 1810, 'Freedom (i.e. Arbitrium, Free Will)—the verbal Definition of— 
The faculty of absolutely beginning any state—einen Zustand (Seyn oder Bestehen) 
absolut anzufangen—the real definition; the faculty of Causality thro' or by Thought 
alone—or Thought actually causative.'50 Kathleen Coburn suggests that 'Coleridge 
translates what appears to be his own German'. If that is the case, the entry 
vindicates Kant's strong influence on Coleridge in regard to the understanding of
49 CN, III, 4 0 3 0 .
50 CN, III, 3 6 7 6  and note .
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freedom. Certainly the passage has a strong resonance with Kant's argument that 
'freedom' is outside 'natural necessity'. Kant writes in the Prolegomena:
1st aber Naturnothwendigkeit bios auf Erscheinungen bezogen, und Freiheit bios 
auf Dinge an sich selbst, so entspringt kein Wiederspruch,
muss ... Naturnothwendigkeit die Bedingung sein, nach welcher die 
wirkenden Ursachen bestimmt werden. Soli dagegen Freiheit eine Eigenschaft 
gewisser Ursachen der Erscheinungen sein, so muss sie, respective auf die 
letzteren als Begebenheiten, ein Vermogen sein, sie von s e lb s t  (sponte) 
anzufangen,
[But if natural necessity is referred only to appearances, and freedom merely to 
things in themselves, no contradiction arises.
... natural necessity must be the condition according to which effective 
causes are determined. But, if freedom is to be a property of certain causes of 
appearances, it must be, with respect to the latter as events, a faculty of 
beginning them of itself (sponte).]^^
Soon Coleridge rephrases Kant's distinction between 'natural necessity' and 'freedom' 
as that between 'ontosophical' and 'anthropological' philosophies. In February-April 
1810 he writes, 'Only two Systems of Philosophy—(sibi consistentia) possible 1. 
Spinoza 2 Kant, i.e. the absolute & the relative, the ko.t ovxcog ovra, and the K ar  
avdpwjiov. or 1 ontosophical, 2 the anthropological.'52 And he, following Kant, 
makes it clear that in order to initiate ethical argument he has to insist on the 
latter's priority over the former, that is, in Kantian terms, the practical reason 
over the speculative reason. In May 1810 he refers to 'the proof of the dependence 
of the speculative on the practical Reason' and argues that 'all reasoning commences
51 Kant, Werke, IV, p. 91, and Lucas, op. cit., pp. 108-9.
52 CN, III, 3756.
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with a Postulate i.e. an act.'53 But what he has in mind is not ethics as such but 
religion. 'Ontosophical' and 'anthropological' philosophies are in Coleridgean terms 
'moral' and 'material' revelations. He repeats the same argument for the priority of 
the practical over the speculative reasons in the long Notebook entry titled 
'Religion', which is one of his important preparations for 'Confessio Fidei1. He 
writes, 'Religion has no speculative dogmas—but all practical—all appealing to the 
will, & therefore all imperative', therefore 'my outward senses—the subjugation of 
which to Faith, i.e. the passive to the actional & self-created Belief—is the Great 
Object of Religion'.54 It should be noticed here that Coleridge's 'Great Object' is 
'self-created Belief' and not self-created maxim. Thus while following Kantian 
argument, he leaves himself the possibility of rewriting Kantian ethics in 
theological terms.55
Up to this point Coleridge follows Kant's distinction between 'natural necessity' 
and 'freedom'. Even when he shifts the argument into the religious dimension, he 
maintains essentially the same distinction. But when he exercises this  
ethical/religious argument for himself, he finds the need for a radically different 
distinction. As the result, in 'Confessio Fidei' he sets up a theological distinction 
between 'Natural Religion' and 'Revealed Religion'. The crucial point is that while 
the former presupposes 'coincidence' between Kantian ’natural necessity' and 
'freedom', the latter never assumes such 'coincidence'. Already by this distinction
53 CN, III, 3802.
54 CN, III, 3581.
55 There is little doubt that he fully absorbs Kant's ethical argument. For an 
example, he writes in a Notebook in March 1808, '0  what an aweful Being is 
Conscience! and how infra-bestial the Locks, Priestleys, Humes, Condilliacs and the 
dehumanizing race of fashionable Metaphysicians. Metapothecaries, said one 
sportively, but I seriously, should say Cataphysicians (i.e. Contranaturalists) when 
I spoke of them as Agents; but when I regard them merely in themselves & passive, I 
should call them Hypophysicians, i.e. below Nature. Zwoophytes?— Nay, there is no 
contradiction in any thing but degraded man.1 CN, III, 3281. Kant uses the word 
’hypophysisch' in Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten to criticize one of the 
'popular philosophies' which he would not regard as properly a 'metaphysic'. Kant, 
Werke, IV , p. 258.
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Coleridge implicitly argues that human freedom which lies outside natural necessity 
is in itself a problem. And he fully articulates his point in 'Confessio Fidei': 'I am of 
myself capable of moral evil, but not of myself capable of moral good1. For Coleridge 
the loss of the divine 'perpetual Discourse1 in nature which precedes all the 
phenomenological and ethical arguments is essentially a theological matter. That is, 
he sees the event as the Fall from nature. By that Fall human nature becomes 
separate from divine nature and caught in the insoluble problem of two natures. And 
his 'incapability1 of moral good and subsequent need of salvation are the necessary 
consequences of that Fall. Fie writes in June 1810:
the importance of any act in restoring the mind from its wanderings, the 
servitude of mere association, by strengthening & re-enlivening the Will... an 
y^olian Flarp was moaning in my window—what if this had been an appointed part 
of religious furniture, like the crucifix—and ae end a means, to which a promise 
of grace had been affixed—56
Coleridge's 'Natural Religion' includes the freedom of man. It is not by necessity 
but by 'coincidence' that the human will is reconciled with the divine will. And his 
'Revealed Religion' describes the situation in which such 'coincidence' is 
theologically impossible. Fie makes clear his view on the problem of 'Evil' in The 
Friend on 1 June 1809, 'there is Evil distinct from Error and from Pain, an Evil in 
human nature which is not wholly grounded in the limitation of our 
understandings.'57 And this is his personal problem. Fie writes in 'Confessio Fidei', 
'I am of myself capable of moral evil, but not of myself capable of moral good, and ... 
Guilt is justly imputable to be me prior to any given act, or assignable moment of 
time, in my Consciousness.' Fie calls this a 'fearful Mystery' and gives up further
56 CN, III, 3 9 0 9 .
57 Friend, II, p. 9.
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explanation. But he clearly understands that because of this 'fearful Mystery' it 
becomes theologically impossible for God and man to 'coincide'. In June 1810 he 
writes;
Conditions of human Virtue/—That there is a Being, whose will comprizes in 
itself Goodness, Wisdom, & Power in the plenitude of Perfection—That Man is not 
that Being—that Man possesses a free Will separable from perfect Reason, & yet 
by the very act of separation ceasing to be free, and retaining one sole relict of 
freedom, Guilt! the Guilt of Suicide!—God manifests himself to Man, as a 
Legislator, by the Law of Universal Reason, the obedience to which is not only 
perfect Freedom, but the only possible Freedom: the Law appealing to the Free 
Will, i.e. Reason with the consciousness of Will is Conscience—/Where there is 
no Law, there must be Tyranny—58
In 'Natural Religion' God is a speaker of 'a perpetual Discourse' in nature. But 
outside it he is 'a legislator' of the law. Coleridge here adopts philosophical and 
ethical terms such as 'Freedom', Will', or 'Reason', but he clearly shows that his 
acknowledged inability to observe this divine legislation is beyond ethical argument.
The problem of two natures is not a problem in 'Natural Religion'. But outside 
'Natural Religion' it is an insoluble problem. As seen above, Coleridge implicitly 
argues that Kant's ethical argument is useless since it works only within 'Natural 
Religion'. At this point he adopts the doctrine of the incarnation to deal with the 
problem. He thus sets up his Trinitarian, or, theanthropic theology. In 'Confessio 
Fidei' he writes, 'I receive with full and grateful Faith the assurance of Revelation, 
that the Word which is from all eternity with God and is God, assumed our human 
nature in order to redeem me and all mankind from this our connate Corruption.' In
58 CN, III, 3866.
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July-September 1809, relying on this notion of the incarnation, he summarizes his 
own development from 'ontosophical' philosophy to 'anthropological' philosophy, and 
finally hints at his theanthropic resolution. He writes:
An idea has just occurred to me—it seems important. Is not Sin, or Guilt, the 
first thing that makes the idea of a God necessary, instead of t o  Geiov— therefore 
is not the incarnation a beautiful consequence & revelation of the to dsiov first 
revealing itself as d@eog? ... To see the Gospel in a new light again—& again read 
Spinoza—to think vices mere necessitated movements, relative only as stench or 
roughness, we know to be false—but take it in the Kantean idea, as the Anti-type 
of the moral Law—suppose it like Cohesion—as that simply causing coherence, so 
this essentialy demanding morality—& what becomes of Sinners? I feel the 
Clouds—yet sure there is something here.—59
By asking 'what becomes of Sinners?', he makes clear his view that there is no 
salvation in Kant's ethics. 'Something' he seeks here is obviously a salvation, or, as 
he writes in 'Confessio Fidei', 'an effort of my mind to conceive the utmost of the 
infinite greatness of that [Divine] Love'.
Kant's ethical argument implies that speculative, passive reason is dependent on 
practical, active reason. Kant's ethics are based on a particularly active principle. 
Coleridge's theology, in contrast, seeks the mediation of passivity and activity. 
Probably around July-September 1809 he writes in a margin of Kant's Metaphysik 
der Sitten:
There are two mighty mysteries to begins with it—Action and Passion (or passive 
action)—and Love is a Synthesis of these, in which each is the other—and as it is
59 CN, III, 3510.
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only a Synthesis, or one of the Syntheses, of Action and Passion, other 
discoveries must be made in order to know the principle that individuates this 
particular Synthesis—for instance, we must master the principle o f  
Individuation in general, and then the principle of Personality—Action + Passion
= Eyco + O u k  eyco. Eyco = Eyco: O u k  eyco = o v k  eyto—yet O u k  eya) = E yo , and Eyco 
= ouk eyco by an act which is yet a passion = Love: Mysterium finale.^0
Each individual suffers from the paradox of passivity and activity. 'I' is 
simultaneously passive and active towards 'Not I', the other. Therefore, he argues, it 
has to seek for mediation, which he here calls 'Love1, or, 'Mysterium finale'. In Die 
Metaphysik der Sitten Kant dismisses 'love' as a passive principle and therefore 
having nothing to do with ethics. He says, 'Love is a matter of feeling, not of will, 
and I cannot love because I will to, still less because I ought to (i.e. I cannot be 
necessitated to love). So a duty to love is logically impossible.' [L i e b e ist eine 
Sache der E m p f i  n d u n g ,  nicht des Wollens, und ich kann nicht lieben weil ich 
w i l l ,  noch weniger aber, weil ich so l I , (zur Liebe genothigt werden;) mithin ist 
eine P f l i c h t  zu l i e b e n  ein Unding.]61 To this passage Coleridge responds 
and writes the following marginal note:
If I say, I doubt this independence of Love on the Will, and doubt even Love's being 
in its essence merely eine Sache der Empfindung, a mere matter of feeling, i.e. a 
somewhat found in us which is not of and from us/Emp.-(= in sich)-Findung, I 
mean only that my Thoughts are not distinct much less adequate on the subject— 
and I am not able to convey any grounds of my Belief of the Contrary. But the 
Contrary I do believe. What Kant affirms of Man in the state of Adam, and 
ineffable act of the will choosing evil & which is underneath or within the
60 CM, III, p. 266.
61 Kant, Werke, VII, p. 205, and CM, III, p. 264.
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consciousness tho' incarnate in the conscience, inasmuch as it must be conceived 
as taking place in the Homo Nouhevov, not Homo <|>aivo^evov— something like this 
I conceive of Love— in that highest sense of the Word.62
It is clear that Coleridge has to insist that 'love1 is both passive and active, for he 
expects 'Love— in that highest sense of the Word1 to be the principle which solves the 
insoluble problem caused by the Fall.
Coleridge places 'love' not only at the centre of his ethical argument but also of 
his epistemological speculation. That is, he expects 'love' to save him not only from 
freedom but also from phenomena. In February-May 1807 he attempts to solve the 
problem of phenomena and the following problem of self-consciousness by referring 
to 'love1.
All our Thoughts all that we abstract from our consciousness & so form the 
Phaenomenon Self is a Shadow, its whole Substance is the dim yet powerful sense 
that it is but a Shadow, & ought to belong to a Substance/but this Substance can 
have no marks, no discriminating Characters, no hie est, ille non est/it is 
simply Substance—& this deepliest felt during particular phaenomena with a 
consciousness that the phaenomenon is in us but it not in the phaenomenon, for 
which alone we yet value the phaenomenon, constitutes the craving of True Love. 
Love a sense of Substance/Being seeking to be self-conscious, 1. of itself in a 
Symbol. 2. of the Symbol as not being itself. 3. of the Symbol as being nothing 
but in relation to itself—& necessitating a return to the first state, Scientia 
absoluta.63
62 CM, III, pp. 264-5
63 CN, II, 3026.
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'Love' thus occasions the symbolic mediation between noumenon and phenomenon. 
Theologically speaking, 'love' occasions the symbolic reconciliation between God and 
man. And the symbolic reconciliation between God and man has been at the heart of 




For Coleridge, however, the symbolic mediation is an unstable, critical mediation. 
That is, in the sacrament he does not tolerate 'the thing signifying ... idolatrized into 
the thing signified'.65 He had already made the same point in Malta and wrote:'all 
expressions belong to the world of Sense—to phaenomena/all are contingent, local, 
here this, there another/but when ennobled into symbols of Noumena, it is a common 
& venial error to forget the vileness in the worth, to confound not to analyse—the 
contingent symbol with the divine Necessity = Nou^evov'.66 It is his critical mind 
which resists 'the idolatry' of symbol, that is, it is he who resists the identity of 
divine and human natures. Thus the solution he offers here for the problem of two 
natures is a theological one, that is, it does not actually 'solve' the insoluble problem 
but only allows him to express his hope of possible solution. He repeats the same 
argument in 'Confessio Fidei' and says, 'his miraculous Birth, his agony, his 
Crucifixion, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension, were all both Symbols of our 
Redemption (^mvojueva rcuv Novfxevmv) and necessary parts of the aweful process.'
64 CN, III, 3 7 6 5 .
65 CN, III, 4 0 4 4 .  Coleridge writes, 'were the Symbolical Doctrine then held, 
nothing is more natural than that in the lapse of years the thing signifying should be 
idolatrized into the thing signified—secundum analogiam Historiae per orbem 
terrarum/<N.B. A Mistake this, from my confounding the Love-feast with the 
preceding Eucharist/>'
66 CN, II, 2 6 6 4 .
Chapter 6. Transcendentalism in Biographia Literaria
I. Coleridge's attempt to rewrite Kant gradually takes a more systematic form from 
around 1810. At the time when he 'rewrites' Kant's ethics in 'Confessio Fidei', he 
also begins to reconsider the basic arguments which constitute Kant's epistemology. 
The point of the argument is the theological recognition of man's fall from nature. 
The division between 'Natural Religion' and 'Revealed Religion' in 'Confessio Fidei’ is 
a radical revision of Kant's distinction between natural and moral religion, for in 
spite of Kant's argument to the contrary Coleridge includes in 'Natural Religion' man 
who successfully fulfils the Kantian ethical demand, in his word, 'Adam'. Outside 
'Natural Religion' lies 'Revealed Religion', which is, no doubt, Coleridge's religion. 
There is no discussion in 'Confessio Fidei' as to how 'Revealed Religion' stands to the 
lost 'Natural Religion', nor any suggestion that the final purpose of 'Revealed 
Religion1 should be the recovery of 'Natural Religion'. But Coleridge simply shifts 
back from ethics to epistemology, and within epistemological argument he attempts 
to recover the notion of divine nature. It is this attempt that leads him to his 
definitions of 'the primary imagination', 'the secondary imagination' and 'fancy' in 
Biographia Literaria.1
Coleridge never disregards Kant's phenomenological argument. On the contrary 
he carefully examines it and detects precisely what problem it poses for him. 
Around 1810 he begins to make extensive notebook entries about this problem. He 
writes in August-September 1809:
What is the common principle of the Philosophical Systems of Des Cartes, 
(Locke?) Berkley, Hume, and Kant? That Our Senses in no way acquaint us with 
Things, as they are in and of themselves: that the properties, which we attribute
1 BL, I, pp. 304-5.
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to Things without us, yea, that this very Outness, are not strictly properties of 
the things themselves, but either constituents or modifications of our own minds 
... we know only the Impressions made on us by unknown O v k  e<j) r j f i iv ,  or <by> 
unknown workings £$ ^ iv ;  these Impressions which we call Things, are truly 
only Ideas, or Representations, which change with the changes of the 
representative Faculties in the subject:2
He accepts that there is a distinction between 'Things as they are in and of 
themselves' and their appearances, and that 'all our knowledge is confined to  
Appearances, our philosophy a philosophy of Phaenomena'. Thus things only 'appear' 
to be out there solely by 'the representative Faculties in the subject'. He then 
summarizes Kant's argument in one 'position' and two 'deductions':
Position. A sentient Being has only its own sensations as the <immediate> objects 
of its Knowledge/Sentiens non nisi sensationes suas noscit.
Deduction 1. All else we must conclude: or all else must be deduced by 
reasoning, it is not given by perception.
Deduction 2. But Reason at farthest justifies us only in affirming the 
existence of a Cause out of ourselves adequate to the effect in ourselves.
The important point of this argument is that he maintains a duality between 
'unknown [workings] O v k  c<I> [not under our control]', and 'unknown workings 
e0 rjfiLv [under our control]'. That is, he maintains the duality between 'the 
impressions' which human mind receives from 'unknown working not under our 
control' and those which it produces by 'unknown workings under our control'. He 
again raises the question of passivity and activity of the human mind. It should be
2 CN, III, 3605.
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noted here that he resists reducing this duality into either passive or active unity. 
He resists both passive unity, or, materialism which absorbs the human mind in 
external nature, and active unity, or, idealism which places external nature within 
the human mind. Shortly before this entry he criticizes idealism and writes, fif 
Malbranche and Berkley reject the primary properties & make all phaenomena 
subjective, they make compensation M. by placing the Object in God, B. by realizing 
the representation in itself, and God creates that in, and of, the mind immediately 
without any material Go-between.'3 In the previous entry he makes a specific 
objection to Berkeley whose denial of matter leads to the dismissal of divine nature
which Coleridge holds to lie outside the human mind. He writes, 'Berkley's Idealism
may be thus illustrated: Our perceptions are impressions on our own minds standing 
to the external cause in the relation of the picture on the Canvass to the Painter, 
rather than in that of the Image in the Mirror to the Object reflected.'4 But 
Coleridge also disagrees with the materialist argument which reduces the human 
mind into a mirror merely reflecting external material nature.5 The basic question 
which Coleridge does not yet articulate clearly is whether the human mind is prior 
or posterior to the material creation. The question is unanswerable since he 
believes that there is mind prior to the creation, but he also believes that such mind 
is not human but divine. Thus the problem arises from the act of the human mind 
which he believes to be posterior to the creation though it behaves as if it is prior to 
it. What is unique in Coleridge is that he is resistant to the alternative choice
3 CN, ill, 3592. This entry is titled 'On Certainty'.
4 CN, III, 3605.
5 Coleridge provides a fine illustration of the materialists in 'Essays on the 
Principles of Method' by quoting from his 'Limbo' (1811). They are 'the partizans 
of a crass and sensual materialism, the advocates of the Nihil nisi ab extra'.
They, like moles,
Nature's mute monks, live mandrakes of the ground,
Shrink from the light, then listen for a sound;
See but to dread, and dread they know not why,
The natural alien of their negative eye! S. T. C. Friend, I, p. 494.
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between idealism and materialism, between the denial of the external material world 
and the denial of the internal and active human mind. His ultimate purpose, which is 
not yet fully articulated at this stage, is to seek for the mediation of the two. So far, 
he states his position as follows, 'we see in all men, more or less, a desire of 
knowing that what they appear to themselves to know, has a correspondence in 
Reality.'6
Coleridge argues that in recognizing what he sees as mere appearance, man 
cannot but 'desire' for its correspondent reality. According to him, the pursuit of 
'Reality' is man's instinct which generates this 'desire'. He concludes this entry as 
follows: 'One Hint more—and I conclude this note. It is not the desire of attaching 
Outness, an externality to our representations which is at the bottom of this 
Instinct; on the contrary this very attachment of Outness originates in the Instinct'.7 
He argues that man cannot stop attaching 'Outness' to his phenomenal representation. 
The pursuit of 'Reality' presupposes the recognition of the absence of 'Reality'. And 
if the sense of 'Outness' is the result of such pursuit, 'Outness' is no longer factual 
but fictional. Although he retains the sense of 'Outness', he has to admit that it is not 
given 'ab extra' but gained 'ab intra'. Therefore, Coleridge argues, he cannot but 
desire for, or yearn after, the factual 'Outness' which he has to postulate beyond the 
fictional 'Outness'. Coleridge even calls this postulation 'those original and innate
6 CN, III, 3592.
7 Ibid. Coleridge gives a full description of this 'Instinct' in 'Essays on the 
Principles of Method', with the suggestion that this 'Instinct' is both the cause of the 
separation and the attempt of reunion between subject and object, or, mind and 
nature. He writes, 'In a self-conscious and thence reflecting being, no instinct can 
exist, without engendering the belief of an object corresponding to it, either present 
or future, real or capable of being realized: much less the instinct, in which 
humanity itself is grounded: that by which, in every act of conscious perception, we 
at once identify our being with that of the world without us, and yet place ourselves 
in contra-distinction to that world. Least of all can this mysterious pre-disposition 
exist without evolving a belief that the productive power, which is in nature as 
nature, is essentially one (i.e. of one kind) with the intelligence, which is in the 
human mind above nature: however disfigured this belief may become'. Friend, I, pp. 
497-8. For the similar view expressed by Kant about the 'oneness' of the mind and 
nature, see Chapter 7, I.
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prejudices which nature herself has planted in all men, and which to all but the 
philosopher are the first principles of knowledge and the final test of truth1, and 
deems, 'Now these essential prejudices are all reducible to the one fundamental 
presumption, THAT THERE EXIST THINGS WITHOUT US.’8 But even so, according to him, 
a priori knowledge is still possible. While unconscious and uncritical attachment of 
'Outness' may be mere prejudices, there can be the conscious and critical prejudice 
which 'the philosopher' exercises. He writes also in Biographia Literaria:
This phrase, a priori, is in common most grossly misunderstood, and an 
absurdity burthened on it, which it does not deserve! By knowledge a priori, we 
do not mean, that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would 
be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of 
experience (i.e. something acting upon us from without) we then know, that it 
must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible.9
Coleridge thus keeps coming back to the question concerning the 'fullness' and the 
'halfness' of human mind. The argument above is virtually a restatement of 'Miss 
Theta'. It is she who 'desires' for correspondent reality beyond her own perception. 
Coleridge distinguishes himself from other philosophers by his fine sensitivity to 
the problem of the phenomenon and by his resistance towards reductionism, 
alternatively materialistic or idealistic. 'Symbol' is again the key term for him to 
maintain his position. In May 1808 he writes:
All minds must think by some symbols—the strongest minds possess the most 
vivid Symbols in the Imagination—yet this ingenerates a want, ito d o v . 
disiderium, for vividness of Symbol: which something that is without, that has
8 BL, I, pp. 258-9.
9 BL, I, p. 293, Coleridge's note.
2 1 0
the property of Outness (a word which Berkley preferred to "Externality") can 
alone fully gratify/even that indeed not fully—for the utmost is only an 
approximation to that absolute Union, which the soul sensible of its imperfection 
in itself, of its Halfness, yearns a fte r ... I say, every generous mind not already 
filled by some one of these passions feels its Halfness— it cannot think without a 
symbol—neither can it live without something that is to be at once its Symbol, & 
its Other half— 10
There is a crucial difference between Kant and Coleridge in dealing with this 
'yearning after union1.11 Kant ultimately denies this yearning in epistemology and 
gratifies it in ethics. That is, epistemologically the human mind cannot hope to be 
full, and ethically it is already full without yearning. In Coleridge's case, he 
'yearns' in both epistemology and ethics. That is, he retains the hope, which will 
remain 'hope' forever, of 'union' in both epistemology and ethics. In 'Confessio Fidei' 
Coleridge rewrites 'fullness' which Kant takes for granted in ethical man as 
'fullness' which he yearns after. When Coleridge begins to rewrite Kant's 
epistemology, his purpose is to retain the very same yearning which Kant ultimately 
excludes from his epistemology.
Kant defines nature as the whole of what is perceived and thought by man. That 
is, there is no 'nature' without man, or, nature is thoroughly human. According to 
Kant, 'nature' is that which is extracted by human perception from what Coleridge 
calls 'real' nature. Kant renames this 'real' nature as 'things in themselves' and 
virtually excludes it from his epistemological argument. This radical re-definition
10 CN, III, 3325.
11 In another place he explains this 'yearning' as follows: 'a striving in the Creature 
to make itself God by an imitation of that eternal Act, in which the ( t o )  0 e A e t v  
comprehends all in himself, and by that contraction generating in himself the <j>(og 
voepov dilates by this procession of the Spirit, and thro' the nepiKwprioig  fills up as 
it were all the interspaces as -it were (infanda vel saltern ineffabilia fari annitor) of 
the intellectual forms constitutes the heavenly Plenitude.' CN, III, 4359.
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of nature, as it must appear to one like Coleridge who never abandons the notion of 
divine nature, is the starting point of Kant's whole phenomenology. In the 
Prolegomena Kant provides a whole section to clarify this procedure. The thirteen- 
sixth section is titled 'How is nature itself possible?' [Wie ist Natur selbest 
moglich?] Two sets of questions and answers exhaust his argument. In a simplified 
form, one is 'how is nature in the material sense ... possible?' [wie ist Natur in 
m ater i el I er Bedeutung ... moglich?] The answer is 'by means of the constitution 
of our sensibility’ [vermittelst der Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnlichkeit]. The other 
is 'how is nature in the formal sense ... possible?' [wie ist Natur in f or mel I er 
Bedeutung ... moglich?] The answer is 'by means of the constitution of our 
understanding' [vermittelst der Beschaffenheit unseres Verstandes]. Both 
materially and ideally, he argues, nature is exclusively human, or, there is no 
nature without man. He has to do so in order for him to assert the possibility of a 
priori certainty of human knowledge. He asserts 'the proposition' [den Satz]
dass die oberste Gesetzgebung der Natur in uns selbst d. i. un unserem Verstande 
liegen miisse und dass wir die allgemeinen Gesetze derselben nicht von der Natur 
vermittelst der Erfahrung, sondern umgekehrt, die Natur ihrer allgemeinen 
Gesetzmassigkeit nach bios aus den in unserer Sinnlichkeit und dem Verstande 
liegenden Bedingungen der Moglichkeit der Erfahrung suchen miissen;
[that the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, i.e. in our 
understanding, and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature from 
nature by means of experience, but conversely, we must seek nature, as to its 
universal conformity to law, merely from the conditions of the possibility of 
experience which lie in our sensibility and in the understanding.]12
12 Kant, Werke, IV, pp. 6 6 - 7 ,  and Lucas, op. cit., pp. 7 9 - 8 1 .
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Only by this procedure can he overturn the precedence of sensibility over 
understanding and procure the absolute autonomy of categories and the categorical 
imperative. In the Prolegomena he calls 'the system of categories' as 'Leitfaden' 
[clue]
der, weil er immer durch dieselben festen, im menschlichen Verstande a priori 
bestimmten Punkte gefuhrt werden muss, jederzeit einen geschlossenen Kreis 
bildet, der keinen Zweifel iibrig lasst, dass der Gegenstand eines reinen 
Verstandes- oder Vernunftbegriffs, sofern er philosophisch und nach 
Grundsatzen a priori erwogen werden soli, auf solche Weise vollstandig erkannt 
werden konne.
[which, because it must always be taken through the same fixed points 
determined a priori in the human understanding, always forms a closed circle, 
leaving no room for doubt that the object of a pure concept of the understanding 
or of reason, in so far as it is to be considered philosophically and according to 
principles a priori, can be completely known in such a w a y . ] 1 3
This is a 'complete' argument. This 'circle' is as it were Kant's Miss Theta, which is 
complete as it has no ontological 'yearning'. It does not suffer from any logical 
inconsistency, quite unlike Coleridge's Miss Theta who suffers from the logical 
inconsistency in retaining the ontological yearning in the form of symbolism. 
Coleridge may say Kant's Miss Theta does not breathe. Kant's argument for the 
independence and autonomy of human mind is supported by his belief that, though the 
unknown remains unknown, the meeting point on which the human mind meets the 
unknown can be defined and described in human terms. For Coleridge this meeting is
13 Kant, ibid., p. 73 and Lucas, ibid., p. 88.
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a mystery.14 But Kant believes that by defining how the human mind reacts to the 
unknown he can solve the mystery if not of the unknown itself but certainly the 
mystery of the way it meets with the human mind. He writes:
Denn nun fragt sich, wie verhalt sich unsere Vernunft bei dieser Verkniipfung 
dessen, was wir kennen, mit dem, was wir nicht kennen und auch niemals kennen 
werden? Hier ist eine wirkliche Verkniipfung des Bekannten mit einem vollig 
Unbekannten, (was es auch jederzeit bleiben wird,) und wenn dabei das 
Unbekannte auch nicht im mindesten bekannter werden s o llte w ie  denn das in 
der That auch nicht zu hoffen ist,—so muss doch der Begriff von dieser 
Verkniipfung bestimmt und zur Deutlichkeit gebracht werden konnen.
[For the question now arises, how does our reason behave in this connecting of 
what we know with that which we do not know and shall never know? There is 
here a real connection of the known with a completely unknown (which will 
always remain so), and even if the unknown is not to become the least bit better 
known—which cannot in fact be hoped for—the concept of this connection must be 
capable of being determined and brought to clarity.]15
Coleridge sees this 'connexion' as a mystery. But Kant thus attempts to solve it, or, 
to define the point of the connection from the human side. For this purpose he 
provides an extensive discussion on the original apperception [urspriingliche 
Apperzeption] in Kritik der reinen Vernunft It explains why nature is solely
14 In 1 820 in the notebook, Coleridge gives an impressive description of this 
infallible but undefinable meeting point. He writes, 'The most perfect human Mind 
is to God or divine Truth as a Globe on a Table—the G. touches th T. but at one point at 
a time, but while the T. at each point supporteth the whole globe.' The editor notes 
that the the passage is taken from Luther's Colloquia Mensalia (1652). See CN, IV, 
4665 and note. It is Coleridge, however, who uses it in this epistemological context.
15 Kant, ibid., p. 102 and Lucas, ibid., p. 121.
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human, or, phenomenal, and why the human mind cannot transgress beyond this 
human, phenomenal nature.
Coleridge, as he believes that the human mind is originally passive, remains 
unconvinced with Kant's argument for the original 'active' apperception. Kant would 
deny that by postulating the original apperception at the beginning he either ties or 
unties what Coleridge calls the 'Kantian knot' between passivity and activity of the 
human mind. But Coleridge is suspicious that Kant ties the knot by postulating the 
original apperception as the first principle and excluding things in themselves 
which are by definition prior to the original apperception. Coleridge checks this 
point when he writes in the marginal note to Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 'p. 129 to 
169 comprehended the most difficult and obscure passages of this Critique',16 where 
he finds the chapter on 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding' which includes the sections concerning the original apperception. In 
Biographia Literaria he repeats the same point when he says of Kritik, 'the few 
passages ... remained obscure to me, after due efforts of thought, (as the chapter on 
original apperception) '.17 He suggests that he is dissatisfied with Kant's procedure. 
He detects that these 'obscure' passages 'were hints and insinuations referring to 
ideas, which KANT either did not think it prudent to avow, or which he considered as 
consistently left behind in a pure analysis, not of human nature in toto, but of the 
speculative intellect alone.'18 If the former were the case, Coleridge would exert 
enough courage to say precisely what these 'ideas' are; if the latter were the case, he 
would rewrite Kant's argument and reintroduce it in its proper form. In fact, 
Coleridge's theory of imagination is his response to what he calls 'the most difficult 
and obscure passages' of Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Where Kant speaks in a 
descriptive language and merely say 'ideas', Coleridge would speak a sort of language
16 CM, III, p. 242.
17 BL, I, p. 153.
18 BL, I, p. 154.
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which inevitably transgresses the limit which Kant sets for his own argument. Two 
reasons seem likely: one is that Coleridge finds lost in him what Kant takes for 
granted as the proper function of human mind; another is that Coleridge is a poet. 
Kant would not accept the charge which Coleridge implicitly brings to him that he 
disregards the 'Kantian knot' by his argument for the original apperception. But 
because of these differences between them, Coleridge remains dissatisfied with 
Kant's treatment of the original passivity of human mind and demands a proper 
recognition of the knot between passivity and activity. And these differences also 
lead to their different approaches to the problematic human subject, 'I'.
The original apperception in the form of 'I think' is the starting point of Kant's 
phenomenology. In Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 'the knot' between passivity and 
activity of the human mind is placed on 'intuition' [Anschauung] in the form of the 
question whether it belongs to passive sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] or active 'original 
apperception'. And as seen above, his intention is to overturn the precedence of its 
passivity over activity. In order to initiate his phenomenological argument he has to 
postulate 'I think' at the starting point of the active human mind. Although it is not a 
simple question whether Kant indeed drops the original passivity of human mind 
from the consideration, one thing can be said with certainty. That is, his whole 
argument begins with the separation of 'the synthetic unity in the connection of 
perceptions' [die synthetische Einheit der W a h r n e h m u n g e n ]  from 'the 
synthetic unity in the connection of things in themselves' [die synthetische Einheit 
in der Verkniipfung der D i nge  an s ich  s e l b s t ] . 19 Two lines of argument
19 Kant, ibid., p. 58, and Lucas, ibid., p. 70. In Kant, this separation is thorough 
and complete. He then argues that even the transcendental ideas cannot repair it, 
that they are 'regulative' only and not 'constitutive'. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (Frankfurt, 1968) B 672. See also Chapter 1, III note. Coleridge 
is to wonder whether they are merely regulative or also constitutive. See SM, p. 
114. Quoted in Chapter 4, III note. He also uses the word 'consubstantial' for 
'constitutive'. See SM, p. 29. Quoted in Chapter 4, IV note. Coleridge's problem is, 
as he writes in 1825-1826: 'The unsatisfyingness, the felt insufficiency, of all 
Finites in themselves, and the necessity which the Understanding feels of seeking 
their solution elsewhere—i. e. in an X that is not finite—It would therefore derive the
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follow. One is that he then proceeds to the possibility of a priori knowledge by 
categories. The implicit argument here is that by sensation man does not receive 'the 
synthetic unity of things in themselves1 or anything which is related to it, but only 
the chaos of impressions. Kant sees this chaos as the material on which the human 
mind actively works and of which it produces 'the synthetic unity of perceptions'. In 
short, the unity of his perception is not given by nature outside the human mind but 
actively produced from within. This is how Kant procures the active autonomy of 
human mind and guarantees a priori certainty of knowledge by categories. The other 
line of argument is that such knowledge is only empirical, that is, limited within 
experience. He repeatedly warns that categories which are not applied to sensible 
intuition are empty. Behind this warning is his grand purpose of the whole book, 
that is, to criticize the transgression of reason. For the sake of limiting the 
application of categories within experience, but only for that sake, Kant does not 
dismiss 'sensibility' which is the passive and first 'experience' of man.
It is very suggestive that the chapter on 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding' begins with the definition of intuition in the passive 
sense. Kant writes, 'THE manifold of representations can be given in an intuition 
which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity1 [Das Mannigfaltige der 
Vorstellungen kann in einer Anschauung gegeben werden, die bloS sinnlich, d. i. 
nichts als Empfanglichkeit ist].20 But according to him this receptivity in a formal 
sense is determined from within and not from without. He immediately continues,
Finite from the Infinite, the Condition from the Absolute! But alas! by what 
intelligible process Diminuendo can the Infinite pass into the Finite.' CN, IV, 5294. 
'The unsatisfyingness, the felt insufficiency' resonate with Miss Theta's 'Halfness' 
and her yearning after 'Other half. See Chapter 4, IV, and Chapter 5, II. In the same 
entry, he offers his solution: 'there lies a chasm between them, which no Industry 
can fill up, no Imagination over-bridge.—Here the Ideas intervene, and the 
Reconcilers'. In 1820-1821 he provides a shorter version, 'the Infinite taken up 
into the Finite', but says that he prefers, 'SPACE = the form by which the Boundless 
is subsumed into the Bounded.1 CN, IV, 4775. For his speculation on space, see 
Chapter 5, I.
20 Kant, ibid., and Norman Kemp Smith, trans., Critique of Pure Reason 
(Hampshire, 1929) B 129.
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'and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation, 
which being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected.1 [und die 
Form dieser Anschauung kann a priori in unserem Vorstellungsvermogen liegen, 
ohne doch etwas anderes, als die Art zu sein, wie das Subject affiziert wird.]21 His 
basic argument is already clear. He here argues that although he cannot define 'what' 
affects man, he can certainly define in human terms 'how' it affects him. He thus 
replaces 'intuition' in the passive sense with that in the active sense. And he 
postulates the original apperception as the first and pure intuition of the active 'I 
think'. Once this is done, his transcendental philosophy unfolds almost  
automatically. He writes:
Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, hei&t 
Anschau u ng ... Diese Vorstellung aber ist ein Actus der S p o n t a n e i t a t , d .  i. 
sie kann nicht als zur Sinnlichkeit gehorig angesehen werden. Ich nenne sie die 
r e i n e  Apper  z ep t i  o n , urn sie von der empi  r i schen zu unterscheiden, 
oder auch die ur spr iingl i che Apper  zept i  o n , weil sie dasjenige 
Selbstbewufctsein ist, was, indem es die Vorstellung Ich denke  hervorbringt 
... von keiner weiter begleitet werden kann. Ich nenne auch die Einheit derselben 
d i e t r a n s z e n d e n t a l e  Einheit des Selbstbewufctseins, um die MOglichkeit der 
Erkenntnis a priori aus ihr zu bezeichnen.
[That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition 
... But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded 
as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from 
empirical apperception, or again, original apperception, because it is that self- 
consciousness which, while generating the representation '/ think' ... cannot 
itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this
21 Ibid.
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apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in 
order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it.]22
By this procedure he believes that he procures the a priori certainty of categories 
'which have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility' 
[[die] un a bhSng ig  von S i n n l i c h k e i t  bloS im Verstande entspringen],23 
and that he successfully guarantees 'the a priori validity of the categories in respect 
of all objects of our senses' [Gultigkeit [der Kategorie] a priori in Ansehung aller 
Gegenstande unserer Sinne].24
Kant then confidently proceeds to the section titled 'The Application of the 
Categories to Objects of the Senses in General' [Von der Anwendung der Kategorien 
auf Gegenstande der Sinne uberhaupt].25 By this application the human mind 
produces empirical unity which is different from and, as Coleridge may say, 
secondary to, the original unity of apperception. Kant calls this empirical unity 
'figurative synthesis' and explains, 'the figurative synthesis ... must ... be called the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of representing 
in intuition an object that is not itself present.' [die figiirliche Synthesis ... muS ... 
die t r  anszenden tal  e S y n t h e s i s  der Ei nbi  I dungskr  a f t  heiSen. 
Ei nbi I dungs kr a f t  ist das Vermogen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen  
Gegenwar  t in der Anschauung vorzustellen.]26 At this point again he repeats his 
discussion on passivity and activity of human mind. He writes:
Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich ist, so gehort die Einbildungskraft, der 
subjektiven Bedingung wegen, unter der sie allein den Verstandesbegriffen eine
22 Ibid., B 132.
23 Ibid., B 144.
24 Ibid., B 145.
25 Ibid., B 150.
26 Ibid., B 151.
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korrespondierende Anschauung geben kann, zur Si nnl i chke i  t; so fern aber 
doch ihre Synthesis eine Ausiibung der Spontaneitat ist, welche bestimmend, und 
nicht, wie der Sinn, blofc bestimmbar ist, mithin a priori den Sinn seiner Form 
nach der Einheit der Apperzeption gemafc bestimmen kann, so ist die 
Einbildungskraft so fern ein Vermogen, die Sinnlichkeit a priori zu bestimmen, 
und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen, den Kategor  i engemafc , mufc die 
transzendentale Synthesis der E i n b i l d u n g s k r a f t  sein, welches eine  
Wirkung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit und die erste Anwendung desselben 
... auf Gegenstande der uns moglichen Anschauung ist.
[Now all our intuition is sensible, that imagination, owing to the subjective 
condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a 
corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But in as much as its synthesis 
is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, 
determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in 
respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is 
to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its 
synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of the 
understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application ... to the objects of 
our possible intuition.]27
Kant also calls this imagination 'the productive imagination1 and distinguishes it 
from 'the reproductive imagination'. Coleridge picks up this distinction and uses it 
in distinguishing between 'the secondary imagination' and 'fancy' in Biographia 
Literaria. Kant says, 'In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also 
entitle it the productive imagination, to distinguish it from the reproductive
27 Ibid., B 151-2.
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imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws, 
namely, of association, and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of 
the possibility of a priori knowledge.1 [So fern die Einbildungskraft nun Spontaneitat 
ist, nenne ich sie auch bisweilen die p r o d u k t i v e  Einbildungskraft, und 
unterscheide sie dadurch von der repr  odukt i  ven,  derren Synthesis lediglich 
empirischen Gesetzen, namlich denen der Assoziation, unterworfen ist, und welche 
daher zur Erklarung der Moglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori nichts beitragt].28
II. Kant's original apperception, productive imagination, and reproductive 
imagination respectively correspond with Coleridge's primary imagination, 
secondary imagination, and fancy. In two points, however, Coleridge differs from 
Kant. The first point is that Coleridge's 'I think' is not the same as Kant's. Kant 
argues that 'I think' is 'that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment 
of the understanding' [der hochste Punkt, an dem man alien Verstandesgebrauch ... 
heften muK].29 In this argument, the crucial point is the separation of 'the 
synthetic unity of perceptions' from 'the synthetic unity of things in themselves' at 
the inception of 'I think'. By this procedure Kant believes that he successfully 
procures the rest of human mind's active autonomy. For Kant the original 
apperception and the productive imagination are one continual act with no hint of 
shift or disparity. But Coleridge argues that there is the original stage of the human
28 Ibid., B 152. In Biographia Literaria he says, 'The Fancy is indeed no other than 
a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space ... But equally with 
the ordinary memory it must receive all its materials ready made from the law of 
association.' BL, I, p. 305. From here he develops his 'ontological' argument. It is 
crucial to see that this argument primarily concerns the distinction between the 
secondary imagination and fancy and not between the primary and secondary 
imaginations. See below. He later writes, 'the Mind must have emancipated itself 
from the thraldom of the sensuous Imagination, which perpetually craves an 
antecedent Matter— self-subsistent Appearance—in short, an Apparition — The first 
exercise in Philosophy is facere non dare materiam/or Matter is a result not a 
Datum—'. CN, IV, 5298. This statement is also the developed form of his speculation 
on 'double-touch'. See Chapter 5, II.
29 Ibid., B 134 note.
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mind where it is passive. In that stage 'the synthetic unity of things in themselves' 
and 'the synthetic unity of perceptions' are not separate but related, and man 
receives something to do with 'the synthetic unity of things in themselves< which 
once received becomes 'the synthetic unity of perceptions'. Coleridge maintains that 
at this stage the human mind is still passive. The primary imagination is 'a 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I A M '.30 
The crucial point comes at the emergence of the active, secondary imagination. At 
this point he loses the original passivity of the human mind and also 'the synthetic 
unity of perceptions' which once was given to this passive mind. The task of the 
secondary imagination therefore is to re-create 'the synthetic unity' which it forces 
out of human mind at its own inception. This difference between Kant and Coleridge 
as to the original state of human mind inevitably leads to another difference between 
them.
The second point in which Coleridge differs from Kant is the way he distinguishes 
the secondary imagination from fancy. When Kant says that productive imagination 
is 'spontaneous', he has in mind a sort of automatic mechanism, such as the function 
of categories, which are innate in the human mind unvariably. But Coleridge has a 
personal reason to disbelieve such automatism.31 While he may agree that the 
productive imagination is 'spontaneous', this spontaneity is not that of the automatic 
mechanism but that of a willed act. He says of the secondary imagination that it is 
'co-existing with the conscious will' and 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to
30 BL, I, p. 304. There is a fine definition of the primary imagination contrasted 
with the secondary imagination in 'Essays on the Principles of Method' (1818). In 
the tenth essay Coleridge says, 'whatever could be educed by the mind out of its own 
essence, by attention to its own acts and laws of action, or as the products of the 
same; and whatever likewise could be reflected from material masses transformed as 
it were into mirrors, the excellence of which is to reveal, in the least possible 
degree, their own original forms and natures'. Friend, I, p. 505.
31 Coleridge sometimes calls the secondary imagination as 'Forma efformans' as in 
the following formula: 'cvXtj = confusio = passio = finiri—//Reason, Action, Forma 
efformans. (= means "the same as": //"opposed to".)>' CN, II, 2543. It is important 
to note that this formula is a comment made later on his investigation into his own 
nightmares in Malta. See Chapter 4, II.
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re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it 
struggles to idealize and to unify.'32 Because of how he defines the primary 
imagination, his secondary imagination suffers from resistance quite unlike Kant's 
productive imagination which claims its autonomy. But by the same reason, 
Coleridge's secondary imagination has the clear teleological orientation from the 
beginning, of which Kant remains quiet at this stage of the discussion. It is to 're­
create' and not merely to create.33
Coleridge's own argument gradually evolves along with his response to Kant's 
phenomenology. In the latter part of the notebook entry from August-September 
1809 quoted above, he writes:
a Perception blended with the sense of real Presence I use the word, a 
Presentation—a renewal of this by the memory or in the imagination, with or 
without an act of the will, Representation.
Thus then: THING = a supposed Reality existing separately from our 
minds, and the supposed Correspondent to the impressions, of which it is the 
supposed Cause—. OBJECT—the impression made or left, either that in which we
32 BL, I, 304.
33 Coleridge seeks for a 'trichotomous' resolution to the problem of passivity and 
activity of the human mind. He writes, 'Our inward experiences were thus arranged 
in three separate classes, the passive sense, or what the school-men call the merely 
receptive quality of the mind; the voluntary, and the spontaneous, which holds the 
middle place between both.' BL, I, p. 90. The problem of passivity and activity 
involves 'the absence or presence of WILL'. BL, I, p. 89. And Coleridge's basic 
question is whether or not there can be a middle point in this dichotomy, or, how he 
should seek after this middle point. In another place he writes, referring to the 
movement of 'a small water-insect', 'There are evidently two powers at work, which 
relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without a 
intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. (In philosophical 
language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and 
determinations, the IMAGINATION ...)' BL, I, pp. 124-5. This 'imagination' includes 
both the primary and secondary imaginations and intermediates them. For his 
further discussion on trichotomy and its relation to Richard Baxter and Kant, see 
Chapter 7, I.
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perceive the Thing, or by which we recall it to our imagination: in the former 
sense, I term it a PRESENTATION, in the latter, a REPRESENTATION.—
A SENSATION, = a Feeling referring to some Thing, and yet not organized 
into a definite Object and -this nor separated from the sentient Being.34
Here the primary imagination is called 'Perception blended with the sense of real 
Presence'. He does make a distinction between 'Sensation' and 'Perception', but this 
distinction is quite unlike Kant's distinction between sensibility and apperception 
which, as seen above, is the same as the distinction between passivity and activity of 
the human mind. In this sense Coleridge's 'Perception' is still passive and close to, if 
not identical with, 'Sensation'. In other words, 'Perception' is the first act of the 
human mind which is still enwrapped in its overall passivity and not yet extracted 
from this original passivity and identified as pure act, as pure apperception. 
Coleridge's 'Perception' is still very close to 'Sensation' when he says, 'Perception is 
blended with "the sense" of real Presence'. Thus, he argues, 'Perception' 
presupposes 'Presentation' of 'a supposed Reality existing separately from our 
minds', or, through 'Presentation' the human mind receives 'the sense real Presence' 
of 'a supposed Reality1. And the human mind receives not only 'sense' but also 
'Object' or 'the impression made or left ... in which we perceive the Thing'. It is 
when this 'Presentation' ceases that 'Representation' comes into play. It is a 
replacement, or, 'renewal' of Presentation. When 'the Thing' is no longer present, it 
can still be 'recalled to our imagination'. But this 'renewed' Presentation is not a 
repeated Presentation in the sense that it does not present 'the sense of real 
Presence' but merely recalls it. Moreover, the human mind is passive and receptive 
to 'real Presence' in 'Presentation' while in 'Representation' it has to be decisively 
active and expressive in order to reproduce, or, 'recall' the sense of real Presence.
34 CN, III, 3605
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The point may become clearer by asking who presents 'the sense of real Presence1 
and who re-presents its 'renewal'. 'The Re-presenter' is no doubt the human 'I', but 
'The presenter' is the divine, infinite 'I'. Coleridge also points out here that there 
are two kinds of 'Representation'. One is a 'a renewal ... by the memory ... without 
act of the will', and the other 'a renewal... in the imagination with an act of the will'. 
The former is to be called fancy and the latter the secondary imagination.
In March-April 1811 Coleridge repeats basically the same observation. Here
'Objects' in the above quotation are called 'Definites'. He writes:
Definites conceived as being in us but not of us—& these subdivided into Definites 
at once present in us & to us, & secondly Definites present in us but not—to us ... 
In other words, Definites, be they Sounds or Images, that must be thought of 
either as being or as capable of being, out of us. Nay,-this 4s is not this faulty?— 
for an Imagination quoad Imagination cannot be thought of as capable of being out 
of -eur us? Answer. No. For while we imagine, we never do think thus. We
always think of it as an it, & intimately mix the Thing & the Symbol.35
Coleridge's position as to the origin of 'Definites' is quite clear. They are not 'of us', 
that is, they are given, or, defined prior to any act of human mind. And there are two 
ways in which the human mind relates itself with these 'Definites'. 'Definites' are 
either presented 'in us & to us' or represented 'in us but not—to us'. This 
'subdivision' corresponds to the division between 'Presentation' and 'Representation'. 
In 'Presentation', definites are presented 'to us' from without and internally 
received 'in us'. But there comes the moment when definites are no longer presented 
'to us' but only remains 'in us'. Therefore, in 'Representation', the human mind 
attaches 'Outness' to these internal 'Definites'. These 'Definites' can no longer 'be'
35 CN, III, 4058.
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out of us but 'be thought to be' out of us. In his words, they are 'capable of being out 
of us'. Thus 'Presentation' is from without to within, and 'Representation' is from 
within towards without. 'Presentation' is the work of the primary imagination. 
'Representation' is the work of the secondary imagination in the form of active 
symbolism in which 'we ... intimately mix the Thing [without] & the Symbol 
[within]'. He summarizes the above discussion as follows:
1. Definites with the sense of their divided Presence. 2. Definites 
without this sense—or still better—Definites perceived by us as present 
Realities—and Definites perceived by us as Symbols distinct from the Things, of 
which they are Symbols— ... Definites conceived as-re present really—Definites 
conceived as not combined with the sense of real Presence.—This will do.— 
a Definites combined with the sense of their real presence; 
p. Definites combined with a sense of their Absence.36
At 'Presentation', 'Presence' of 'Definites' are divided between without and within, 
but also united in one 'Presence'. But at the next moment, 'Definites' lie only within, 
so that by 'Representation' the human mind attaches 'Outness' to them and transfers 
them from within towards without by the act of symbolism. Finally, he concludes 
that 'Definites' given to the human mind at 'Presentation' carries 'the sense of their 
real presence', while 'Definites' returned from within the human mind by 
'Representation' carries 'a sense of their Absence'.
In this context the secondary imagination is an attempt to recover from 'Absence'. 
From here he begins his argument about the secondary imagination, as he shifts the 
point of the argument from the distinction between the primary and the secondary 
imaginations to that between the secondary imagination and fancy. Coleridge's basic
36 Ibid.
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argument is that the human mind is no longer passive, that the original passivity 
cannot be retained but should only be referred to through the willed act of the human 
mind. Immediately after the above entry, he writes, 'we clearly feel the difference 
in our own minds & know well when we remember a thing by accident & passively, & 
when actively—This important distinction of active and passive Remembrance is 
among the many Omissions of Hartley's System—1.37 Coleridge takes 'Hartley's 
System' as an example and suggests that it lacks the proper acknowledgement of the 
secondary stage of the human mind in which it can only 'remember'. As Hartley fails 
to make a proper distinction between 'Presentation' and 'Representation', so he fails 
to make, or rather fails to see the need of making, a distinction between the active 
'Representation' and the passive 'Representation'. Coleridge argues that the 
passivity in the passive 'Representation' is nothing like the original passivity but 
merely a negated activity. 'Hartley's System', according to Coleridge, is the system 
which by disregarding the inevitable activity of the human mind mistakes mere 
negation of that activity for the original passivity.38 In February-June 1813 he 
repeats this argument.
His Imagination, if it must be so called, is at all events of the pettiest kind—it is 
an Imagunculation [imaguncula: little image].—How excellently the German 
Einbildungskraft expresses this prime & loftiest Faculty, the power of co- 
adunation, the faculty that forms the many into one, in eins Bildung.
37 CN, III, 4059.
38 In Biographia Literaria he writes of Hartley's associationism, 'this hypothesis 
neither involves the explanation, nor precludes the necessity, of a mechanism and 
co-adequate forces in the percipient, which at the more than magic touch of the 
impulse from without is to create anew for itself the correspondent object.1 BL, I, p. 
137.
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Eisenoplasy, or esenoplastic Power, -H  Fantasy, or the Mirrorment, 
either catoptric or metoptric—repeating simply, or by transposition—& again, 
involuntary (as in dreams) or by an act of the will.—39
In one formula he makes the contrasts between 'Einbildungskraft' and 'Fantasy', 
between 'the power of co-adunation' and the power of 'the Mirrorment', between the 
passive repetition of what is given and the active re-creation of it, between the 
'involuntary' act and the willed act.
In April 1811 Coleridge repeats basically the same argument with a more 
vehement language and a hint of theology. This is because he clearly states here what 
he aims at in the exercise of the secondary imagination. He writes:
The image-forming or rather re-forming power, the imagination in its passive 
sense, which I would rather call Fancy = Phantasy, a <j)aiveiv, this, the Fetisch & 
Talisman of all modern Philosophers (the German excepted) may not inaptly be 
compared to the Gorgon Head, which looked death into every thing— ... all form as 
body, i.e. as shape, & not as forma efformans, is dead—Life may be inferred, even 
as intelligence is from black marks on white paper—but the black marks 
themselves are truly "the dead letter".40
The sole purpose of the secondary imagination is to 'infer Life'. By this alone it is 
distinguished from fancy. 'Inference of Life' as an attempt of recovery follows the 
recognition of loss of Life. But without the due recognition of 'death', even this 
attempt does not come forward. He continues and detects where the mistake occurs:
39 CN, III, 4 1 7 6 .
40 CN, III, 4 0 6 6 .
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Here then is the error—not in the faculty itself, without which there would be no 
fixation, consequently, no distinct perception or conception, but in the gross 
idolatry of those who abuse it, & make that the goal & end which should be only a 
means of arriving at it. Is it any excuse to him who treats a living being as 
inanimate Body, that he we cannot arrive at the knowledge of the living Being but 
thro1 the Body which is its Symbol & outward & visible sign?—
Certainly not. On the contrary Coleridge believes that the very recognition of the 
loss of 'Presentation' should lead to the determination to 'infer Life' in his 
'Representation'. Passive 'Representation' simply lacks this determination. Finally, 
this 'inference' is poetical. He concludes the entry as follows: 'From the above deduce 
the worth & dignity of poetic Imagination, of the fusing power, that fixing unfixes & 
while it melts & bedims the Image, still leaves in the Soul its living meaning—'. And 
it is not only poetical but also religious. The argument of the above entry is in fact 
the extended recapitulation of another entry from November 1809 where he had to 
write:
Important remark just suggests itself— 13 Novr- 1809—That it is by a negation 
and voluntary Act of no-thinking that we think of earth, air, water & c as dead— 
It is necessary for our limited powers of Consciousness that we should be brought 
to this negative state, & that should pass into Custom—but likewise necessary 
that at times we should awake & step forward—& this is effected by Poetry & 
Religion/—.41
This entry resonates with his early plan to write hymns to the element, which was 
abandoned and reworked into 'The Ancient Mariner'.42 In Biographia Literaria there
41 CN, III, 3632.
42 See Chapter 2 , 1.
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is little theological argument related to the theory of imagination, except that he 
mentions his intention to expand the argument and attach it to The Ancient Mariner1 
as the preface.43 While the preface remains unwritten, it is not difficult to see the 
parallel between the origin and the purpose of the secondary imagination and the 
departure and the destination of the Mariner's voyage. In both cases man falls from 
nature and yearns after the recovery which may be granted only partially or 
symbolically.
Coleridge thus appropriates Kant's phenomenological argument in distinguishing 
the secondary imagination from fancy. But Coleridge radically disagrees with Kant's 
two basic arguments. Kant argues that intuition only brings about a confused 
manifold, and that once it is given, or rather, gained by intuition in the active sense, 
the human mind freely and without resistance works on it and brings about the 
formally regulated unity. Coleridge argues that by intuition in the passive sense 
man is originally provided with cosmos and not chaos. It is on the loss of the original 
annunciation that his intuition becomes active in the Kantian sense. He also argues 
that when he works on his own chaos, he gets overwhelming resistance from it. He 
simply disagrees with Kant's usage of the word 'intuition'. In Biographia Literaria, 
he notes that Kant's intuition as the first active re-presentation has no equivalent in 
English. He writes, 'I take this occasion to observe, that here and elsewhere Kant 
uses the terms intuition, and the verb active (Intueri, germanice Anschauen) for 
which we have unfortunately no correspondent word, exclusively for that which can 
be represented in space and time.' Coleridge then insists that the word should be 
used in his way. He continues, 'But as I see no adequate reason for this exclusive 
sense of the term, I have reverted to its wider signification authorized by our elder 
theologians and metaphysicians, according to whom the term comprehends all truths 
known to us without a medium.'44 In short, he suggests that intuition is not the
43 BL, I, p. 306.
44 BL, I, p. 289.
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beginning of the secondary imagination but of the primary imagination, and that the 
shift from the primary to the secondary imaginations , which he takes along with 
Kant, has not only epistemological or ontological but also theological implications.
In Appendix C of The Statesman's Manual Coleridge restates this argument 
rephrasing 'the primary imagination1 and 'the secondary imagination' as 'the Reason' 
and 'the understanding'. He postulates the self-manifestation of 'the Reason' in the 
beginning of the argument. He writes, 'the Reason first manifests itself in man by 
the tendency to the comprehension of all as one.' But this first manifestation is 
unsustainable because once received in man, it forms a paradox, or in his words, 'the 
original temptation'. It is the paradox in which 'we can neither rest in an infinite 
that is not at the same time a whole, nor in a whole that is not infinite.' 
Subsequently he falls and 'either loses the ONE in the striving after the INFINITE  
... or the INF I NITE in the striving after the ONE.45 Thus 'the Reason [which] is 
the science of the universal, having the ideas of ONENESS and ALLNESS as its two 
elements or primary factors'46 becomes impossible. 'The Reason' recedes from the 
surface of consciousness, and 'the discursive understanding' remains 'which forms 
for itself general notions and terms of classification for the purpose of comparing 
and arranging phaenomena'. 'The Characteristic', he continues, 'is the Clearness 
without Depth'.47 Therefore, he argues, man must recover 'the reason' from the 
depth and reunite it with the understanding on the surface. Quoting John 1. 5, he 
writes in Appendix D, 'all human understandings are nourished by the one Divine 
Word, whose power ... (= shineth in darkness, and is not contained therein, or 
comprehended by the darkness)'.48 Thus 'the Reason' must become 'the integral
45 SM, p. 60.
46 SM, p. 59-60.
47 SM, p. 69.
48 SM, p. 97.
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spirit of the regenerated man'.49 Only by this recovery 'the Reason1 and 
'understanding' are
"Differing but in degree, in kind the same!"50
Coleridge appropriates Kant in this potentially theological context. Kantian 
phenomenology can be said to begin with the loss of 'the ONE IN F IN IT E ', that is, it 
begins with a confused manifold, and strives after the recovery of 'the ONE' at the 
cost of 'the IN F IN ITE '. But since Kant neither postulates 'the Reason's self­
manifestation' in the beginning nor acknowledges its loss, his discussion has nothing 
to do with Coleridge's view that the human understanding as such is degenerate. 
While Kant does argue that the reason leads the understanding to its unity,51 he has
49 SM, p. 69.
50 SM, p. 69 and note. As the editor notes, Coleridge here adopts Milton's 
distinction of 'Intellectual' and 'Discursive' reasons. See Paradise Lost, V, Is 488- 
90. He quotes the same book Is 485-90 in Biographia Literaria and Is 469-88 in 
the twelfth Philosophical Lecture. See BL, I, 1 73-4, and Phil Lects, p. 349. 
Coleridge says of the secondary imagination in Biographia Literaria that it is 
'identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, 
and in the mode of its operation.' BL, I, p. 304.
51 In the fifty-sixth section of the Prolegomena Kant argues of pure concepts of 
reason 'that they are principles for establishing thoroughgoing unanimity, 
completeness and synthetic unity in the use of our understanding, and hence they are 
valid merely of experience, but of the whole of it. But although an absolute whole of 
experience is impossible, the idea of a whole of knowledge according to principles in 
general is what alone can procure for it a special kind of unity, namely that of a 
system, without which our experience is nothing but patchwork and cannot be used 
for the highest end ... and here I mean not merely the practical use of reason, but also 
the highest end of the speculative reason.1 [dass sie Grundsatze sind, unseren 
Verstandesgebrauch zur durchgangigen Einhelligkeit, Vollstandigkeit und 
synthetischen Einheit zu bringen, und sofern bios von der Erfahrung, aber im 
Ganzen derselben gelten. Obgleich aber ein absolutes Ganze der Erfahrung 
unmoglich ist, so ist doch die Idee eines Ganzen der Erkenntniss nach Principien 
uberhaupt dasjenige, was ihr allein eine besondere Art der Einheit, namlich die von 
einem System, verschaffen kann, ohne die unser Erkenntniss nichts, als Stiickwerk 
ist, und zum hochsten Zwecke ... nicht gebraucht werden kann; ich verstehe aber 
hier nicht bios den praktischen, sondern auch den hochsten Zweck des speculativen 
Gebrauchs der Vernunft.] Kant, Werke, IV, p. 97 and Lucas, ibid, pp. 115-6. See 
also Chapter 4, III.
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no intention to re-introduce 'the IN F IN IT E 1 in Coleridge's sense of the word or 
insist that such re-introduction is 'the regeneration' of the human understanding.52
All the disagreements between Kant and Coleridge come from the different ways 
they postulate the human subject 'I'. Kant's original apperception, as the highest 
point of his philosophy, has many names. One of them is ' the transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness' [die t r  a n s ze n d e n ta l e Einheit des Selbstbewu&tseins].53 
This is an empty 'I' which is thought to be prior to any intuition other than that of 
itself. It is 'the "I" that intuits itself' [Ich, das sich selbst anschauet].54 And it 
becomes 'the "I" who think I' [Ich, der ich denke] by its act of thinking.55 The 
process is that, first, the empty 'I' extracts human nature by intuition, or, gains its
52 Coleridge often discloses his inherent theology in a philosophical argument. In 
'Essays on the Principles of Method' (1818) he identifies the Fall with the loss of 
reason and writes, 'The ground-work, therefore, of all true philosophy is the full 
apprehension of the difference between the contemplation of reason, namely, that 
intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves, as one with the whole, 
which is substantial knowledge, and that which presents itself when transferring 
reality to the negations of reality, to the ever-varying framework of the uniform 
life, we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the 
mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life. This is abstract knowledge, 
or the science of the mere understanding.1 By 'reason' he has in mind, as it were, 
Adamic, intuitive, comprehension of the whole creation. Fie continues, 'By the 
former [reason], we know that existence is its own predicate, self-affirmation, the 
one attribute in which all others are contained, not as parts, but as manifestations. 
It is an eternal and infinite self-rejoicing, self-loving, with a joy unfathomable, 
with a love all comprehensive.' Friend, I, p. 520-1. Fie repeats his own argument 
in Aids to Reflection (1825). There he distinguishes 'Reason' from 'the human 
Understanding' as follows. 'There is, in this sense, no human Reason. There neither 
is nor can be but one Reason, one and the same: even the Light that lighteth every 
man's individual Understanding (Discursus), and thus maketh it a reasonable 
Understanding, DISCOURSE OF REASON—"one only, yet manifold; it goeth 
through all understanding, and remaining in itself regenerateth all other powers." 
(Wisdom of Solomon, c. viii.)' Aids, p. 218.
53 Kant, ibid, and Smith, ibid, B 132. Quoted above.
54 Ibid., B 155.
55 Ibid. Smith translates this as "I' that thinks', following Vaihinger's reading of 
'das Ich, der ich denke' as 'das Ich, das denkt'. But since in this section Kant is 
restating 'cogito, ergo sum' with the phenomenological terms, Kant's original passage 
with its first person to 'think' and with the suggestion that this 'thinking' is self­
manifestation through thinking rather than mere thinking seems to be more 
appropriate. Smith's commentary explains his general agreement with Vaihinger. 
See Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ’Critique of Pure Reason' (London, 1918) pp. 
xliv and note, 233-4, 268.
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content in the form of a confused manifold by its active intuition, and subsequently 
when it produces formal unity of its content by thinking, it becomes 'the "I" who 
think I1. Kant calls this process 'a system of the epigenesis of pure reason' [ein 
System der Epi genesi s der reinen Vernunft].56 Coleridge also postulates an 
empty 'I'. But in his case this empty 'I' is filled with the divine presence which 
reflects on its emptiness. It receives the divine creation as if it were a mirror 
placed in the middle of the whole creation. In Kant's terms, it does not know the 
possibility of 'synthetic judgments' [synthetische Urtheile]57 nor the painful and 
perilous pursuit of their a priori certainty. Thus Coleridge's empty 'I' is not active 
as Kant's. It is not 'the "I" that intuits itself' of Kant but the 'I' that reflects the 
divine 'I'. The former is inevitably active, but the latter is not. When Coleridge's 
empty 'I' becomes active, it loses the divine cosmos, one, and gains the human chaos, 
many. It is precisely at this point that Coleridge appropriates Kant's 
phenomenological argument which begins with the original apperception. He also 
accepts that 'the "I" who think I' is the final form of the human epigenesis. But 
Coleridge's primary concern is not with the epigenesis' a priori certainty but with 
its relation to the genesis, the original creation.
Thus Coleridge's secondary imagination is inherently paradoxical, or rather, 
theological. When he writes to Wordsworth on 30 May 1815 and encourages him to 
write 'a Philosophical Poem', he uses probably the most overtly theological language 
for active, poetic creativity of man. He says, 'I supposed you first to have meditated 
the faculties of Man ... by removing the sandy Sophisms of Locke, and the Mechanic 
Dogmatists, and demonstrating that the Senses were living growths and 
developements of the Mind & Spirit in a much juster as well as higher sense, than 
the mind can be said to be formed by the Sense—.' But these 'faculties of Man' 
presuppose his fall from nature. He continues, [I supposed you] 'to have affirmed a
56 Ibid., B 167.
57 Kant, Werke, IV, p. 14 and Lucas, trans, Prolegomena, p. 16.
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Fall in some sense, as a Fact, the possibility of which cannot be understood from the 
nature of the Will, but the reality of which is attested by Experience & Conscience.1 
Then he declares the beginning and the ultimate aim of poetic exercise with a specific 
biblical reference: the beginning is 'the sore evils, under which the whole Creation 
groans'; therefore the end is 'a manifest Scheme of Redemption from this Slavery, of 
Reconciliation from this Enmity with Nature'.58 In Biographia Literaria, however, 
he avoids an explicitly theological language in discussing his theory of imagination. 
The theological dimension is only suggested when the discussion is said to be related 
to 'The Ancient Mariner'. But even if he adopts a theological language, it would not 
reduce the paradoxicality of the secondary imagination. It may, however, generate a 
sense of hope. He says of the secondary imagination that it is 'an echo of the former 
[the primary imagination] ... identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, 
and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation.'59 This is not a 
statement but an expression of hope for the possible reconciliation of the secondary 
creation with the original creation.
Towards the end of Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Kant confesses that nature as it is, 
and especially man's status in such nature, appears to him to be a riddle. He cannot 
but think that nature as a great piece of art is without any purpose. He asks:
wozu sind ... alle jene kunstlichen Naturdinge; wozu der Mensch selbst, bei dem 
wir, als bei dem letzten fur uns denkbaren Zwecke der Natur, stehen bleiben 
miissen; wozu ist diese gesammte Natur da, und was ist der Endzweck so grosser 
und mannigfaltiger Kunst? Zum Geniessen, oder zum Anschauen, Betrachten und 
Bewundern ... als dem letzten Endzweck, warum die Welt und der Mensch selbst 
da ist, geschaffen zu sein, kann die Vernunft nicht befriedigen;
58 CL, IV, pp. 574-5. The biblical reference is to Rom 8: 22.
59 BL, I, p. 304.
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[wherefore are all those natural things that exhibit art? Wherefore is man 
himself, whom we must regard as the ultimate purpose of nature thinkable by 
us? Wherefore is this collective Nature here, and what is the final purpose of 
such great and manifold art? Reason cannot be contented with enjoyment or with 
contemplation, observation, and admiration ... as the ultimate final purpose for 
the creation of the world and of man himself.]60
Kant's whole philosophy in this context can be said to be the grand attempt to satisfy 
this unsatisfied reason in ethical terms. As seen in the previous chapter, the  
difference between Kant and Coleridge is that Coleridge postulates the moment when 
nature as it is is not a riddle, the moment when nature is divine and not human. It is 
the time when man is content just contemplating and admiring the divine presence in 
nature. For him, 'admiration [Bewundern]' is the beginning and the end of 
philosophy. He writes in 'Essays on the Principles of Method', 'In wonder ... says 
Aristotle, does philosophy begin: and in astoundment... says Plato, does all true 
philosophy finish.'61 When Coleridge finds that nature has become a riddle to him 
too, or in his word, 'ideot',62 he picks up Kant's phenomenological argument and 
works it into the theory of the secondary imagination. But precisely because he
60 Kant, Werke, V, pp. 491-2, and J. H. Bernard, trans., Kant's Kritik of Judgment 
(London, 1892) p. 417, § 91. Bernard, the translator, retains the German spelling 
of 'Kritik' in the title.
61 Friend, I, p. 519. Coleridge believes that man experiences the loss of this 
original state as the split between the speculative reason and the practical reason, 
and that the recovery from this split leads to the recovery of the original state. Just 
before the passage quoted above, he writes, 'The head will not be disjoined from the 
heart, nor will speculative truth be alienated from practical wisdom. And vainly 
without the union of both shall we expect an opening of the inward eye to the glorious 
vision of that existence which admits of no question out of itself, acknowledges no 
predicate but the I AM IN THAT I AM!' Ibid. For a further discussion about 'I AM', 
see Chapter 7, I. His statement that philosophy begins with and ends in 'wonder' 
reappears in Aids to Reflection. See AR, p. 236. In February 1824 he makes three 
variations of this statement. See CN, IV, 5131.
62 CN, I, 174: 16. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 2 , 1 and II.
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maintains that his unsatisfied reason is secondary, he retains his yearning towards 
the original state, the yearning which always brings him back to theology.63
III. Coleridge is far more articulate about the hope of recovery when he discusses it 
in artistic terms. For example in Biographia Literaria he confidently argues that 
poetry is the sublimation of all human faculties. He writes, 'No man was ever yet a 
great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher. For poetry is the 
blossom and the fragrancy of all human knowledge, human thoughts, human passions 
emotions, language.'64 This argument is likely taken from the Notebook entry of
63 Coleridge makes an interesting marginal note between September 1816 and the 
summer 1817 to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's comments on Kant. In translation, 
Jacobi says in 'Allwills Briefsammlung', 'If the highest thing upon which I can 
reflect, which I can intuit, is my empty and pure, naked and mere I, with its self- 
sufficiency and freedom: then reflective self-consciousness and rationality is a curse 
to me—and I curse my existence'. CM, III, p. 96. Coleridge would agree with him 
without reservation. Coleridge is also deeply reluctant to accept the Kantian 
position. But when Jacobi refuses to accept this 'curse' and dismisses Kant's 
phenomenological argument which, Coleridge believes, leads to ethics, Coleridge 
radically disagrees with Jacobi. Jacobi continues, 'Never have I understood how one 
could find something mysterious and incomprehensible in Kant's categorical 
imperative and could subsequently use this mystery to turn the conditions of the 
reality of the laws of practical reason into a convenient substitute for theoretical 
reason.' For Coleridge, however, the categorical imperative is not a 'convenient' but 
a desperate substitute, and, as a substitute, it is irreplaceable. He at once refutes 
Jacobi and writes, 'And what is Jacobi's Mystery? Is it not the Organ of spiritual 
Truth? And what is this but the real Ich, that shines thro' the empirical Ich—the 
coincidence of which with the former is categorically demanded./' That is to say, no 
one can avoid that 'curse', and the Kantian ethics is the only possible way to deal with 
it. As seen in Chapter 5, III, Coleridge's theology begins when he recognizes the 
impracticability of this 'demand' and rewrites it in theological terms. Yet even so he 
never dismisses Kantian phenomenology and ethics as nonsense. For possibly the 
latest example of such rewriting, one finds the following passage in 'Essay on Faith': 
'FAITH may be defined, as fidelity to our own being—so far as such being is not and 
cannot become an object of the senses ... I am conscious of something within me 
peremptorily commanding me to do unto others as I would they should do unto me;— 
in other words, a categorical (that is, primary and unconditional) imperative;—that 
the maxim ( regula maxima or supreme rule) of my actions, both inward and 
outward'. LR, IV, p. 425.
64 BL, ll, pp. 25-6. Coleridge wrotes on 13 July 1802, 'a great Poet must be ... a 
profound Metaphysician'. CL, II, p. 810. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 3, I. The 
reason why he reintroduces the same argument while he repeatedly acknowledges his 
'metaphysical1 failure is that simply he has no other alternatives. His implicitly 
theological argument in Biographia Literaria is expected to be the way to get over 
this impasse.
237
May 1810 where he called poetry as 'a mode of composition that calls into action & 
gratifies the largest number of the human Faculties in Harmony with each other, & 
in just proportions'. He then said, 'Frame a numeration table of the primary 
faculties of Man ... the Like and the Different—the spontaneous and the receptive—the 
Free and the Necessary—And whatever calls into consciousness the greatest number 
of these in due proportion & perfect harmony with each other, is the noblest 
Poem'.65 Although this confident argument is similar in its content to his 
theological argument, and although he must be aware that 'the noblest Poem', the 
sublimation of all human faculties, is 'noblest' only in the human scale, he still 
hopes rather than despairs. In art he confidently presupposes nature which is 
nobler than 'the noblest Poem'. Again in Biographia Literaria he says of imagination 
that it is 'that synthetic and magical power' which 'first put in action by the will and 
understanding ... reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or 
discordant qualities ... while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, 
[it] still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter'.66 Yet poetry is 
'imitation' and not 'copy', that is, active 'Representation' and not passive 
'Representation'. He writes, 'Could a rule be given from without, poetry would cease 
to be poetry, and sink into a mechanical art. It would be pop^wmg, not nol^aig. The 
rules of the IM AG INATIO N are themselves the very powers of growth and 
production.'67 This leads into the inevitable paradox of the secondary imagination. 
But though nature and art, matter and manner, can never be identified, they can still 
be mediated by the very paradoxical nature of imagination. For poetry is the 
creation which is neither the same as, nor completely different from, the original 
creation. That is, one can be simultaneously the same as and different from the 
other. He writes 'the composition of a poem is among the imitative arts; and
65 CN, III, 3827.
66 BL, II, p. 16-7.
67 BL, II, pp. 83-4.
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imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in the interfusion of the S A M E 
throughout the radically DIFFERENT, or of the different throughout a base 
radically the same1.68
Thus the goal of poet is to create a phenomenal nature which is symmetrical with 
the original, noumenal one. It aims to achieve the sort of symmetry in which the two 
are simultaneously the same and different as landscape and its reflection on the 
surface of a lake are. Coleridge certainly has in mind his early observations that the 
surface of clear water shows the exact reflection of surrounding landscape.69 In 
Biographia Literaria he writes of Wordsworth's poetic genius that it produces
the perfect truth of nature in his images and descriptions as taken immediately 
from nature, and proving a long and genial intimacy with the very spirit which 
gives physiognomic expression to all the works of nature. Like a green field 
reflected in a calm and perfectly transparent lake, the image is distinguished 
from the reality only by its greater softness and lustre.70
But Coleridge argues that Wordsworth's poetic creation is not a static, two- 
dimensional reflection of the surrounding landscape but a three-dimensional re­
creation of it. In Coleridge's term, it is not 'Copy' but 'Imitation'. Whether 
Wordsworth himself follows this argument or not, Coleridge is determined to insist 
that the three-dimensional re-creation from the depth of human mind can be as 
bright and faithful as the two-dimensional reflection, that the primary and the 
secondary imaginations are not necessarily contradictory.
Acknowledgment of the depth is crucial for Coleridge in arguing for the three- 
dimensional re-creation. It is in November 1799 when he notes his experience that
68 BL, II, p. 72.
69 See Chapter 1, III.
70 BL, II, p. 148.
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he sees a reflection on water even when the real landscape is hidden in mist. He 
writes, 'all the objects on the opposite Coast are hidden, and all those hidden are 
reflected in the Lake, Trees, & the Castle, <Lyulph's Tower,> & the huge Cliff that 
dwarfs it!— Divine!—.71 Here he simply expresses surprise and wonder at 
witnessing the opening of a new world. But this early optimism is soon replaced 
with a deep ontological anxiety. In fact, the opening of the phenomenal world within 
himself is the result of his shift, or, fall from the bright surface of the water to 'the 
metaphysical depth' underneath the surface. He thus loses the original landscape. 
From this moment on, the re-creation of the landscape from the depth of his own 
mind becomes his urgent task. In September 1809 he restates the same experience 
in a clearly theological context. He writes, 'the promises of ancient prophecy would 
disclose themselves to our Faith, even as when a noble Castle hidden from us by an 
intervening mist, discovers itself by its reflection in the tranquil Lake, on the 
opposite shore of which we stand gazing.'72 In the mean time he repeatedly 
criticizes Hartley and others for the lack of this 'Faith'. He persistently argues that 
perception as the passive, static reflection on the surface is no longer possible, that 
the landscape he sees on the opposite shore is in fact not the one he receives from 
without but the one he re-produces from within. He repeatedly argued that the 
human mind inevitably shifts from the surface to the depth, from receiving the 
external landscape to re-producing it from within. In Biographia Literaria he uses 
the model of Plotinian contemplation to illustrate this. First, the poet is merely 
passive, or, contemplative. He does not yet 'create' since contemplation on nature 
does not automatically teach him how to create. By quoting Plotinus he makes 
'nature' say, 'it behoves thee not to disquiet me with interrogatories, but to  
understand in silence, even as I am silent, and work without words.'73 Then comes
71 CN, I, 553. Quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 1, III.
72 Friend, II, p. 70. The editor relates this passage to a Notebook entry 1844 which 
is relevant but only remotely so. See Friend, I, p. 103 note.
73 BL, I, p. 241. The editor notes that the quotation is from Ennead 3. 8. 4.
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the moment when the poet receives what he seeks after in nature, in Wordsworth's 
words, 'the vision and the faculty divine'. With this faculty the poet begins to create. 
Again quoting Plotinus Coleridge says, 'it suddenly shines upon us; preparing 
ourselves for the blessed spectacles as the eye waits patiently for the rising sun'. 
But he never forgets the darkness which precedes the sunrise, that is, his 'inward 
darkness'. For it is in this internal depth that the new creation takes place.
They and they only can acquire the philosophic imaginations, the sacred power of 
self-intuition, who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, 
that the wings of air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar; those 
only, who feel in their own spirits the same instinct, which impels the chrysalis 
of the horned fly to leave room in its involucrum for antennae yet to come.74
As seen above, Coleridge maintains that the re-creation of phenomenal landscape 
is not the purpose in itself. The ultimate purpose of such re-creation is the 
recovery of the symmetry between noumenal and phenomenal natures. In March 
1818, he provides a discussion on 'Art' in his notebook, which serves as a summary 
for the above discussion. He defines poetry as this: 'Poetry ... is purely human ... It 
is the Apotheosis of the former state—viz. Order and Passion'.75 Then he examines 
the shift from the primary to the secondary imaginations: 'N.b. how by excitement of 
the Associative Power Passion itself imitates Order, and the order resulting 
produces a pleasurable Passion ... and thus elevates the Mind by making its feelings 
the Objects of its reflection.' He then continues to state the paradoxical nature of 
poetry:
74 BL, I, pp. 241-2.
75 CN, III, 4397.
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Poetry is the-Pef Preparation for Art: inasmuch as it avails itself of the forms of 
Nature to recall, to express, and to modify the thoughts and feelings of the m ind- 
still however thro' the medium of articulate Speech, which is so peculiarly 
human that in all languages it is the ordinary distinction phrase by which Man 
and Nature are contra-distinguished.
He argues that the poetic exercise both divides and reunites man and nature. That is 
to say, he hopes that the Creator and the creator may be reconciled through 'Art'. He 
states the possibility of mediation between the two artists as follows: 'Nature itself 
is to a religious Observer the Art of God—and for the same cause Art itself might be 
defined, as of a middle nature between a Thought and a Thing, o r ... the union and 
reconciliation of that which is Nature with that which is exclusively Human.' Then 
he describes the human artist's Fall from nature and his hope of recovery, with some 
confidence:
the Artist must first eloign himself from Nature in order to return to her with 
full effect.—Why this?—Because—if he began by mere painful copying, he would 
produce Masks only, not forms breathing Life—he must out of his own mind 
create forms according to the several Laws of the Intellect, in order to produce in 
himself that co-ordination of Freedom & Law, that involution of the Obedience in 
the Prescript, and the Prescript in the tendency impulse to obey, which 
assimilates him to Nature—enables him to understand her—. He absents himself 
from her only in his own Spirit, which has the same ground with Nature, to 
learn her unspoken language, in its main radicals, before hef approaches to her 
endless compositions of those radicals—Not to acquire cold notions, lifeless 
technical Rules, but living and life-producing Ideas, which contain their own 
evidence/and in that evidence the certainty that they are essentially one with the 
germinal causes in Nature, his Consciousness being the focus and mirror of
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both—for this does he for a time abandon the external real, in order to return to 
it with a full sympathy with its internal & actual.76
'The Artist1 begins with passive reception. But he soon becomes unable to 'infer 
Life', or, produce 'form breathing Life'. Therefore, 'he must out of his own mind 
create forms according to the several Laws of the Intellect', that is, he must engage 
himself in the secondary imagination. It involves 'Freedom & Law’, or, ethical 
dimension too. For that sake 'he absents himself from her [Nature] only in his own 
Spirit' and becomes 'I myself I'.77 He then learns how to read the book of nature 
before he learns how to speak it.78 Finally he recovers the sym m etrical 
correspondence between nature and man. Yet it is the three dimensional 
correspondence which reconciles 'external' and 'internal', 'real' and 'actual', that is, 
'without' and 'within', or, 'fact' and 'phantom'. Thus the poet distances himself from 
nature in order to find 'living and life-producing Ideas' within himself. Only then he 
allows himself to presume that these 'Ideas' should be 'essentially one with the 
germinal causes in Nature'. It is certainly a matter of faith, but only by this 
presumption may he provide himself with the sense of orientation in his poetic 
exercise. Coleridge's descent from nature is a symmetrical imitation of the ascent of 
the transcendent God. Instead of ascending towards God, he descends and finds himself 
on the opposite side of nature, doubly distanced from what he means to follow. Thus 
the problem of the two nature leads him to the problem of the two creators. And he is 
to spend most of his remaining time in search of the mediation between them.79
76 Ibid.
77 CL, I, 295. See Chapter 3,111.
78 See Chapter 4, III.
79 In the eleventh Philosophical Lecture Coleridge repeats the same argument in 
scientific terms and ascribes it to Descartes. He says, 'Out of these simple acts the 
mind, still proceeding, raises that wonderful superstructure of geometry and then 
looking abroad into nature finds that in its own nature it has been fathoming nature, 
and that nature itself is but the greater mirror in which he beholds his own present 
and his own past being in the law, and learns to reverence while he feejs the
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necessity of that great Being whose eternal reason is the ground and absolute 
condition of the ideas in the mind, and no less the ground and the absolute cause of all 
the correspondent realities in nature—the reality of nature for ever consisting in 
the law by which each thing is that which it is.1 Phil Lects, p. 333-4. For his other 
references to 'mirror1, see Chapter 1, III note. In Theory of Life he repeats the same 
argument in philosophical terms. He writes, 'we cannot force any man into an 
insight or intuitive possession of the true philosophy, because we cannot give him 
abstraction, intellectual intuition, or constructive imagination; because we cannot 
organize for him an eye that can see, an ear that can listen to, or a heart that can 
feel, the harmonies of Nature, or recognize in her endless forms, the thousand-fold 
realization of those simple and majestic laws, which yet in their absoluteness can be 
discovered only in the recesses of his own spirit'. TL, p. 399. However, as argued 
above, he carefully excludes theological implication from these scientific and 
philosophical argument.
Chapter 7 The 'Pentad' in Aids to Reflection
I. Coleridge thus restates the problem of 'two natures' as the problem between the 
genesis and the epigenesis and anticipates his later theological speculations between 
God and man. This is a particularly Coleridgean development which is driven by his 
theological tendency to shift the problem beyond the limit of epistemology, to replace 
the problem of truth and falsehood with that of good and evil. His epistemological 
argument is thus essentially theological even when he adopts neutral, untheological 
terms in the argument. As seen above, at the end of the philosophical chapters of 
Biographia Literaria he declares his intention of re-introducing theological 
argument. While he falls short of achieving his intention in Biographia Literaria, he 
certainly compensates for it with subsequent writings towards the end of his life.
Human subjectivity is an inevitable consequence of Kantian phenomenology. 
While suspending any argument about the genesis, Kant extensively argues that the 
human subject is an active creator of its own object, nature. He needs his 
phenomenology in order to procure the autonomy of the human subject in its 
epigenesis. And he needs to establish the human autonomy in order to argue for 
human freedom. That is to say, he is a transcendentalist in human terms who draws 
a rigid distinction between 'being' and 'personality' and argues that human freedom 
can never be buried in nature. The crucial point is that his 'personality' is solely 
human. By his phenomenological argument, he believes that he solves the question of 
the human transcendence and immanence. For example, he writes in Kritik der 
Urtheilskraft:
Ob nun zwar eine unubersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs, 
als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs, als dem  
Uebersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so dass von dem ersteren zum anderen, (also 
vermittelst des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein Uebergang moglich
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ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten waren, deren erste auf die zweite 
keinen Einfluss haben kann, so soli doch diese auf jene einen Einfluss haben; 
namlich der Freiheitsbegriff soli den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in 
der Sinnenwelt wirklich machen, und die Natur muss folglich auch so gedacht 
werden konnen, dass die Gesetzmassigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur 
Moglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen 
zusammenstimme.
[Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the 
concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that 
no transition is possible from the first to the second (by means of the theoretical 
use of Reason), just as if they were two different worlds of which the first could 
have no influence upon the second, yet the second is meant to have an influence 
upon the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the world of sense 
the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought 
that the conformity to law of its form, at least harmonises with the possibility of 
the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of freedom.]1
Kant is a determined transcendentalist and argues that the human subject is 
transcendent, or, free, from nature, and that only by its act of self-manifestation 
does it make itself immanent in its own nature. It is not surprising if Coleridge 
immediately notices that exactly the same argument has been repeated about the 
transcendence and immanence of God. Coleridge is also a determined 
transcendentalist both in divine and in human terms, believing that the subject, be it 
divine or human, cannot be buried in nature. In 1820 in a Notebook, he, as a 
transcendentalist in divine terms, attacks 'these good folks' who 'forget, that in 
making Nature God they make God Nature, and fall into all the chaos of Eastern
1 Kant, Werke, V, p. 182, and J. H. Bernard, op. cit., p. 12.
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Pantheism1. Then he continues as a transcendentalist in human terms, 'if they 
include Man in Nature, they annul all morality1.2 It is characteristic of him to argue 
in one breath both divine and human transcendence. What makes Coleridge 
theologically different from Kant is that Coleridge believes that human transcendence 
and divine transcendence are not identical but opposite, that is, divine transcendence 
is above, and human transcendence below, nature. Simply, human transcendence is a 
fall from divine nature. Since he has the concept of transcendence which is 
theologically twofold, he does not allow himself to mention human transcendence 
'above' without considering its furthest theological implication. Kant, on the other 
hand, believes that human transcendence is necessarily above nature. Kant can argue 
for 'the unity' between what Coleridge would call divine transcendence and human 
transcendence and say, 'There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the 
supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of 
freedom practically contains' [Also muss es doch einen Grund der Ei nhei t des 
Uebersinnlichen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der 
Freiheitsbegriff praktisch enthalt, geben].3 Coleridge would never say 'the unity'. 
But he allows himself to expect that there may be a symmetrical correspondence 
between the two, one from above and the other from below, nature. Precisely 
because of his theology, he reserves for himself the possibility that the divine and 
human creations, each from the opposite end, may meet on the level of nature, that 
the problem of two natures may be solved by the reconciliation of the £wo creators, 
God and man. His question is: is there anything in common between the two creations 
which are undoubtedly heterogeneous, that is, is the human epigenesis related to the 
original genesis at all?.
2 CN, IV, 4 6 4 8 .
3 Kant, ibid., and Bernard, ibid., pp. 12-3.
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Coleridge's ten theses written in a Notebook in September 1815 deal primarily 
with this question.4 The question itself, however, is not fully worked out. What is 
closest to the expected answer comes at the conclusion of Thesis III where he writes, 
'the Ult imate ABSOLUTE GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE MUST be A PRINCIPLE, in which BEING 
AND THOUGHT COINCIDE, a«4 EACH INVOLVING AND PRESUPPOSING the Other.’5 That is to 
say, there must be 'a Principle' which penetrates both the creation of 'Being' and the 
creation of 'Thought'; that the material creation and the immaterial creation not only 
'coincide' but one necessarily 'involves' and 'presupposes' the other. Fie even expects 
a parallelism between 'the Process' of nature and that of 'Human Intelligence'. He 
writes in Thesis IX, 'there [will] arise a confirmation of the Truth of the Process, 
should it appear that all the different Steps of the Process, which we had shewn to be 
the necessary Preconditions of Human Intelligence did actually exist in Nature, & 
that in giving the hypothetical Progression of our Self to Reason, & Conscience, we 
had undesignedly given the History of the Material World'.6 But at this point he 
refrains himself from paraphrasing the statement in theological terms. Such an
4 CN, III, 4265. The ten theses in Biographia Literaria, which is a reworking of 
these in the Notebook, do the same, though in a much less degree. There the question 
is somehow muffled by a number of borrowings from Schelling. See BL, I, pp. 264- 
86 and notes. His reading of Schelling suggests that Schelling fails to notice the 
problem of the two transcendent subjects and, as a result, slips into what Coleridge 
calls pantheism. While acknowledging his limited reading of Schelling, Coleridge 
writes for example, 'The inconsistency Schelling has contrived to hide from himself 
by the artifice of making all knowledge bi-polar, Transcendental Idealism as one 
Pole and Nature as the other—from the tendency of my mind to confidence in others I 
was myself taken in by it, retrograding from my own prior and better Lights, and 
adopted it in the metaphysical chapters of my Literary Life—not aware, that this was 
putting the Candle horizontally and burning it at both ends ... The divine Unity is 
indeed the indispensable CONDITION of this Polarity; but both it's formal and it's 
immediate, specific CAUSE is the contradictory Will of the Apostasy.' CL, IV, p. 874. 
See also CL, IV, p. 883. What he sees missing in Schelling is the transcendent God 
which is prior to the polarity, that is, 'Prothesis' which remains transcendent while 
it manifests itself by polarity of 'Thesis; and 'Antithesis'. He makes this point clear 
when he writes, 'Schelling's System and mine stand thus:—In the Latter there are God 
and Chaos: in the former an Absolute Somewhat, which is alternately both, the rapid 
leger de main shifting of which constitutes the delusive appearance of Poles— . CN, 
IV, 4662. For 'Prothesis', 'Thesis' and 'Antithesis', see below.
5 CN, III, 4265.
6 Ibid.
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attempt would immediately have required a radical reconsideration of the precedence 
between God and man. At this stage he is not ready to say of them, 'each involving and 
presupposing the other'.7
The principle which penetrates both the 'Material' and 'Intelligent' creations is 
the principle of self-manifestation. By this principle, 'an absolute principium 
essendi' and 'an absolute principium cognoscendi'8 may achieve symmetry, or 
'coincidence' in Coleridge's word. It should be noted here that what he expects is not 
their identity but their symmetry at their middle point. He continues, 'The result of 
both the sciences, or their equatorial point, would be the principle of a total and 
undivided philosophy.' However, he avoids making clear that this 'principle of a 
total and undivided philosophy' is the result of a radical mediation between the two 
creators. He avoids saying that this principle ' in which BEING AND THOUGHT 
COINCIDE, and EACH INVOLVING AND PRESUPPOSING the other' is the same as the one in 
which the creator of 'Being' and the creator of 'Thought' coincide, and 'each involving 
and presupposing the other'. While his argument requires a radical reconsideration 
about the theological precedence of God over man, he obviously hesitates what to do 
with it. In fact, instead of following up his argument, he makes an attempt to 
preserve the stable precedence of God over man. In the 'Scholium' he adds to Thesis 
IV in a Notebook he makes an extensive argument for the precedence of 'Sum quia in 
Deo sum' over 'Sum quia sum'.9 For the conclusion to the 'Scholium' he quotes from 
the Bible and says:
7 Coleridge's annotation to The Friend clarifies this point. He writes, '<that the 
object & subject are one—> that the Reason is Being, the Supreme Reason, the 
Supreme Being—and that the antithesis of Truth and Being is but the result of the 
polarizing property of all finite mind, for which Unity is manifested only by 
correspondent opposites.—' Friend, I, p. 515. Thus 'Truth' and 'Being' are separated 
yet also reconciled by the polar logic. But the problem of the 'finite mind' remains. 
And as to whether the polar logic reconciles the 'finite mind' with the infinite mind, 
that it, whether the polar logic works vertically as well as horizontally, he remains 
quiet here. For his resolution of this problem and formation of the Pentad, see 
below.
8 BL, I, p. 282.
9 CN, III, 4265.
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we have, by anticipation the distinction between the conditional finite I (which as 
known in distinct consciousness by occasion of Experience, (= e/juietp[i]a) is 
called by Kant’s Followers, the empirical I) and the absolute I AM—& likewise 
the dependence or rather the Inherence of the former in the Latter:—in whom "we 
live and move and have our Being."10
However, 'reflection1, after Kant, is no longer between God and man but between 
'homo noumenon1 and 'homo phenomenon1, that is, self-reflection. After Kant man 
has to say 'I am that I am' in exclusively human terms. And, as seen above, Coleridge 
fully accepts this argument. He accepts that human self-manifestation produces its 
own, exclusively human, sphere, in which there remains no trace of divine self­
manifestation. There is nothing in common between the two subjects except for the 
supposedly shared principle of self-manifestation. This virtually means that man 
never knows if he lives and moves and has his being 'in God'.
The principle of self-manifestation is 'I am that I am1. While putting aside full- 
scale discussion as to how this principle can be both divine and human, Coleridge 
gives some detailed sketches of what he thinks of it. First of all, the first 'I am1 is 
not a mere subject but the primary identity of subject and object. He writes in 
Thesis IV, 'It is to be sought for therefore neither in Object or Subject, taken 
separately, and consequently, as there is no other conceivable as a Third, it must be 
found in that which is neither Subject nor Object, but the identity of Both.—Such a 
Principle is the SUM or I AM.'11 From this identity comes subject and object as 
separate entities when subject begins to manifest itself in its object. That is, the 
principle is the process from primary identity which is prior to the separation of
10 Biblical quotation is from Acts 17: 28. For other occasions of this quotation, see 
Chapters 1, I and 5, I.
11 CN, III, 4265.
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subject and object towards their secondary identity after their separation. And this 
process is self-manifestation, or, the act of 'will1. He writes in Thesis VI:
as an absolute Principle it can be neither Subject nor Object, per antithesin; but 
the identity of both, or Subject-Object—. And yet to be known, this Identity must 
be dissolved—and yet it cannot be dissolved. For its Essence consists in this 
Identity. This Contradiction can be solved no otherwise, than by an Act, in 
consequence of which and from the necessity of Self-manifestation the Principle 
makes itself its own Object, in and thus becomes a Subject.—The Self­
affirmative is therefore A WILL: and Freedom therefore is the a prim ary  
Intuition, & can never be deduced.—
Here he carefully avoids such a question as to whether this 'Will' or 'Freedom' is 
divine or human. That is to say, he believes, or at least pretends to believe, that his 
discussion here is an epistemological one. But Thesis VII clearly shows that he 
consciously draws a parallel between the genesis and the epigenesis. He writes:
Thus then A Will only can be Self-Conscious, and Self-consciousness is the 
primary Act of a Will in and in order to Self-manifestation—the original and 
perpetual Epiphany. All Modes of Knowledge are -pro Parts of the Process, by 
which the Will becoming an Object for itself becomes the SUBJECT, and in this 
creation of the material of Thought & Intelligence is self-revealed as 
Intelligence-
One may ask whether 'the original and perpetual Epiphany' is divine. But he is here 
arguing for the self-manifestation of 'a Will', that is, of 'a man'. Later, he 
paraphrases subject and object as 'Thesis' and 'Antithesis', and names the primary 
identity of subject and object 'Prothesis' and the secondary identity or indifference
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'Synthesis'. His later thinking is dominated by these terms. Out of these terms he 
eventually forms the 'Pentad'. And through the formation of the Pentad he gradually 
picks up the problem he suspends at this moment—the problem arising from the 
question about the precedence concerning the two self-manifestations.12
Coleridge's Pentad has both scientific and humanistic origins. Scientifically, it 
is derived from the polar logic of electricity and magnetism. He subsequently
12 Coleridge makes possibly the clearest exposition of what he means by Prothesis 
in a Notebook entry of April 1819. There he writes, 'Now to manifest itself is to 
produce itself, & to produce is to manifest, as is implied in the very terms. Absolute 
oneness in the manifestation may be known, indeed, or inferred, as Oneness; but 
cannot appear except in and by the many, or not-one, as the condition of the Distinct 
... Since then the One Monad or Indistinction can be made manifest only by the Many 
( the Dyad we will suppose;) and as each is distinct in relation to that from which it 
is distinguished; it follows, that all manifestation is by Opposites, each opposed to 
the other as Thesis and Antithesis, and both (as both) opposed to the Prothesis or 
that which is thus manifested, as the distinct Multeity to absolute Identity. Both I 
say as both: for neither as either is opponible to Identity, inasmuch as they exist, 
eaeh severally, in <and by> contradistingwsbablection to each other. Thus then: 
Unity is manifested by Opposites. But it is equally true, that all true Opposites tend 
to Unity. For the further Fleeing each from the other is here precluded by the 
assumption of the Line as finite, i.e. the assumption of a punctum indifferentiae 
midway between the extreme points, and the distance of each from the mid point is 
the exponent or measure of the equal attractive power of the mid point over each 
extreme in controlling their centrifugal, power of-the latter, or the measure of the 
finite degree of the its own projective power'. CN, IV, 4513. It should be noticed 
here that his understanding of 'transcendence' radically changes by integrating 
Prothesis into the argument. It is no longer the transcendence of subject from its 
object but the transcendence of Prothesis from both Thesis (subject) and Antithesis 
(object). 'Polar logic' obviously provides him with a hint for formulating this 
argument. In Thesis VIII he writes of electricity and magnetism, 'an <indestructible> 
Power [is] displaying itself by two opposite and counteracting Forces, + and -, the 
one tending to objectivize itself, in order to know itself—the other to remain itself'. 
CN, III, 4265. In May 1819, drawing on the polar logic, he makes essentially the 
same explanation. 'These twin Opposites I call the Poles; and the process itself, in 
which THE ONE reveals its Being in two opposite yet correlative Modes of Existence, I 
designate the term, Polarity, or Polarizing. The ©ft Poles themselves are entitled, 
either plus (+) & minus (-); or positive and negative; or Thesis and Antithesis (in 
English, Position and Counterposition) and the Antecedent One, which is the sole 
reality of Both, and in both is presupposed, I call the Prothesis (in English, the 
Pre- or Ante-position) or the Identity; or the Radical.' CN, IV, 4538. See also 
Chapter 5, I note. In the eleventh Philosophical Lecture he suggests that the self­
manifestation which originates in Prothesis is irreversible. He says, 'the polar 
principle, (that is that in order to manifest itself every power must appear in two 
opposites, but these two opposites having a ground of identity were constantly 
striving to reunite, but not being permitted to pass back to their original state, 
which would amount to annihilation, they pressed forward and the two formed a third 
something)'. Phil Lects, p. 323. See also his marginal note to Bohme's Aurora. CM, 
I, pp. 562-3.
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explores its possible applications in chemistry, physics or physiology. 
Humanistically, he believes it to be the last form of his philosophical and theological 
speculations. He certainly believes that he can find the Pentad both in nature and in 
man, that the Pentad is the 'truth' both of nature and of man. Richard Baxter's brief 
statement of 'the Divine Trinity' seems to exercise a decisive influence in setting 
this grand scheme. It appears in his Reliquae Baxterianae which, with his Catholick 
Theologie Coleridge reads repeatedly and heavily annotates when he forms the Pentad. 
The passage reads: 'I had been Twenty Six Years convinced that Dichotomizing will 
not do it; but that the Divine Trinity in Unity, hath exprest it self in the whole 
Frame of Nature and Morality'.13 In this context Coleridge's Pentad is an attempt to 
find 'the Divine Trinity' both in nature and in man and finally to reconcile them by 
showing that both nature and man participate in one and same principle. What is 
probably most important for him personally is that he finds in Baxter's 
trichotomous argument a clue to settle his lifelong problem, 'reality and unreality'. 
In a margin of Baxter's Catholick Theologie, Coleridge writes, 'Trichotomy ... Instead 
of the dichotomy Real h- Unreal... Reality can have no opposite, we should say—'.14 A 
similar statement appears in his marginal note to Kant's Vermischte Schriften 
(1799). There he points out 'the false conclusion inevitable on the Logic of 
Dichotomy' which ends up in saying 'it is at once +A and -A '.15 What he finds 
difficult in 'the dichotomy' is that it cannot but postulate 'Non-entity—i.e. O' in the 
middle of 'Real -s- Unreal' or '+A and -A'. In the dichotomy the middle point is 'Non­
entity—i.e. O'. In contrast, the middle point in the trichotomy is the point not of
13 CM, I, p. 347.
14 CM, I,p. 231.
15 CM, III, p. 363. Coleridge also acknowledges Kant's contribution in developing 
the trichotomous argument. In the marginal note to Reliquae Baxterianae he writes, 
'the substitution of Trichotomy for the old & still general plan of Dichotomy in the 
Method and Disposition of Logic, which forms so prominent & substantial an 
excellence in Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, of the Judgement, &c belongs 
originally to Richard Baxter, a century before Kant'. CM, I, p. 347. It is likely that 
when he writes '+A and -A' he has also in mind Kant's 'negative quantities'. For his 
view on it, see BL, I, p. 297-9.
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cancellation but repletion and fulfilment. When he polarizes 'Real' into 'Actual' and 
'Potential' and speculates the point of their union, that is, when he realizes that the 
problem of reality and unreality can be settled by the trichotomous argument, he 
begins to say confidently, 'Reality has no opposite'.16 And, as will be seen below, his 
speculation on the middle point plays a crucial role in his formation of the Pentad. 
In 1820-1821 he makes a long Notebook entry and explores possible development of 
the trichotomy. Here he calls this middle point 'Indifference' and writes:
It differs from Identity or the co-inherence of the Thesis & Antithesis 
contemplat-mged as anterior to their manifestation as opposite—& out of which as 
their pre-existing principle they are both evolved: and from synthesis, which is 
posterior to both, and arises is formed by adding the one to the other so as to 
produce a third different from both.17
Soon he expects this middle point to reconcile the opposites in nature, the opposite in 
man, and finally nature and man. When he renames 'Indifference' as 'Mesothesis' and 
suggests that it is the point of fulfilment not only between horizontal Thesis and 
Antithesis but also between vertical Prothesis and Synthesis, he forms the complete 
Pentad.
II. The manuscript of the Logic (1823 -9 ) is one of Coleridge's major later works. 
It is an extended restatement of his theory of the secondary imagination, and, 
inevitably, heavily dependent on Kant. The basis of his argument in the Logic is the 
Kantian original apperception. He explains it as follows:
16 CN, IV, 4784, and CM, I, p. 231.
17 CN, IV, 4784.
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This primary mental act, which we have called the synthetic unity or the unity of 
apperception, is presupposed in, and in order to, all consciousness. It is its 
condition ( Conditio sine qua non) or that which constitutes the possibility of 
consciousness a priori, or, if we borrow our metaphor from space instead of 
time, ab intra. Both metaphors mean one and the same, viz. an act or product of 
the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external 
objects.18
While Kant invariably says 'a priori1, Coleridge more often says fab intra1. But as 
Coleridge says here, they 'mean one and the same1, that is, the priority and 
independence of the human mind as subject over its object, nature. It involves the 
overturn, to use the temporal metaphor, of the precedence of the genesis over the 
epigenesis, or, to use the spatial metaphor, the opening of the new internal sphere 
within the human mind which lies outside the sphere of the genesis. This 'internal 
sphere' is what Coleridge understands of Kant's phenomenal space. Coleridge sees 
that it is the sphere within which the human mind claims its autonomy. He argues 
that an object of the senses which 'exists out of us or without us would, if examined 
exclusively on speculative grounds, derive its evidence from a truth formed within 
us, and we may appropriately say with us.'19
The result of this precedential overturn, or the spatial inside-out is that the 
human mind becomes active in its own sphere. By postulating in the beginning 
Kant's original apperception and not his primary imagination, Coleridge virtually 
precludes the original passivity of the human mind.20 That is, he 'cuts' what he once
18 Logic, p. 76.
19 Logic, pp. 65-6.
20 'The primary mental act' in the Logic is not the same as 'the primary 
imagination' in Biographia Literaria in the sense that the former is not contrasted 
with something which is prior to itself. Coleridge makes an argument in the Logic 
which seems similar to the one of the primary and secondary imaginations in 
Biographia Literaria. But it is different in presupposing 'nothing' prior to it. He 
writes in the Logic, 'Without the primary act or unity of apperception we could have
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called the ’Kantian knot1 which is made of passivity and activity of the human 
mind.21 He declares in the Logic, 'It is a Gordian knot which it is incomparably 
more to our interest to cut than untie, even if the latter were as easy as it is in fact 
impossible.’22 By cutting the knot, he 'emancipates' human mind from its passivity. 
In another place he writes, 'To emancipate the mind from the despotism of the eye is 
the first step towards its emancipation from the influences and intrusions of the 
senses, sensations, and passions generally.'23 By 'this power of abstraction' the 
human mind distances, or, 'emancipates' itself from nature. It is a little surprising 
to see him triumphantly declaring the end of the original passivity of the human 
mind. In his usual expression, this 'abstraction' is not emancipation but the Fall. 
But here he is so willing to follow Kant that he seems to be able to suspend his 
inherent theological argument. Whether emancipation or the Fall, this marks the 
end of the primary imagination and the beginning of the secondary imagination, that 
is, the beginning of self-reflection. He writes:
if the passive be wholly separated, what can remain but acts and the immediate 
results of the same in the subject or agent himself; for this is the very principle 
from which we commence, that we confine ourselves to the mind, and that the 
mind is distinguished from other things as a subject that is its own object, an 
eye, as it were, that is its own mirror, beholding and self-beheld.24
nothing to be conscious of. Without the repetition or representation of this act in the 
understanding [that] completes the consciousness we should be conscious of nothing. 
It will appear, however, on a moment's self-examination that a mere repetition of 
this act, a mere representation of the product of the act, could in no respect differ 
from the former in kind, at least more than the second echo from the former'. Logic, 
p. 78.
21 See Chapters 4, II and 6.
22 Logic, p. 235.
23 Logic, p. 243.
24 Logic, p. 75-6.
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Describing the human mind's 'emancipation' from nature, he here appropriates a 
particularly Coleridgean illustration. This 'mirror' is the mirror which reflects 
itself and not the natural landscape which surrounds it.25 In restating Kant's 
argument about the application of categories, Coleridge says that the human mind is 
not 'a small concave mirror'.
Let it n o t ... be thought that by referring the synthetic function to the sense ... I 
mean the unity ... to be a mere simultaneity of passive impressions without 
distinguishable interspaces, as for instance a landscape [in] a small concave 
mirror or the image of a lake on the retina of the eye, which is an act of agents 
external to the mind, if it be an act at all. No! I speak of a function which, as I 
have before explained, supposes a power of conferring unity in the mind itself, 
which power in the very introduction of the work we have learnt to recognise as 
mental forms or primary moulds.2^
In another place, however, he speaks of 'the faith in the existence of the external 
world' and says that the external world is 'something self-subsistent and present to 
us as other from ourselves and no less real'.27 And he even illustrates this 'faith' by 
referring to 'the Eolian Harp'. He writes:
the matter or material from  which we have withdrawn our attention are 
properly and wholly objective—i.e. that they have a subsistence independent of 
the mind which contemplates them. They may for aught that the common logic
25 See Chapter 1, III.
26 Logic, p. 73.
27 Logic, p. 133.
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can affirm or deny consist of a wonderful and seemingly indecomponible union of
the mind and an external agency, as the tune of the breeze and the Eolian harp.28
His metaphysical speculation of this sort is as old as 'The Eolian Harp' (1795). But 
once he 'withdraws his attention' from nature, such faith becomes 'only negative'.29 
'The external world' becomes merely 'that which the mind can discover of what is not 
contained in its own consciousness by a light of its own'. That is to say, 'the 
external, the immediately sensuous' becomes a uncreated, confused manifold, in 
other word, chaos. He carefully avoids implying that the active human mind 
uncreates the divine creation. But the following explanation virtually amounts to 
saying it. He continues, 'the supposed impressions from external agents are 
comprised under the common term of "the many", "the manifold", or "multeity", or 
"the indistinguishable" (to which we may add the phrases adopted by symbolical 
writers or mystics, viz. "chaos", "the water", etc, e tc [)].'30 These 'symbolic 
writers' certainly include Coleridge himself, who consciously draws the contrast 
between the divine genesis and the human epigenesis both from the chaos, or, the 
confused manifold.
In the Logic Prothesis is called 'the higher ground of philosophy, seen from 
which mind and nature, subject and object, are one (that is, anterior to that 
evolution of the Prothesis in which mind and nature first appear as the thesis and 
antithesis)'.31 And since 'Logic' is the principle of the human self-manifestation by 
language, the Prothesis here is called 'the verb substantive ("am", sum, ei^i)'. 
Relying on his speculation on grammar and paraphrasing mind and nature as act and 
being, he draws a chart of the transition from Prothesis to Synthesis.
28 Logic, p. 142.
29 Logic, p. 77.
30 Logic, p. 77.
31 Logic, p. 265.
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the verb substantive ("am", sum, ei^i) expresses the identity or coincidence the 
being and act. It is the act of being. All other words therefore may be considered 
as tending from this point, or more truly from the mid-point of the line, the 
punctum indifferentiae respecting the punctum identitatis, even as the whole line 
represents the same point as produced or polarized.
A
CB a
In this simple diagram A (= the point of identity) is supposed to generate by 
perpetual eradiation the line BC, the pole B representing being in its greatest 
predominance, and the pole C action in like manner: while the point a, expressing 
the indifference of being and action, of substantive and verb, is the more especial 
representative or analogon of the point A, as a point. A, the point of identity, is 
verb and substantive in one and as one; a, the point of indifference, is either verb 
or substantive, or even both at the same time, but not in the same relation. Such 
in grammar is the infinitive.32
The point 'A' is Prothesis and the point 'a' is Synthesis. This diagram, however, is 
not yet the Pentad. The diagram is still that of the onefold self-manifestation, that 
is, it is exclusively 'human'.
'Logic' or human self-manifestation is the Coleridgean epigenesis. It is not 
surprising if he draws a parallel between the divine and human self-manifestations 
by using exactly the same term to describe them. In fact, the diagram in the Logic is 
the restatement of what he calls 'the Pythagorean Tetractys— i.e. the eternal Fountain
32 Logic, p. 16-7. For a similar speculation, see CN, IV, 4523.
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or Source of Nature'.33 That is, his epigenesis is a recapitulation of the genesis, 
both interpreted in a particularly Coleridgean way. In 1818 he makes several 
attempts in the Notebooks to interpret the genesis as the divine self-manifestation 
from the Prothesis. In one of them he explains the Prothesis as 'Unitrine ... Or the 
Subject-Object in absolute Identity neither Subject or Object, or both in 
Combination, but the Prothesis or Unground of both = T o  vjiepavoiov, O jra r^ p . '34 He 
even re-interprets the verses of Genesis I with these terms. He writes in August 
1818:
2nd V. A state of Indistinction, or Fluidity— i.e. intelligible transcendental 
Fluidity...the parts of which ... are absolutely w  indistingwsbact and co- 
inherent, so that neither is there an Outness nor an In-ness—neither a whole nor 
Parts, but a Mere Allness—all without an each. This Prothesis in Inwardness and 
Outwardness, which therefore is neither because the (N.b. not Synthesis, but) 
Prothesis or potential Identity of both ... And the Spirit of God moved on the faces 
of the Waters, there is an actual tho1 not a phaenomenic Trans or Super— 
therefore a relation ejusdem generis of all the Surfaces to the common 
Superincumbent or Super-incubant, and consequently an intelligible relation to 
each other: which in V. 3 becomes real by the resolution of the Prothesis into the 
Thesis and Antithesis.35
It should be noted here that he is at pains to preclude his own anxiety from this 
interpretation of Genesis. He makes clear that there is no 'Outness nor an In-ness', 
no 'phaenomenic Trans or Super' in the original genesis. But his precaution, 
probably contrary to his intention, suggests that he already has such anxiety in
33 CM, I, p. 3 4 8 .
34 CN, III, 4 4 2 7 .
35 CN, III, 4 4 1 8 .
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himself. In fact, he confesses his phenomenological anxiety right in the middle of the 
interpretation. He writes:
For tho' the Thesis as necessarily supposes the Antithesis, as the Anti-thesis the 
Thesis, and both must begin to be as Thesis and Anti-thesis at in one and the same 
indivisible instant, yet in the order of our Thought or rather mode of 
representing our Thought, there must be a priority assumed even while the 
contrary is affirmed—/but which shall be assumed, as the Thesis, is determined 
best by choosing that which is most of the Nature of a Noumenon, the Antithesis 
being essentially a Phaenomenon or the power of Manifestation.36
He makes the point clearer in another notebook entry from the same time. Here he 
expresses his epistemological anxiety and the problem of self-reflection which 
follows such anxiety by alluding to 'Ixion's wheel1. He writes in August-September 
1818:
behold in these two Theses and Antitheses the History of Nature for ever 
struggling to reproduce the-Pf ineffable Prothesis, and for ever Ixionlike baffled 
by the its cloud-like Counterfeit, the Synthesis—or producing and therefore 
self-reduplicating Product—or rather Mock-Product— Ptaeno-product—for our 
word mock answers rather to pseudo—37
Therefore, when he draws the diagram of 'Unitrine1, he quietly integrates the human 
dimension into it. The diagram depicts the divine self-manifestation from Prothesis 
towards Synthesis. And after drawing the diagram he adds, 'Hence in all things the 
Synthesis -©f a© images what in God only absolutely is, the Prothesis manifested—it
36 Ibid.
37 CN, III, 4432.
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is a return to the Prothesis, or re-affirmation. Thus the Monas, the Dyas, the 
Trias, and the Tetractys are one/'. Although he says 'Synthesis = Father1 in the 
diagram, the sort of reciprocity he describes here between Prothesis and Synthesis 
is that between God and man. When he says, 'the Synthesis images what in God only 
absolutely is', he may well replace this 'Synthesis' with the human mind.38
Coleridge's first attempt to formulate a proper Pentad, that is, a Pentad which, 
unlike Tetrad which tends to be either divine or human, integrates both the divine 
and human dimensions, appears in his marginal note to Hegel's Wissenschaft der 
Logik (1812, 1813, 1816). Criticizing Hegel for omitting Prothesis in the 
beginning, Coleridge writes down the following diagram:
Prothesis 
= The









38 CN, III, 4427. See also Coleridge's marginal note to Bohme's Aurora. CM, I, pp.
562-3. In his attempt of reinterpreting Genesis, he receives probably the most 
important influence from Bohme, especially from Aurora. Yet while making 
extensive and minute marginal note to the work, he maintains that his own basic 
problem is unsolved even here. The problem is 'the Chasm infinitely infinite 
between Deity and the Creature[s]\ CM, I, pp. 573-4. For his own version of 
reinterpretation not only of the creation but also of salvation, see CM, I, pp. 574-5.







Having detailed epistemology and phenomenology in between, here are arranged the 
divine and human self-manifestations facing each other on the vertical line and thus 
revealing his intention of introducing a theological argument.
But when the human mind abstracts itself from this correspondence and grants 
itself the status of Prothesis, it begins to repeat the genesis or produce the 
epigenesis within itself. The fact that Coleridge closely follows Kant's argument 
allows us to suspect that Coleridge's term 'Synthesis' comes from Kant's 'synthetic a 
priori judgment'. Kant defines 'synthetic a priori judgment' in the Prolegomena as 
that which 'enlarges my knowledge in that it adds something to my concept' 
[vergrossert also meine Erkenntniss, indem er zu meinem Begriffe etwas 
hinzuthut].40 The question concerning the belonging of this 'added something' is at 
the centre of Coleridge's whole theological investigation. In fact, by contrasting the 
Kantian Synthesis with Prothesis, and the Kantian epigenesis with the genesis, 
Coleridge already brings the question into the theological arena. He suggests that the 
genesis is inevitably followed by the epigenesis which is outside yet also inside the 
original genesis, which is prior yet also posterior to the original genesis. His point 
is that this paradox comes from the duality of Prothesis. In August-September 
1818, he writes in a Notebook, 'Now here the 01 is the Prothesis, i.e. id quod 
semper supponit 'O Oeog intra se; quum apud jravrag rovg Kncnovg  est id quod 
supponitur sub nosmet ipsos'.41 In the Logic he repeats the same argument and says:
The principle itself, I say, which is here the absolute "I am", will be found to 
involve a universal antecedency and consequently to preclude both all precedency 
and all parity of any other in its very conception, and what is here affirmed
40 Kant, Werke, IV ,  p. 14, Lucas, op. cit., pp. 16-7.
41 CN, III, 4436. 'Id quod ... that which God always lays down within himself, 
whereas among all his creatures it is that which is laid down beneath us ourselves.
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metaphysically of the absolute "I am", is logically and scientially affirmable of 
consciousness generally.42
But this argument requires a theological mediation between 'the absolute "I am'" and 
the not-absolute "I am"s. In a marginal note to Bohme's Aurora he writes of 'the 
infinite disparateness' between 'Mind' and 'Minds'.
the infinite disparateness of an eternal and creative Mind, whose ideas are 
anterior to their Objects, from Minds whose Images and Thoughts are posterior 
to the Things, and produced or conditioned by their Objects! The latter—Effects, 
Shadows of Shadows, pene Nihilum a non vere Ente! The former super-essential 
Causes ... wv evxcd nEpiaaaj, in whose excess and overflow of Actually all created 
Things have their Reality.43
Coleridge sees this 'infinite disparateness' between Mind and Minds as the result of 
the Fall. When the separation between God and man takes places, it results in the 
problem of the two separate, irreconcilable self-manifestations, that is, the 
problem of 'these two Theses and Antitheses'. Once this happens, it becomes 
insoluble. Even when he grants priority to the human 'Mock-Product', or allows the 
status of Prothesis to the human mind by the theory of the secondary imagination, 
the inherent paradoxicality does not decrease. On the contrary, it increases and 
intensifies. In a marginal note to Eschenmayer's Psychologie (1817) he discusses 
'transformation' of 'the archetypal soul' into 'a copy-soul'. He writes, 'Was the 
transformation good or evil? If good, then the Copy-Soul must be better than the 
original Prototype Soul: & we have the Schellingian Atheism. If evil, how is the
42 Logic, p. 86-7.
43 CM, I, p. 565. 'Pene Nihilum a non vere Ente': Almost Nothing, from what does 
not really Exist; ow ev xoo nEpiacro): In the superabundance of which.
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adulteration of a perfect free Essence by a blind and heterogeneous Inferior -P 
Conceivable?'44 Thus he restates the epistemological problem in theological terms 
and shifts it onto the more intricate ground.
III. The basic argument of Aids to Reflection (1825) is in direct continuity with 
that of the philosophical chapters in Biographia Literaria. That is, Aids to Reflection 
also deals with the problem of freedom, or in Coleridge's case, the problem of evil, 
arising from the active human mind. The simplest motto in Aids to Reflection is 'He 
only thinks who reflects.'45 And Coleridge adds a long note to this motto and explains 
the 'Distinction between Thought and Attention'. He writes, 'In ATTENTION, we keep 
the mind passive: In THOUGHT, we rouse it into activity. In the former, we submit to 
an impression—we keep the mind steady in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, 
we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or duplicate of his 
work.' If 'the artist' here is the divine artist, he has in mind the problem of the two 
creators. Even if it is the human artist, he cannot avoid the same problem since the 
artist 'imitates' the divine artist. And he also deals with his old problem of passivity 
and activity, or, between passive, receptive 'ATTENTION' and active, productive 
'THOUGHT'.
As well as the argument from Biographia Literaria, Aids to Reflection repeats 
also Coleridge's epistemological and phenomenological speculations from various 
stages of his life. The first of such speculations is his acknowledgment that man falls 
into his own internal darkness. He writes a poem about it in a Notebook, for which 
Kathleen Coburn suggests the date September-October 1796.
0  man, thou half-dead Angel—
a dusky light—a purple flash
44 CM, II, p. 553-4.




in that eternal and & delirious misery— 
wrathfires—
inward desolations— 
an horror of great darkness
great things that on the ocean 
counterfeit infinity—46
In Aids to Reflection he describes those who do not see with 'the eye of Reason' as 
follows:
one that shuts the eye hard, and with violence curls the eyelid, forces a 
phantastic fire from the crystalline humor, and espies a light that never shines, 
and sees thousands of little fires that never burn; so is he that blinds the eye of 
Reason, and pretends to see by an eye of Faith. He makes little images of Notions, 
and some atoms dance before him, but sees like a man in his sleep.47
However, if he holds to a thorough phenomenological argument, every man is 'in his 
sleep'. To see is to dream, be it bright or dark. The following statement looks back 
to his experience of nightmare and his desperate investigation into it in the days in 
Malta. He writes, 'Things take the signature of Thought. The shapes of the recent 
dream become a mould for the objects in the distance; and these again give an 
outwardness and a sensation of reality to the Shapings of the Dream.'48 Therefore,
46 CN, I, 273.
47 AR, p. 341.
48 AR, p. 36.
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Aids to Reflection is aid to 'the Delightful Dream', or, 'Dream of Truth'.49 The 
acknowledgment of the Fall and the yearning for the recovery, or ascent, makes the 
crucial difference between upward 'Delightful Dream' and downward nightmare. 
Referring to his early day's observation on 'the images of the weeds' on the surface of 
water,50 he writes:
All things strive to ascend, and ascend in their striving. And shall man alone 
stoop? Shall his pursuits and desires, the reflections of his inwards life, be like 
the reflected Images of a Tree on the edge of a Pool, that grows downward, and 
seeks a mock heaven in the unstable element beneath it, in neighbourhood with 
the slim water-weeds and oozy bottom-grass that are yet better than itself and 
more noble, in as far as Substances that appear as Shadows are preferable to 
Shadows mistaken for Substance!51
The phenomenological anxiety behind this statement leads him to the argument for 
the need of theological attestation. He raises a question in a Notebook exactly when he 
interprets Genesis as the divine self-manifestation from Prothesis. He writes in 
August-September 1818, 'Either our spiritual Instincts have their correspondent
49 AR, p. 394.
50 CN, II, 2557. The notebook entry is from his days in Malta. Coleridge writes, '0  
the beautiful Fountain or natural Well at Upper Stowey— ... The images of the weeds 
which hung down from its sides, appeared as plants growing up, straight and 
upright, among the water weeds that really grew from the Bottom/& so vivid was the 
Image, that for some moments & not till after I had disturbed the water, did I 
perceive that they their roots were not neighbours, & they side-by-side 
companions. So—even then I said—so are the happy man's Thoughts and Things— (in 
the language of the modern philosophers, Ideas and Impressions.)' In the days of the 
Pantisocracy scheme, he sought to be such a 'happy man' and 'to make ideas & 
realities stand side by side'. CL, II, p. 1000. Quoted in full and discussed in Chapter 
1, IV. But to the above Notebook entry he later adds, 'Who that thus lives with a 
continually divided Being can remain healthy! <... Pain is easily subdued compared 
with continual uncomfortableness—and the sense of stifled Power! ... 0  it is horrid!— 
Die, my Soul, die!—Suicide—rather than this, the worst state of Degradation! It is 
less a suicide! S.T.C.>'
51 AR, p. 118.
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Objects as well as the animal Instinct, or it is the in the Holiesty Temple Place of 
thetf noblest Temple, the Heart of Man, that Nature tells her first Lie. Ideas as 
anticipations are intellectual Instincts.'52 And he writes in Aids to Reflection, 'All 
other prophecies of Nature have their exact fulfilment—in every other "ingrafted 
word" of Promise Nature is found true to her Word, and is it in her noblest 
Creature, that she tells her first Lie?'53 The fact that he repeats the same question 
two more times in the Notebook shows how anxious he is forsome form of theological 
attestation.54 But this attestation does not bring him any conclusion. In that sense it 
always remains sustained attestation, and he keeps raising the same question again 
and again.
In order to occasion attestation, Coleridge has to have some form of metaphysical 
argument, or rather expectation, that the epigenesis is posterior to the genesis, and 
that the latter is somehow related to the former. At this point he turns to the theory 
of Leibnizian pre-established harmony. It is in 1809 that he argues that the theory 
is not 'Hypothesis' but 'Hypopoeesis'.55 As a post-Kantian, he sees that the theory is 
invalidated as a propositional theory. Yet he tries to argue that it is valid as poetry. 
It should be remembered here that he calls Leibniz 'a visionary'.56 Since then, he 
makes several attempts to re-introduce a poeticised Leibnizian theory to meet his 
need of metaphysics.
52 CN, ill, 4438.
53 AR, p. 353.
54 See CN, III, 4377, and CN, IV ,  4692.
55 CN, III, 3587. Quoted and discussed in Chapter 5, II. In April 1819 Coleridge 
criticizes 'Atomism' and writes, 'Atoms.—If understood and employed as xyz in 
Algebra, and for the purpose of scientific Calculus, as in elemental Chemistry, I see 
no objection to the assumption Fiction not overweighed by its technical utility. But 
if they are asserted as real and existent, the Suffiction (for it would be too 
complimentary to call it a Supposition)'. CN, IV ,  4518. In July 1822 he complains 
about 'Pseudo-platonists' and writes, 'their Explanations are all not so much 
suppositions or hypotheses, as Suffictions or hypopoieses'. CN, IV ,  4910. For 
Coleridge's own Hypopoeesis, see below.
56 Phil Lects, p. 380. Quoted below.
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It is rather ironical that Leibniz's own addition, 'proeter ipsum intellectum' 
[except the mind itself] to the Aristotelian-Lockean principle, 'nihil in intellectu 
quod non prius in sensu' [There is nothing in the mind that was not before in the 
senses]57 should mark a crucial step towards Kant's phenomenology and eventually 
invalidate what Leibniz believes in the form of pre-established harmony. Kant 
develops to the full extent the slight suggestion of the autonomy of the human mind in 
Leibniz's addition and initiates his phenomenology by establishing a thorough 
dualism between being and thinking. Kant summarizes the Leibnizian pre- 
established harmony in Kritik der reinen Vernunft towards the end of the section on 
the original apperception:
Wollte jemand zwischen den zwei genannten einzigen Wegen noch einen Mittelweg 
vorschlagen, namlich, daft sie [die Kategorien] weder sel b s tg e d a c h te  erste 
Prinzipien a priori unserer Erkenntnis, noch auch aus der Erfahrung geschopft, 
sondern subjektive, uns mit unserer Existenz zugleich eingepflanzte Anlagen 
zum Denken waren, die von unserm Urheber so eingerichtet worden, daft ihr 
Gebrauch mit den Gesetzen der Natur, an welchen die Erfahrung fortlauft, genau 
stimmte (eine Art von P ra fo r m a t io n s s y s te m  der reinen Vernunft)
[A middle course may be proposed between the two above mentioned, namely, that 
the categories are neither self-thought first principles a priori of our knowledge 
nor derived from experience, but subjective dispositions of thought, implanted 
in us from the first moment of our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that 
their employment is in complete harmony with the laws of nature in accordance 
with which experience proceeds—a kind of preformation-system  of pure 
reason.]58
57 BL, I, p. 141 and note.
58 Kant, ibid., and Smith, ibid., B 167.
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Then he dismisses this argument on the ground that it does not procure the a priori 
certainty of categories. That is, the argument does not lead to the categorical 
imperative. Coleridge agrees with Kant that the pre-established harmony 
understood as a propositional theory nullifies ethics. But the reason Coleridge 
dismisses it is graver than that of Kant. Coleridge's concern is not with freedom 
itself but with its inevitable result, the problem of evil. To use his terms, the 
theory is 'necessitarianism' or 'pantheism' which cannot properly deal with the 
problem of evil. Around 1809 he writes a marginal note to a German translation of 
Leibniz's Essais de Theodicee:
the Falsum Magnum, on w[hi]ch all the Theodices have struck: & with them the 
first Principle of morality. I mean the subordination of moral to physical Evill: 
in consequence of which the latter in reality constitutes the true evil of the 
former—now as the latter is evidently avoidable by omnipotence ... the former 
becomes unintelligible—.59
He never stops arguing against this view. To hold such a view, he argues in 
Biographia Literaria, is to 'assume in its full extent the position, nihil in intellectu 
quod non prius in sensu, without Leibnitz's qualifying proeter ipsum intellectum, 
and in the same sense, in which it was understood by Hartley and Condilliac'.^O That 
is, to hold to necessitarianism is to deny freedom and drop ethics altogether. In Aids 
to Reflection he criticizes those who hold 'the doctrine ... which represents a Will 
absolutely passive' and writes:
they supported the Necessitarian Scheme, and made the relation of Cause and 
Effect the Law of the universe, subjecting to its mechanism the moral World no
59 CM, III, p. 505.
60 BL, I, p. 141.
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less than the material or physical. It follows, that all is Nature ... With such a 
system not the Wit of Man nor all the Theodices ever framed by human ingenuity 
before and since the attempt of the celebrated Leibnitz, can reconcile the Sense of 
Responsibility, nor the fact of the difference in kind between REGRET AND 
REMORSE.61
In December 1823, he repeats the same criticism of the same people in a Notebook, 
calling them 'Leibnitzian'.62
Coleridge writes his dismissive comment on Leibniz's theory in Biographia 
Literaria on this line of argument. He writes, 'Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre- 
established harmony, which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza, who had himself 
taken the hint from Des Cartes's animal machines, was in its common interpretation 
too strange to survive the inventor—too repugnant to our common sense'.63 But he 
adds a provocative comment on 'our common sense', saying that it 'is not indeed 
entitled to a judicial voice in the courts of scientific philosophy; but whose whispers 
still exert a strong secret influence.' He repeats the same dismissive comment on 
'Leibniz's doctrine' in the twelfth Philosophical Lecture.64 But in the thirteenth
61 AR, p. 159. In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge repeatedly points out that 'the Will' 
is distinct from nature. Nature here is understood as material, mechanical, 
unspiritual nature, that is, nature of necessitarianism. He writes for example, 'The 
first step to a rational Faith is the clear understanding of the sense attached to the 
word, Spirit, as that which is not included in Nature. The NEXT step is the 
conviction, that if there be aught spiritual actually existing, the Will must be the 
Spiritual part of our Humanity.' p., 74 note. Then he goes on to argue that by 'the 
Wiir man becomes distinct from nature. He writes, 'the Will, as the Supernatural 
in Man and the Principle of our Personality—of that, I mean, by which we are 
responsible Agents; Persons, and not merely living Things.' pp. 77-8. But all these 
arguments are not for praising man's freedom but for pronouncing his original sin. 
He writes, 'I profess a deep conviction that Man was and is a fallen Creature, not by 
accidents of bodily constitution, or any other cause, which human Wisdom in a 
course of ages might be supposed capable of removing; but diseased in his Will, in 
that Will which is the true and only strict synonime of the word, I, or the intelligent 
Self.' p. 139-40.
62 See CN, IV, 5077
63 BL, I, pp. 130-1.
64 Phil Lects, p. 350.
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lecture, he says, 'Leibniz supposed [a plenum, a pre-established harmony, but he 
was a visionary, a fantastic fellow and was treated with bitterness and contempt by 
Newton's understrappers]'.65 That is, he thinks that Leibniz is 'a visionary' whom 
'our common sense' is incapable of proper appreciation. As shall be seen below, this 
means that if the Leibnizian theory concerns not nature as an 'animal machine' but 
two natures as divine and human self-manifestations, he would keep it. In a 
marginal note, probably from the time when he is preparing for Biographia 
Literaria, to Maass Versuch iiber die Einbildungskraft, he writes:
In order to render the creative activity of the Imagination at all conceivable, we 
must necessarily have recourse to the Harmonia praestabilita of Spinoza and 
Leibnitz, in which case the automatism of the Imagination and Judgement would 
be Perception in the same sense, as a <self-conscious> Watch as would be a 
Percipient of Time, and inclusively of the apparent motion of the Sun and 
Stars.66
Then he continues and declares, 'I shall still prefer it [Leibnizian theory]: & not 
doubt, that the Pencil of Rays forms pictures on the Retina ft because I cannot 
comprehend how this Picture can excite a mental Fac-simile.' Contrary to Kant's 
argument, Coleridge here argues that the secondary imagination presupposes the 
external forming power, in his words, 'Form' as 'an external active power'.67 That 
is to say, the epigenesis presupposes the genesis. In 'Essays on the Principles of 
Method' (1818), he asks the question: 'what is the ground of the coincidence between
65 Phil Lects, p. 380.
66 CM, III, p. 790. The last sentence shows that this argument is in direct 
continuity with the one for the 'coincidence' between God and man in 'Confessio Fidei'. 
There Coleridge writes, 'all holy Will is coincident with the Will of God, and 
therefore secure in its ultimate Consequences by his Omnipotence—having, if such 
similitude be not unlawful, a similar relation to the goodness of the Almighty, as a 
perfect Timepiece would have to the Sun. CN, III, 4005. See also Chapter 5, III.
67 CM, III, p. 790.
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reason and experience? Or between the laws of matter and the ideas of the pure 
intellect?1 Then, by introducing the 'personal' dimension, he argues that to ask this 
question is to 'seek the ground of this agreement in a supersensual essence, which 
being at once the ideal of the reason and the cause of the material world, is the pre- 
establisher of the harmony in and between both.'68 About the same time, he writes 
in a marginal note to Eschenmayer, 'Precious Logic 'pon 'onor'!—A beautiful View, or 
Scheme of Leibs Pre-est. Harmony indeed!'69 In April 1819 he contemplates the 
possibility of 'reconciling Leibnitz with Kant' within the framework of 
phenomenology.70
Coleridge's next move is to add to this epistemological theory the ethical and 
potentially theological dimension. Also in April 1819, he writes, 'Leibnitz brought 
forth two imposing Ideas: one, that all the varieties of existing Things consisted in 
the More or the Less, i.e. in different degrees or quantities of the same X: the other 
that the vis representativa (Vorstellungskraft) was this X or one prime fundamental 
Power (Grundkraft).'71 Then he immediately expresses his dissatisfaction with 
this. He continues:
The latter is obviously either false, if it exclude the Will, and vis essendi: or 
nugatory and an illogical generalization if it subsume them ... To the former it 
has been objected, that such an Analysis would require an infinite Mind, Yes!
68 Friend, I, p. 463. Coleridge continues and presents 'the Method in the FINE ARTS' 
as lying between the ideal and material worlds. He writes, 'Between the two lies the 
Method in the FINE ARTS, which belongs indeed to this second or external relation, 
because the effect and position of the parts is always more less influenced by the 
knowledge and experience of their previous qualities; but which nevertheless 
constitute a link connecting the second form of relation which the first. For in all, 
that truly merits the name of Poetry in its most comprehensive sense, there is a 
necessary predominace of the Ideas (i.e. of that which originates in the artist 
himself)'. Friend, I, p. 464.
69 CM, II, p. 556.
70 CN, IV, 4545.
71 CN, IV, 4515.
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(Leibnitz might justly reply) to compleat it. But it is proposed as an Idea, for 
regulation and guidance—as the ultimate Insight, at which we are to aim; the 
unattainable Ideal, by which we are to measure our approximations.
Here is a hint that although Leibnizian theory does not deal with the problem between 
'Mind and Minds', or, 'Will and Wills', Coleridge may be able to make it do so. The 
crucial problem then is the essential, 'infinite disparateness' between 'Mind and 
Minds', and between 'Will and Wills'. He raises this point in this entry as follows:
There is, however, another Objection which has not, I believe, been advanced, 
and less easily to be removed—viz. that Leibnitz's Idea contains a probable Truth 
turned topsy-turvy—proposing Quantity as the ground of Quality, <(Qualitas 
primaria)> i.e., the Phaenomenal and merely Relative for the Real or Actual, 
Quality being in fact pre-demanded in order to determine the amount of Quantity.
He again complains that Leibnizian system lacks the due recognition of the essential 
heterogeneity between 'Mind and Minds', between 'Will and Wills'. Yet even so, if 
there is possible mediation beyond the qualitative difference between the two 
heterogeneous self-manifestations, he would remain Leibnizian. Finally in Aids to 
Reflection, he discloses what sort of mediation he has in mind. He writes:
the Will is pre-eminently the spiritual Constituent in our Being. But will any 
reflecting man admit, that his own Will is the only and sufficient determinant of 
all he is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the 
system to which he belongs, and to the pre-established Fitness of the Objects and 
Agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the will, though, 
doubtless, with it likewise? a process, which the co-instantaneous y e t
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reciprocal action of the Air and the vital Energy of the Lungs in Breathing may 
help to render intelligible.72
He expects mediation by inspiration. 'Breath' here is not at all a capricious 
allusion.73 Drawing on 'breath', he in fact hints at 'co-instantaneity' and 
'reciprocity' between God and man and suggests that this is the way to mediate the 
two.
In Aids to Reflection Coleridge makes many biblical references to explain his 
faith in inspiration.74 But he does not forget that his theory of inspiration is for the 
mediation between the two self-manifestations, that is, between the two Protheses. 
He explains how the spirit reaches the deepest human Prothesis as follows:
If any reflecting mind be surprised that the aids of the Divine Spirit should be 
deeper than our Consciousness can reach, it must arise from the not having 
attended sufficiently to the nature and necessary limits of human Consciousness. 
For the same impossibility exists as to the first acts and movements of our own 
will—the farthest back our recollection can follow the traces, never leads us to 
the first foot-mark—the lowest depth that the light of our Consciousness can
72 AR, p. 75.
73 See, for example, CN, IV, 4689 where he writes, 'Life without breathing— not 
always a positive torture of deprivation of Breathing, but often a mere negative—not 
to breathe— fearfully symbolical of a spiritual Life, but why say I Spiritual only?— 
of Life without continued successive feeling of dependence on God, of food of Life asked 
each moment & granted—0  recollect in waking thought, that every free Breath is = 
God has not yet rejected me.1
74 For example, Coleridge writes with a characteristically Coleridgean 
modification,'we may believe the Apostle's assurance, that not only doth "the Spirit 
aid our infirmities;" that is, act on the Will by a predisposing influence from  
without, as it were, though in a spiritual manner, and without suspending or 
destroying its freedom ... but that in regenerate souls it may act in the will; that 
uniting and becoming one with our will and spirit, it may "make intercession for 
us;" nay, in this intimate union taking upon itself the form of our infirmities, may 
intercede for us "with groanings that cannot be uttered."' AR, p. 78. The biblical 
passages are from Rom 8. 26.
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visit even with a doubtful Glimmering, is still at an unknown distance from the 
Ground:75
Conscience is thus 'the Ground1, or rather, 'the Unground' of consciousness.75 And he 
expects 'the Divine Spirit' to mediate this human Prothesis with the original 
Prothesis. He argues that only by this mediation, or, 'a quickening inter­
communion with the Divine Spirit', one may receive 'the mystery of Redemption, 
that this has been rendered possible for us.' Then he quotes from 1 Cor 15. 45: 'And 
so it is written: the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a 
quickening Spirit.'77
It is in Aids to Reflection that Coleridge draws the first complete Pentad with 
Mesothesis at the centre.
1. Prothesis
2. Thesis 4. Mesothesis 3. Antithesis
5. Synthesis78
He explains Prothesis here in the same way as he did in the previous notebook 
entries. He says that it is
75 AR, p. 79.
75 Coleridge writes, 'How do you define the human mind? the answer must at least 
contain, if not consist of, the words, "a mind capable of Conscience" For Conscience 
is no synonime of Consciousness, nor any mere expression of the same a modified by 
the particular Object. On the contrary, a Consciousness properly human (i.e. Self- 
consciousness), with the sense of moral responsibility, presupposes the Conscience, 
as its antecedent Condition and Ground.' AR, p. 125.
77 AR, p. 217.
78 Aids, pp. 180-2 note.
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a Point not contained in the line but independent, and (in the language of that 
School [Pythagorean]) transcendent to all production, which it caused but did not 
partake in. Facit, non p a titu r. This was the Punctum invisibile, et 
presuppositum: and in this way the Pythagoreans guarded against the error of 
Pantheism, into which the later schools fell.79
Then he makes a curious comment on it. He writes, 'Taken absolutely, this finds its 
application in the Supreme Being alone, the Pythagorean TETRACTYS; the INEFFABLE 
NAME, to which no Image dare be attached.1 Mesothesis is here understood as what 
was Synthesis in the previous speculations, that is, 'the INDIFFERENCE' between 
Thesis and Antithesis. He explains the whole diagram, 'the absolutely Real as the 
PROTHESIS; the subjectively  Real as the THESIS; the objectively  Real as the 
ANTITHESIS; and affirm, that Idea is the INDIFFERENCE of the two'. Also curiously, he 
says little of Synthesis. Yet there is a document which allows us to guess what he has 
in mind about these points. It is in July 1833 when he is recorded as offering a new 
interpretation of Mesothesis. He says, 'Imitation is the mesothesis of Likeness and 
Difference; the Difference is as essential to it as the Likeness; for without the 
Difference, it would be Copy or Fac-simile. But, to borrow a term from astronomy, 
it is a librating mesothesis'.80 Carl Woodring, the editor of Table Talk, supplies the 
explanation of 'Libration' from John Bonnycastle, An Introduction to Astronomy (4th 
ed. 1803) p. 431. Bonnycastle writes, 'LIBRATION, an apparent irregularity of the 
moon's motion, which makes her appear to librate about her axis, in such a manner 
that the parts of her eastern and western limbs become visible and invisible 
alternately1. Thus Mesothesis mediates not only between positive Thesis and negative 
Antithesis but also between Prothesis and Synthesis in their sameness and difference 
and their co-instantaneity and reciprocity. It is not surprising that Mesothesis
79 Ibid.
80 7T, I, p. 408.
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finally becomes 'The Spirit1 in the Christian Pentad.81 Accordingly, the upper half 
of Pentad which is the divine Trinity and the lower half which is the human trinity 
are mediated at the centre of the Pentad. Both divine and human self-manifestations 
involve their respective trinities. And when he finally places 'The Spirit' in the 
middle, he achieves the final form of Coleridgean Trinity of God, man, and nature. 
Relying on this development he says in 'Essay on Faith1, in spite of his own caution 
that 'no Image dare be attached' to Prothesis, that Synthesis is 'the only possible 
likeness or image of the prothesis, or identity, and therefore the required proper 
character of man.'82
IV. Thus Coleridge's long metaphysical speculation comes back to its starting point. 
In 'The Eolian Harp' (1795) he writes:
Whilst thro' my half-clos'd eyelids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main,
And tranquil muse upon tranquillity;
Full many a thought uncall'd and undetain'd,
And many idle flitting phantasies,
Traverse my indolent and passive brain 
As wild and various , as the random gales 
That swell or flutter on this subject Lute!
81 See CM, III, p. 416. This Christian Pentad is reproduced in the front page of 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit
82 LR, IV, p. 431. Coleridge makes many extensive marginal notes to Edward 
Irving's Sermons, Lectures and Occasional Discourses, 3 vols (London, 1828) and 
discusses about the Pentad. In one of them he writes, 'The Father begetteth the Son, 
while he proceedeth in and with the Spirit, even as the Spirit proceedeth from and 
with the Father thro' the Son. For the same reason, it Again—if there can be no 
mesothesis, still less, if less could be, can there be any proper Synthesis, or 
Compound of both—only that here a higher form is substituted: and to express this, 4 
instead of omitted I say that the Synthesfis] is exchanged for that absolute Form, of 
which it is a dim and imperfect analogon.' CM, III, p. 16.
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And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversly fram'd 
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze,
As once the Soul of each, and God of all?83
Here he draws a parallel between the genesis without and the epigenesis within. It is 
the spirit, 'one intellectual Breeze' which blows without and within his mind 
simultaneously. His expectation of the mediation by the spirit is expressed by the 
phrase 'what if'. But here the human mind is still 'passive'. When it becomes 
active, or, productive, it invites the problem of two natures. About a year after the 
publication of 'Dejection Ode' he writes in a Notebook:
My nature requires another Nature for its support, & reposes only in another 
from the necessary Indigence of its Being.—Intensely similar, yet not the same; 
or may I venture to say, the same indeed, but dissimilar, as the same Breath sent 
with the same force, the same pauses, & with the same melody pre-imaged in the 
mind, into the Flute and the Clarion shall be the same Soul diversly incarnate.84
Again the spirit is expected to mediate, or, penetrate through the two natures which 
are 'intensely similar, yet not the same'. In October 1819 when he is preparing for 
Aids to Reflection, he writes in a Notebook:
the particular Will could not be awaked and realized into an actual Volition but by 
an impulse and communication from the universal Will. The latter is the vital 
air, which the particular Will breathes, but which must have entered & excited
83 Poems, p. 52.
84 CN, I, 1679.
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the faculty in-order -to as the previous and enabling Condition of the first 
disposition to breathe, as well as of the power of drawing the Breath. It must be 
"in us both to will and to do." And not only at the beginning but thro1 the whole 
Life do we need this prevenient Grace—85
Here two natures, or, the divine and human self-manifestations are related by their 
breath, that is, by their 'co-instantaneity' and 'reciprocity'. Finally, towards the 
end of his life he restates his earliest metaphysical speculation. He depicts the 
simultaneity between the genesis and the epigenesis by the expression which can be 
read as either. He writes: 'And the capacious and capable Ether was the work of God 
the Spirit, as the Spirit singly. It was the Breath of God breathed on the closed Eye­
lids of the Darkness, the Brooding and Hush that smoothing the convulsive Death- 
throe into the smooth Sleep made Death and the Darkness parturient at the voice of 
the heavenly Lucina.'88
85 CN, IV, 4 6 1 1 .
86 IS, p. 393.
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